ON July 1， 2014， Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abes administration adopted a cabinet resolution to “reinterpret” the constitution and so allow the country to exercise collective self-defense. Since Abe took office in December 2012， his administration has consistently sought to break with the restrictions of Article 9 of Japans pacifist constitution， which renounces“the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.” The resolution in effect reflects Abes ultimate aim. Although the Abe administration has issued specific restrictions on the right to collective self-defense， and there are constraints on Japans use of military force， this reinterpretation nonetheless marks a turning point in Japans historical course since WWII. The removal of the ban on the right of collective self-defense implies abandonment of Japans anti-war defense system and therefore reclamation of its right to use military force， not only domestically but also internationally. Marine territorial disputes， historical issues， notably that of the socalled comfort women in Japan-occupied Asian countries forced to work in military brothels， and not least Japans rampant political right deviation， have created serious tensions between Japan and its Asian neighbors. The removal of the ban on the right of collective self-defense is a political shot in the arm for the Abe administration， and endorses enhancement of Japans military function within the Japan-U.S. alliance. But as regards peace and stability in Asia， it confirms Japans propensity to be a trouble maker in the region.

Disaster for Japans Constitutional History

The right of collective self-defense originates in the United Nations Charter. It holds that should a country confront a major security threat it has the right to unite with others in using force as self-defense. The scope of such use of force can be within its homeland or overseas， for instance in joint actions against security threats to the international community. UN-authorized peacekeeping operations and armed interventions fall within the scope of collective self-defense， which is a type of international liability. However， in Japans contemporary politics the right of collective self-defense equates with the right of war， but not with international liability as defined in Japans postwar constitution.

After WWII， Japans constitution explicitly stipulated that in the event of invasion of its territory Japan has the right of selfdefense， namely the right to defend and safeguard homeland security. Japan must otherwise strictly abide by the “peace”clause， whereby it does not use force or military means to resolve international conflicts or to achieve national interests and objectives. Japans post-WWII defense system linked up with its pacifist constitution， and this pursuit of pacifism helped to reinvigorate Japans economy. As a civilian power， Japan has created a remarkable image within the international community. As a country of superb economic and industrial strength， Japan shunned large-scale arms development and kept its distance from great power struggles. More importantly， sticking to the anti-war constitutional principle reflected Japans abandonment of its WWII militarist aggression.

Japan believes that changes in the international security environment endorse its right to collective self-defense. But this right is justifiable only on the understanding that its obtainment conforms to the constitutional rules of amendment and public opinion under majority rules. In spite of protests and opposition from the Japanese public， however， the Abe administration obtained this right solely through its seat advantages in Japans House of Representatives and House of Councilors. Such blatant circumvention of constitutional amendment procedure through use of a cabinet decision undoubtedly implies a retrogressive trend in Japans postwar democratic politics. It is an act that will undoubtedly generate doubt and concern.

The veto of the “peace” clause means that Japan now legally owns the right of war – a monumental change in the countrys postwar state system. To prevent such a dramatic change， Japans constitution explicitly stipulates a “high threshold” for constitutional amendment which entails the consent of two-thirds of senators and two-thirds of votes in a referendum. Cognizant of the impossibility of amending the constitution in short order， the Abe administration instead adopted the euphemistically expressed cabinet decision to “reinterpret” Article 9. But no matter how it is termed， the Japanese government has nevertheless invalidated Japans pacifist constitu-tion through an unconstitutional political procedure. The Asahi Shimbun condemned the resolution in its July 2 front page headline “the most shameful day in Japans constitutional history.”

What Will Japan Become？

The majority of the Japanese people most certainly do not support this move by the Abe administration. There were several shifts in Japanese public opinion following publication from May 16 to July 20 of related reports by the Abe administration. Polls show that 53.4 percent of the Japanese public opposed removal of the ban on the right of collective self-defense， as compared to the 37.5 percent that supported it. Moreover， Abes approval rating dropped from 80 percent in March 2013 to 48 percent in July 2014. This overt recalcitrance by the Abe administration implies that Japan is not fundamentally reconciled to being a “civilian power.” The countrys allout effort to enter the great power politics arena， therefore， can be interpreted as the new direction of Japans national development.

Abes speech on the “reinterpretation” painted it as Japans “second Meiji Restoration.” The Meiji Restoration of 1864 created a Westernized Japan of significantly greater strength. Under the concept of “departing Asia for Europe，” Japan regarded its Asian neighbors as dishes on a menu， and aggression and expansion as the means to make Japan even stronger. Its consequent rampant militarism caused grave suffering and harm to these Asian countries. The Abe administrations present aim seems once again to strive for supremacy. Although Abe insists he is an advocate of “positive pacifism，” his actual intention is to break with the restrictions of the pacifist constitution through rearmament and building up the national defense industry， so enabling Japan to showcase its military might.

Although there are limitations on the Abe administrations lifting of the ban on military operations， it is clear that Japans intended direction is towards becoming a military power. For example， removing the ban on military operations involves more support for U.S. military and combat actions， including escorting U.S. warships and offering missile defense. However， Abe has also stated that Japans operations will provide military help and defense commitments to friendly countries. Selling submarines to Australia has opened up Japans arms exports， and its armament industry has been defined as a new growth point. Japan has also cast a covetous eye on recent sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea， having promised to supply patrol boats to the Philippines and Vietnam. The Abe administration moreover advocates the will and determination to “counterbalance China.” This overtly hostile and confrontational policy towards China portends Japans export of both weapons and so-called security commitments to Asia. Japan under the Abe administration has consequently been a main source of tension in Asias regional security. Removal of the ban on the collective self-defense right will further complicate the situation in the East China Sea and South China Sea， possibly to the point of triggering a new arms race in Asia.

Profits Seized by a Third Party

Of greatest concern to the international community is Japans historical revisionism of its ideology. After taking office， Abe refuted the war atrocities attributable to Japanese militarism during WWII. He also denied that the Japanese army forced women into sexual slavery， saying that a reexamination was necessary of the Kono statement in 1993 and of the Murayama speech in 1995 in this connection. On December 26， 2013， Prime Minister Abe again visited the Yasukuni Shrine and openly paid homage to Japanese militarist war criminals. In his opinion， their actions merit veneration and also constitute the intellectual impetus and precious legacy through which Japan will become stronger. Several New York Times editorials have questioned and criticized Abes historical revisionism.

The U.S.s reaction to the recent moves by the Abe administration has been to put aside the justice and principles that the relevant historical problems entail. In conniving with and supporting Japans strategy transition the U.S. is doing everything possible to commandeer help towards balancing China， and gladly anticipates profiting from any confrontation between China and Japan. The Obama administration openly supports Japans removal of the ban on the right of collective self-defense through violating the constitution， and also disregards Abes historical revisionism. Its response to the worsening ChinaJapan and ROK-Japan relations that historical and territorial disputes have sparked off – rather than objectively and justly requesting Japan to exercise restraint and examine its words and deeds – has been to press South Korea to maintain internal solidarity of the U.S.-led alliance system. Obama made no mention of historical problems while in Japan on his April 2014 four-nation Asia tour. During the visit that followed to South Korea， however， he stated that the forced recruitment of comfort women during WWII constituted a savage injury to human rights.

In the face of Chinas rise， there has been no greater overlap of the U.S. and Japans common strategic interests since the end of the Cold War. Bearing in mind the extent of their media clout， the two countries have done their utmost through public diplomacy platforms to promote the notion of an “expanding” China that “forces”the U.S. and Japan to be tough on it in accordance with the expectations of many Asian countries. The root of the problem lies in the U.S.s intent to maintain supremacy and Japans desire to hitch its wagon to the U.S. and rapidly rebuild its military， diplomatic and strategic strength as a great power. East Asian politics have not been this grotesque since the end of the Cold War.