By Wang Jin

After nearly two decades of war， representatives of the U.S. Government and Afghanistan militant group Taliban signed a peace deal in the Qatari capital city of Doha on February 29. For the U.S.， the agreement is an acceptable way to end its military presence in Afghanistan. Yet， for Afghanistan， it actually points to the beginning of further turbulence， rather than opening the way to peace.

According to the long-awaited pact， the U.S. and NATO will withdraw their military troops from Afghanistan within 14 months and release Taliban prisoners held by both the U.S. and the Afghan Government if the Taliban honors its counter-terrorism commitments. The U.S. also promised to lift all sanctions against the Taliban and provide economic assistance to Afghanistan without any interference in its internal affairs. In addition to undertaking not to provide asylum to terrorists and extremists， the Taliban agreed to start negotiations with the Afghan Government to determine a ceasefire schedule.

Leaving Afghanistan

In short， the deal could be perceived as a major victory for the Taliban， but a total defeat for the U.S.

First， the U.S. has officially recognized the political status of the Taliban. In 2001， when the Taliban regime was overthrown by a U.S.-led coalition， the George W. Bush administration claimed that it wanted to establish a “democratic” political system to construct a national consensus in Afghanistan and declined the Talibans participation in the process. The Taliban was then considered a “protector of terrorists” that could not be included in a“democratic” political system. However， with the resurgence of the Taliban in the following years， Afghanistans future could not be forged without its involvement. After longstanding negotiations since 2013， the U.S. fi nally recognizes the role of the Taliban through the peace deal.

Meanwhile， the Ghani administrations infl uence may not be able to expand to many areas， with the gap between it and provincial authorities growing after the deal. Many provincial governments are controlled or influenced by local military groups and strong tribal clans， which can be traced back to the 1980s when they resisted the Soviet Unions invasion. After 1996， when the Taliban controlled nearly all parts of Afghanistan， these factions continued their resistance and fi nally came to power with the help of the U.S. in 2003.

The hostility between these local groups and the Taliban is still very strong and it is impossible for them to accept major political concessions to the Taliban or share power with it. Local groups and clans treat many provinces as their dominions， and orders from central authorities are not observed. With the emphasis on negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan Government in the deal， many local leaders may resist it and seek to protect themselves， thus the divisions between the central and local governments could deepen.

In addition， the withdrawal of U.S.-led troops may provo ke a new round of competition between regional countries. India and Iran are the Afghan Governments major supporters， and both see the Taliban as an extremist movement. Pakistan hopes to gain more infl uence in Afghanistan through consolidating ties with the Taliban， its traditional ally. Russia and Central Asian states will closely monitor the situation and hope that the Taliban will not support extremists on their territories.

The peace deal is a major diplomatic victory for the Taliban， while it helps Trump fulfill his promise in the 2016 presidential campaign to bring U.S. military personnel home. However， the future of Afghanistan is still unclear. After 18 years of intervention in Afghanistan， the U.S. is leaving without a proper and secured mechanism for the Afghan people， and a new round of confl icts and confrontations may be on the horizon.