■ 尚君奇

關(guān)于堅持一個中國原則的共識

■ 尚君奇

海峽兩岸關(guān)系協(xié)會成立后，根據(jù)國務(wù)院臺灣事務(wù)辦公室的授權(quán)，堅持以一個中國原則作為“兩會”交往和事務(wù)性商談的基礎(chǔ)，從1992年3月至1993年4月，與臺灣海峽交流基金會主要就“海峽兩岸公證書使用”、“開辦海峽兩岸掛號函件遺失查詢及補(bǔ)償業(yè)務(wù)”兩項(xiàng)議題進(jìn)行商談。中國公證員協(xié)會和中國通信學(xué)會郵政專業(yè)委員會分別參加了這兩項(xiàng)商談。

商談初始，如何表述堅持一個中國原則，成為“兩會”商談中的一個突出問題。海協(xié)主張，一個中國原則是“兩會”交往、事務(wù)性商談的基礎(chǔ)，兩岸交往中產(chǎn)生的具體問題是一個國家內(nèi)部的特殊事務(wù)，應(yīng)本著一個中國原則，通過協(xié)商加以妥善解決。但海基會一方面按照臺灣大陸事務(wù)主管部門的要求，表示“沒有受權(quán)談一個中國問題”，另一方面又在商談中提出一些明顯違反一個中國原則的主張。例如，在解決兩岸公證書使用問題中，?；鶗岢霰日諊议g駐外使領(lǐng)館認(rèn)證的做法來處理祖國大陸公證書在臺灣的使用；在開辦兩岸掛號函件業(yè)務(wù)問題中，援引國家間通郵的做法。臺灣當(dāng)局回避討論表述堅持一個中國原則的問題，又企圖用商談達(dá)到政治目的，制造“兩個對等政治實(shí)體”的做法，使兩項(xiàng)本來單純的事務(wù)性議題復(fù)雜化。

事實(shí)表明，要進(jìn)行兩岸商談，首先要確立堅持一個中國原則的共識，沒有這樣一個共識作為基礎(chǔ)，兩岸事務(wù)性商談無法進(jìn)行。因此，在“兩會”1992年3月第一次工作性商談結(jié)束后，針對臺灣當(dāng)局的曲解，并考慮到部分臺灣民眾的疑慮，海協(xié)常務(wù)副會長唐樹備就兩岸事務(wù)性商談中堅持一個中國原則的態(tài)度問題，作了進(jìn)一步闡述。唐樹備指出，首先，商談要反映現(xiàn)實(shí)，一個中國是客觀事實(shí)。只有堅持一個中國原則，并考慮到兩岸存在不同制度的現(xiàn)實(shí)，才能實(shí)事求是、合情合理地處理海峽兩岸交往中的各種具體問題，真正維護(hù)兩岸同胞的正當(dāng)權(quán)益。第二，本來雙方對堅持一個中國的原則沒有分歧，這見之于兩岸雙方領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的談話，見之于臺灣當(dāng)局公布的有關(guān)文件。明明雙方都認(rèn)為是“一個中國”，偏偏臺灣當(dāng)局某些主管大陸事務(wù)的官員，不同意雙方“提一個中國”，不同意雙方本著一個中國原則處理兩岸交往中的問題。第三，我們提出在事務(wù)性商談中堅持一個中國原則，只是要雙方表明堅持一個中國原則的態(tài)度，并不是要與海基會討論一個中國的涵義。至于表明堅持一個中國原則態(tài)度的方式，雙方可以協(xié)商。此后，海協(xié)將在兩岸事務(wù)性商談中堅持一個中國原則的態(tài)度概括為：海峽兩岸交往中的具體問題是中國的內(nèi)部事務(wù)，應(yīng)本著一個中國原則協(xié)商解決；在事務(wù)性商談中，只要表明堅持一個中國原則的態(tài)度，可以不涉及一個中國的政治涵義，表述的方式可以充分討論，并愿意聽取?；鶗团_灣各界人士的意見。

海協(xié)上述合理的主張在臺灣同胞中引起反響，也使臺灣當(dāng)局無法回避這個問題。臺灣當(dāng)局內(nèi)部出現(xiàn)了是否在事務(wù)性商談中應(yīng)表明一個中國原則態(tài)度的爭論。從4月起，經(jīng)過長達(dá)3個多月的討論，1992年8月1日，臺灣“國統(tǒng)會”做出關(guān)于一個中國涵義的結(jié)論。該結(jié)論稱：“海峽兩岸均堅持一個中國之原則，但雙方所賦予的涵義有所不同”；“1949年以后，中國處于暫時分裂的狀態(tài)，由兩個政治實(shí)體分治海峽兩岸”；“臺灣固為中國之一部分，但大陸亦為中國之一部分”。這份結(jié)論表明，臺灣當(dāng)局一方面鼓吹“兩岸分裂分治”，謀求與祖國大陸“對等政治實(shí)體”的地位，另一方面不得不表示“堅持一個中國之原則”的立場和承認(rèn)臺灣是中國領(lǐng)土一部分的事實(shí)。

鑒于臺灣當(dāng)局已做出“海峽兩岸均堅持一個中國原則”的表態(tài)，8月27日，海協(xié)負(fù)責(zé)人發(fā)表談話指出，確認(rèn)“海峽兩岸均堅持一個中國之原則”，對海峽兩岸事務(wù)性商談具有十分重要的意義，“它表明，在事務(wù)性商談中應(yīng)堅持一個中國原則已成為海峽兩岸的共識”。同年9月，“兩會”秘書長在廈門會面，就堅持一個中國原則的表述問題非正式交換意見。海協(xié)代表向?；鶗肀硎?，“臺灣方面關(guān)于一個中國原則的結(jié)論，說明雙方事務(wù)性商談中堅持一個中國原則已有共識。但我們不同意臺灣有關(guān)方面對一個中國內(nèi)涵的解釋，也不可能與?；鶗懻撽P(guān)于一個中國的內(nèi)涵”，建議?；鶗J(rèn)真考慮直接引用“海峽兩岸均堅持一個中國原則”的表述。

1992年10月27日至29日，海協(xié)與?；鶗谙愀圻M(jìn)行工作性商談。商談中，海協(xié)代表提出5種有關(guān)表述堅持一個中國原則的方案，?；鶗硪蚕群竽贸?種表述方案(5種書面表述方案、3種口頭表述方案)與海協(xié)代表進(jìn)行討論。其中第八種(口頭)表述方案是：“在海峽兩岸謀求國家統(tǒng)一的過程中，雙方雖均堅持一個中國之原則，但對一個中國的涵義，認(rèn)知各有不同?！焙；鶗矸Q此案為臺灣方面的底案，并建議“以口頭聲明方式各自表述”。香港商談結(jié)束后，11月1日，?；鶗戆l(fā)表書面聲明表示，有關(guān)事務(wù)性商談中一個中國原則的表述，“建議在彼此可以接受的范圍內(nèi)，各自以口頭方式說明立場”。海協(xié)研究了?；鶗牡诎藗€表述方案，認(rèn)為這個方案表明了臺灣方面謀求統(tǒng)一、堅持一個中國原則的態(tài)度；雖然?；鶗岢觥皩σ粋€中國的涵義，認(rèn)知各有不同”，但沒有具體論述臺灣方面的看法，而海協(xié)歷來主張在事務(wù)性商談中只要表明堅持一個中國原則的態(tài)度，不討論一個中國的政治涵義；鑒于?；鶗硎玖藞猿忠粋€中國原則、謀求國家統(tǒng)一的態(tài)度，因此，海協(xié)可以考慮與?；鶗髯砸钥陬^方式表達(dá)堅持一個中國原則的態(tài)度，提出希望?；鶗軌虼_認(rèn)這是臺灣方面的正式意見。11月3日，海基會發(fā)布新聞稿并致函海協(xié)，表示已征得臺灣有關(guān)方面的同意，“以口頭聲明方式各自表達(dá)”。在上述工作的基礎(chǔ)上，同日，海協(xié)副秘書長就此事與?；鶗貢L陳榮杰通電話時表示，這次“兩會”工作性商談，“在海峽兩岸事務(wù)性商談中表述一個中國原則的問題上取得了進(jìn)展”，“貴會建議采用貴我兩會各自以口頭聲明的方式表述一個中國原則。我們經(jīng)研究后，尊重并接受貴會的建議?？陬^表述的具體內(nèi)容，另行協(xié)商”。11月16日，海協(xié)致函?；鶗赋龊；鶗谙愀凵陶勚芯捅硎鰣猿忠粋€中國原則的態(tài)度“提出了具體表述內(nèi)容，其中明確了海峽兩岸均堅持一個中國的原則”；重申了同意以各自口頭表述的方式表明“海峽兩岸均堅持一個中國之原則”的態(tài)度，并提出海協(xié)口頭表述的要點(diǎn)：“海峽兩岸都堅持一個中國的原則，努力謀求國家統(tǒng)一。但在海峽兩岸事務(wù)性商談中，不涉及一個中國的含義。”并以附件的方式，將?；鶗谙愀厶岢龅牡诎藗€表述方案附在這封函中，作為雙方彼此接受的共識內(nèi)容。12月3日，?；鶗睾瘜Υ宋幢硎救魏萎愖h。?；鶗矎奈捶穸êf(xié)11月16日在函中附去的?；鶗谙愀凵陶勚刑岢龅牡诎朔N表述方案。

此后，“兩會”都認(rèn)為經(jīng)過協(xié)商達(dá)成了共識。構(gòu)成1992年“兩會”共識的就是上述兩段經(jīng)過協(xié)商、相互認(rèn)可的具體內(nèi)容。共識中，“兩會”都表明了“努力謀求國家統(tǒng)一”、“海峽兩岸均堅持一個中國原則”的基本態(tài)度。對于一個中國的政治含義，?；鶗硎尽罢J(rèn)知各有不同”，海協(xié)表示“在事務(wù)性商談中不涉及”，做了求同存異的處理。

“九二共識”雖然是各自以口頭方式表述的共識，但其過程和內(nèi)容均有明確的文件和文字記錄，是任何人、任何政治勢力都否定不了的。當(dāng)時臺灣媒體的報道與?；鶗奈募袑_(dá)成“九二共識”的情況都有明確的記載。1993年8月12日，海基會出版的《汪辜會談紀(jì)要》也明載“雙方同意一個中國原則由兩會各自采用口頭方式表述后，本會始積極考慮此項(xiàng)會談?！?/p>

達(dá)成“九二共識”的過程說明，各自以口頭方式是表述共識的方法，雙方表述的內(nèi)容是相互認(rèn)可、約定的上述兩段文字，而不是不加約束的、單方面的隨意性的各說各話；“九二共識”的核心是“海峽兩岸均堅持一個中國原則”。

“九二共識”是在雙方表明堅持一個中國原則態(tài)度的基礎(chǔ)上，照顧各方利益，擱置對一個中國政治含義的爭議，以靈活的方式求同存異而達(dá)成的，體現(xiàn)了兩岸中國人的政治智慧，對于建構(gòu)商談基礎(chǔ)、建立互信具有多層次的豐富含義。首先，共識的核心和靈魂是雙方共同表明了堅持一個中國原則的態(tài)度。沒有承認(rèn)一個中國原則的基礎(chǔ)，共識是不會達(dá)成的。第二，有了“海峽兩岸均堅持一個中國原則”的態(tài)度，就可以平等協(xié)商的精神和求同存異的務(wù)實(shí)態(tài)度擱置某些政治爭議，包括對一個中國政治含義的不同看法。否則，共識也是難以達(dá)成的。第三，表述共識的方式可以是靈活的，可以采取各自口頭表述的方式。在“九二共識”中，正是在雙方表明堅持一個中國原則態(tài)度的基礎(chǔ)上，暫不討論一個中國的政治含義，從而面向未來兩岸關(guān)系的發(fā)展，進(jìn)行務(wù)實(shí)的對話與談判?？梢哉f，“九二共識”就是在一個中國原則基礎(chǔ)上暫時擱置某些政治爭議的典范。祖國大陸十分珍視這樣的歷史經(jīng)驗(yàn)和來之不易的成果，兩岸同胞應(yīng)共同維護(hù)“兩會”商談的政治基礎(chǔ)。

海協(xié)成立之初，即于1992年1月8日致函?；鶗?，邀請?；鶗麻L、副董事長或秘書長率員訪問祖國大陸，就雙方聯(lián)系與合作事宜交換意見。海基會在復(fù)函中表示，愿意“于雙方便利之時機(jī)專程拜訪”。8月4日，海協(xié)會長汪道涵再次致函?；鶗麻L辜振甫，邀請他于當(dāng)年擇日擇地，“就當(dāng)前經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展及雙方會務(wù)諸問題，交流意見、洽商方案”，進(jìn)行“兩會”負(fù)責(zé)人會談。8月22日，辜振甫復(fù)函表示接受邀請，并提議在新加坡進(jìn)行會談。海協(xié)在9月30日的復(fù)函中對辜振甫接受邀請表示歡迎，并建議雙方有關(guān)人士在北京或祖國大陸其他地點(diǎn)進(jìn)行預(yù)備性磋商。

11月，“兩會”達(dá)成各自以口頭方式表述“海峽兩岸均堅持一個中國原則”的“九二共識”，確立了“兩會”商談的政治基礎(chǔ)，為實(shí)現(xiàn)汪辜會談創(chuàng)造了必要條件。

為保證“兩會”領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人會談成功，海協(xié)又多次致函?；鶗埡；鶗?fù)責(zé)人到北京就汪辜會談進(jìn)行預(yù)備性磋商。199 3年3月2 5日至27日，“兩會”舉行第三次工作性商談，為汪辜會談預(yù)備性磋商進(jìn)行準(zhǔn)備，并就“兩岸公證書使用查證”、“兩岸掛號函件查詢、補(bǔ)償事宜”兩項(xiàng)協(xié)議草案達(dá)成一致意見。4月8日至11日，“兩會”負(fù)責(zé)人在北京進(jìn)行汪辜會談預(yù)備性磋商，就會談的時間、地點(diǎn)、人員、議題及有關(guān)問題達(dá)成8項(xiàng)共識，其中確定汪辜會談的性質(zhì)是“民間性的、經(jīng)濟(jì)性的、事務(wù)性的、功能性的會談”，定于4月27日至28日舉行。對于會談地點(diǎn)，海協(xié)考慮到辜振甫受臺灣當(dāng)局有關(guān)規(guī)定限制不能來祖國大陸的情況，尊重辜振甫的提議，同意在新加坡舉行。預(yù)備性磋商期間，“兩會”負(fù)責(zé)人還草簽了《兩岸公證書使用查證協(xié)議》、《兩岸掛號函件查詢、補(bǔ)償事宜協(xié)議》。汪辜會談自此拉開序幕。

1993年4月2 7日上午10時，舉世矚目的汪辜會談在新加坡?；蚀髲B正式舉行。會談中，海協(xié)積極主張進(jìn)行兩岸經(jīng)濟(jì)合作，提出現(xiàn)階段應(yīng)把兩岸經(jīng)濟(jì)交流與合作放在兩岸關(guān)系的首要位置，政治上的歧異不應(yīng)當(dāng)妨礙經(jīng)濟(jì)合作；兩岸直接“三通”應(yīng)當(dāng)擺上議事日程；提出勞務(wù)、浦東與三峽建設(shè)、能源與資源開發(fā)、科技等方面的合作和共同籌備召開民間性經(jīng)濟(jì)交流會議等具體建議。會談氣氛良好，進(jìn)展基本順利，取得了積極成果。在兩岸經(jīng)濟(jì)交流問題上，達(dá)成“雙方均認(rèn)為應(yīng)加強(qiáng)兩岸經(jīng)濟(jì)交流，互補(bǔ)互利”的重要共識，并確定擇時擇地繼續(xù)商談臺商在祖國大陸投資權(quán)益保護(hù)與相關(guān)問題、兩岸工商界人士互訪等問題，磋商加強(qiáng)能源、資源的開發(fā)與交流的問題。在兩岸科技交流問題上，商定促進(jìn)科技人員互訪，交換科技研究出版物、探討科技名詞統(tǒng)一與產(chǎn)品規(guī)格標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化，共同促進(jìn)電腦及其他產(chǎn)業(yè)科技交流。在文教交流方面，進(jìn)一步商定青少年、新聞界交流的具體項(xiàng)目。“兩會”還商定建立聯(lián)系與會談制度，包括雙方相互給予經(jīng)商定的“兩會”會務(wù)人員適當(dāng)人出境往來與查驗(yàn)通關(guān)便利等。

4月29日上午，汪道涵與辜振甫簽署《汪辜會談共同協(xié)議》、《兩會聯(lián)系與會談制度協(xié)議》、《兩岸公證書使用查證協(xié)議》、《兩岸掛號函件查詢、補(bǔ)償事宜協(xié)議》等四項(xiàng)協(xié)議。

汪辜會談引起臺灣社會和國際輿論的廣泛關(guān)注，采訪會談的記者達(dá)300多人，其中臺灣記者有100 多人，美、日、德、法、英等主要通訊社都做了大量的報道。

汪辜會談是1949年以來，兩岸高層人士以民間名義公開進(jìn)行的最高層次的會談，它的影響力遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過會談成果本身。江澤民指出，“汪辜會談是成功的，是有成果的，它標(biāo)志著海峽兩岸關(guān)系邁出了歷史性的重要一步”；“汪辜會談所以取得成功，主要是因?yàn)榉从沉藘砂锻案郯耐⒑Ｍ鈴V大華人要求兩岸接觸商談、共同合作、發(fā)展經(jīng)濟(jì)、振興中華的愿望”。臺灣方面認(rèn)為這次會談“跨出了兩岸接觸的第一步”，是“兩岸民間交流邁向制度化的里程碑”，“是近半個世紀(jì)以來兩岸關(guān)系從對峙走向和平統(tǒng)一的一個重大發(fā)展關(guān)鍵”。

汪辜會談對于兩岸接觸與談判，乃至兩岸關(guān)系的發(fā)展，具有深遠(yuǎn)的歷史性意義。

首先，汪辜會談建立了一個中國原則基礎(chǔ)上兩岸制度化協(xié)商的機(jī)制，沖擊了臺灣當(dāng)局“不接觸、不妥協(xié)、不談判”的“三不政策”，使談判成為臺灣同胞能夠普遍接受的事實(shí)與觀念。堅持一個中國原則，兩岸間就可以進(jìn)行平等談判；通過兩岸談判，兩岸關(guān)系就能穩(wěn)定和發(fā)展。

其次，汪辜會談為海峽兩岸在一個中國原則基礎(chǔ)上平等協(xié)商樹立了典范。汪辜會談體現(xiàn)了海協(xié)與?；鶗嗷プ鹬?、實(shí)事求是、平等協(xié)商、求同存異的精神，從實(shí)踐上說明了在一個中國原則基礎(chǔ)上的協(xié)商，是一種務(wù)實(shí)、平等的協(xié)商，并不會像臺灣當(dāng)局所說的“矮化”臺灣；說明了只要在一個中國原則的基礎(chǔ)上談起來，可以暫時擱置某些政治爭議，可以在此基礎(chǔ)上求同存異地解決兩岸關(guān)系中的一些問題，可以增強(qiáng)互信、累積共識；也說明了海峽兩岸的中國人完全可以在一個中國原則的基礎(chǔ)上，找到雙方平等談判的適當(dāng)方式。

第三，汪辜會談及其成果，有力地推動了兩岸經(jīng)貿(mào)往來和民間交流的發(fā)展，凝聚了兩岸同胞同是中國人的民族認(rèn)同。汪辜會談是在蓬勃發(fā)展的兩岸經(jīng)貿(mào)往來和民間交流下催生的，集中體現(xiàn)了兩岸同胞要接觸、要交流、要合作的強(qiáng)烈的民族情感與民族意愿。祖國大陸方面在汪辜會談中倡導(dǎo)的加強(qiáng)兩岸經(jīng)濟(jì)合作、發(fā)展民族共同利益的精神和內(nèi)容，不僅為20年來兩岸經(jīng)濟(jì)交流與合作的發(fā)展提供了豐富的養(yǎng)分，而且對于今天兩岸關(guān)系的改善和發(fā)展仍具有現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。

Following its establishment, between March 1992 and April 1993, on the authority of the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Of fi ce and on the basis of adhering to the one-China principle during exchanges and routine discussions, the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS)carried out talks with the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF)on the topics of “the adoption of cross-Strait notarized documents” and “setting up a cross-Strait registered mail inquiry and compensation service.” The China Notaries Association and the Professional Committee of the China Institute of Communications participated in each of the respective discussions.

During the initial talks between the two sides, the one-China principle became a prominent issue. The ARATS suggested that the one-China principle should be the basis on which the two sides carry out exchanges and discussions,and that speci fi c issues arising in the course of cross-Strait exchanges were China’s internal affairs and should therefore be properly solved through consultation on the basis of the one-China principle. However, in accordance with a requirement of the Mainland Affairs Council, the SEF stated that it did not have the authority to discuss the one-China principle. During the talks the SEF also expressed several opinions that clearly violated the one-China principle. For example, when addressing the issue of adopting cross-Strait notarized documents, the SEF proposed that the two countries’ embassies and consulates should handle the adoption of the mainland’s notarized documents in Taiwan. While discussing the issue of setting up a cross-Strait registered postal service, the SEF also talked about“postal links between the two countries.” The Taiwan authorities’ avoidance of discussing or mentioning the one-China principle was an attempt to use the talks to achieve political aims and a way of creating two political entities on equal footing, and it complicated two originally simple and routine issues.

Facts show that to carry out cross-Strait talks, there must fi rst be consensus on the one-China principle. Without a consensus on this, there can be no routine cross-Strait discussions. As a result, at the end of the fi rst working-level talks between the ARATS and the SEF in March 1992, to counter the Taiwan authorities’ misinterpretation and taking into account the doubts of some of the Taiwan people, the ARATS’s executive vice-chairman Tang Shubei elaborated on the issue of adhering to the one-China principle during routine talks. Tang Shubei pointed out, fi rst of all, that the talks should reflect reality, and that the existence of one China was an objective fact. He said that only by adhering to the one-China principle and taking into account the reality that each side has its own system, will they be able to seek truth from facts, amicably and reasonably deal with various speci fi c issues in cross-Strait exchanges, and truly safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Second, he pointed out that neither side had originally disputed the one-China principle,which could be seen from conversations between the leaders of both sides and relevant documents released by the Taiwan authorities. Therefore, both sides obviously believed in one China, and only a few of fi cials in charge of mainland affairs from the Taiwan authorities objected to expressing that there is only one China and disagreed that both sides should deal with issues in cross-Strait exchanges on the basis of the one-China principle. Third, Tang Shubei pointed out that adhering to the one-China principle during the routine discussions had been proposed simply so that both sides could make clear their attitude of adhering to the one-China principle, and not so that the ARATS could discuss with the SEF the connotations of the one-China principle. He even went so far as to suggest that both sides could negotiate how to adhere to the one-China principle. Afterwards, Tang Shubie summarized that during cross-Strait routine talks the following points related to the one-China principle should be adhered to: speci fi c issues in cross-Strait exchanges are the internal affairs of China and they should be discussed and resolved on the basis of the one-China principle; during routine discussions, both sides need only acknowledge that they adhere to the one-China principle and need not discuss the political connotations of the one-China principle, and the manner in which this should be acknowledged could be fully discussed and the ARATS was willing to listen to the views of the SEF and Taiwanese people from all sectors of society.

The ARATS’s reasonable stance provoked a reaction from compatriots in Taiwan, which meant the Taiwan authorities could not avoid the issue. Subsequently, a debate raged within the Taiwan authorities as to whether they should make clear their position on the one-China principle during routine talks. Following three months of discussion,on August 1, 1992, Taiwan’s National Uni fi cation Council issued its conclusion on the meaning of one China: “Both sides of the Taiwan Strait adhere to the one-China principle,but the two sides differ over the meaning ascribed to it.…Since 1949, China has been temporarily divided, with two political entities controlling the two sides of the Strait….Taiwan is a part of China, but the mainland is also part of China.” This conclusion clearly states that the Taiwan authorities, on the one hand, advocate “two political entities controlling the two sides of the Strait” and seeks the status of an “equal political entity.” On the other hand, it expresses adherence to the one-China principle and recognizes the fact that Taiwan is a part of Chinese territory. Seeing as the Taiwan authorities stated that “both sides of the Taiwan Strait adhere to the one-China policy,” on August 27, the head of the ARATS issued a statement confirming that both sides of the Taiwan Strait adhering to the one-China policy was of great significance for cross-Strait routine talks as “it shows that adhering to the one-China principle during routine talks has already become the consensus on both sides of the Strait.” In September of the same year, the secretary-generals of the ARATS and the SEF met in Macao to formally exchange views on issues relating to expressing adherence to the one-China principle. The representative from the ARATS said to the representative from the SEF that, “The Taiwan sides’ conclusion on the one-China principle explained that both sides are in consensus that they should adhere to the one-China principle during routine talks. But we do not agree with the relevant Taiwan authorities’ explanation of the connotations of there being one China, nor are we able to discuss with the SEF the connotations of there being one China.” The ARATS’s representative also recommended that the SEF seriously consider directly stating that “both sides of the Strait adhere to the one-China principle.”

From October 27 to 29, 1992, the ARATS and the SEF carried out working-level talks in Hong Kong. During the talks, the ARATS’s representative proposed fi ve points related to expressing adherence to the one-China principle.The SEF’s representative proposed eight such points (five written and three verbal) to be discussed with the ARATS’s representative. The eighth (verbal) point was, “In the process of both sides of the Taiwan Strait seeking national reunification, though both sides adhere to the one-China principle, they have different understandings of the meaning of one China.” The SEF’s representative called this the Taiwan sides’ sine qua non, and suggested that each side should “state orally their stance.” On November 1, after the talks in Hong Kong had concluded, the SEF’s representative issued a written statement on acceptance of the one-China principle during routine talks, which recommended that both sides should, within mutually acceptable limits, state verbally their stance on the matter. The ARATS studied the SEF’s eighth point and felt that it showed that the Taiwan side was seeking reunification and adherence to the one-China principle. Although the SEF had suggested both sides “have a different understanding of the meaning of one China,” it had not specifically set forth the Taiwan side’s views, and the ARATS had always advocated only adhering to the one-China principle and not discussing the meaning of “one China.” In view of the SEF’s attitude of adhering to the one-China principle and seeking national reuni fi cation,the ARATS was also willing to consider, together with the SEF, verbally expressing their adherence to the one-China principle, and it expressed its hope that the SEF could con fi rm that this was the formal view of the Taiwan side. On January 3, the SEF issued a press release and wrote a letter to the ARATS stating that it had received permission from relevant parties in Taiwan for each side to make a verbal statement. On the basis of the above work, that same day,the ARATS deputy secretary-general phoned the secretarygeneral of the SEF, Chen Rong-jye, regarding this matter and stated that the recent working-level talks between the ARATS and SEF had “achieved progress on the issue of mentioning the one-China principle during routine talks,”and that, following their research, the ARATS respected and accepted the SEF’s suggestion that both parties should make verbal statements expressing their adherence to the one-China principle, and that the specific content of the verbal statements would require separate consultations. On November 16, the ARATS sent a letter to the SEF pointing out that at the talks in Hong Kong the SEF had “proposed specific content, which explicitly stated that both sides of the Strait adhere to the one-China principle,” and reiterated their agreement to stating verbally that “both sides of the Strait adhere to the one-China principle” and proposed the main points for the verbal statements: “Both sides of the Strait adhere to the one-China principle and are striving for national reuni fi cation. But the meaning of “one China” shall not be covered in cross-Strait routine talks.” The ARATS also attached the SEF’s eighth Hong Kong proposal as content on which the two sides had reached consensus. On December 3, the SEF wrote back stating that they had no objection to this. The SEF has never denied that the ARATS attached the SEF’s eighth Hong Kong proposal to its letter dated November 16.

Afterwards, the ARATS and the SEF both believed they had reached a consensus through their consultations.The content of the above two paragraphs constitute the consensus reached through consultations and mutual recognition by the ARATS and the SEF in 1992. The consensus consisted of both the ARATS and the SEF clarifying their basic attitude of “striving for national reunification” and that “both sides of the Strait adhere to the one-China principle.” With regard to the political implications of “one China,” the SEF stated that the two sides had “different understandings,” and ARATS stated that this “was not the concern of routine talks,” and that both sides were seeking common ground while reserving differences.

Although the 1992 Consensus was expressed verbally,there are clear documents and written records of it, and it is undeniable by any person or political force. There are also clear records of the situation leading to the 1992 Consensus in the form of Taiwan media reports and SEF fi les from that time. On August 12, 1993, the minutes from the “Wang-Koo talks” (between Wang Daohan and Koo Chen-fu) were published by the SEF, which clearly showed that both the ARATS and the SEF verbally agreed on the one-China principle and to begin to actively consider it at the talks.

The process that led to the 1992 Consensus proves that it was expressed verbally by each side, that the content expressed by both sides was mutually agreed upon, rather than being unfettered and unilateral statements, and that the core of the 1992 Consensus was that both sides adhered to the one-China principle.

On the basis of expressing both sides’ adherence to the one-China policy, the 1992 Consensus took account of the interests of both sides, set aside the dispute over the political meaning of “one China,” used flexible means to seek common ground while reserving differences, re fl ected the political wisdom of Chinese people on both sides of the Strait, and was highly signi fi cant in establishing a basis for discussions and mutual trust. First of all, the heart and soul of the consensus was that both sides expressed their adherence to the one-China principle. Indeed, consensus could not have been reached without recognizing the one-China principle. Second, with both sides adhering to the one-China principle, they were able to set aside certain political differences, such as their differing views on the political meaning of “one China,” in the spirit of equal consultation and with a pragmatic attitude of seeking common ground while reserving differences. Had it not been for this, it would have been very difficult to reach a consensus. Third, the method of expressing consensus was flexible, with each side able to express it verbally. In the 1992 Consensus, it was on the basis of both sides adhering to the one-China principle that they temporarily agreed not to discuss the political implications of “one China” and were able to hold pragmatic talks and negotiations aimed at developing cross-Strait relations in the future. It could be said that the 1992 Consensus serves as a model for temporarily putting aside political differences on the basis of the one-China principle. The mainland valued this historical experience and hard-won achievement, and compatriots on both sides of the Strait should safeguard the political foundation established by the talks between the ARATS and the SEF.

On January 8, 1992, shortly after it was established,the ARATS sent a letter to the SEF’s chairman, vicechairman and secretary general inviting them to visit the mainland to exchange views on matters relating to contact and cooperation between the two sides. In its reply, the SEF expressed its willingness to arrange the “special visit for a mutually convenient time.” On August 4, ARATS’s president, Wang Daohan, sent another letter to the SEF’s chairman, Koo Chen-fu, inviting him to choose a date and time that year “to exchange views and negotiate plans on the issues of current economic development and both committees’ affairs,” and for the people in charge of the committees to talk. On August 22, Koo Chen-fu replied accepting the invitation and proposed the talks be held in Singapore. In its reply on September 30, the ARATS welcomed the invitation and suggested relevant personnel from both sides hold preparatory discussions in Beijing or another location on the mainland.

In November, the 1992 Consensus, which was reached after the ARATS and the SEF verbally agreed that both sides would adhere to the one-China principle, established the political basis for discussions between the two sides and created the necessary conditions for the Wang-Koo talks.

In order to ensure the success of talks between the leaders of the two committees, the ARATS sent numerous letters to the SEF, inviting the responsible members of the SEF to Beijing to carry out preparatory discussions on the Wang-Koo talks. Between March 25 and 27, 1993, the two committees held their third set of working-level talks to prepare for the preparatory discussions on the Wang-Koo talks, and to reach consensus on draft agreements regarding verifying cross-Strait notarized documents and a cross-Strait registered mail service. From April 8 to April 11,leaders of the two committees met in Beijing to carry out preparatory discussions for the Wang-Koo talks on issues such as time, location, personnel, topics and other issues.During the preparatory discussions, the Wang-Koo talks were designated as a summit on civil, economic, functional and routine affairs, and scheduled for April 27-28. With regard to the location, the ARATS took into account the fact that Koo Chen-fu was prohibited by relevant regulations of the Taiwan authorities from traveling to the mainland and agreed to his request that the talks be held in Singapore.During the preparatory discussions, leaders from both committees initialed the “Cross-Strait Agreement on Notarized Documents” and the “Cross-Strait Agreement on Registered Mail Inquiries and Compensation.” Afterwards,the Wang-Koo talks began.

On April 27, 1993, at 10am, the Wang-Koo talks,which had attracted worldwide attention, formally began at the Neptune Orient Line Building in Singapore. During the talks, the ARATS actively advocated cross-Strait economic cooperation and suggested that cross-Strait economic exchanges and cooperation should be given greatest prominence in cross-Strait relations in the current stage, and that political differences should not impede economic cooperation; proposed that establishing direct mail, transport and trade links (the Three Links) between the two sides should be placed at the top of the agenda; and put forward specific recommendations for cooperation in the areas of labor services, the development of Pudong and the Three Gorges, energy and resource development, and science and technology, as well as for joint preparations for convening non-governmental economic exchange meetings.The atmosphere at the talks was good and progress was smooth, with some positive results achieved. An important consensus was reached on the issue of cross-Strait economic exchanges which stated that, “Both sides believe they should strengthen cross-Strait economic exchanges for complimentary and mutual bene fi t,” and decided to select a time and place to continue talks about protecting the rights and interests of Taiwan businesspeople who invest on the mainland, cross-Strait industrial and commercial personnel visits and other issues, and to discuss strengthening energy and resource development and exchanges. On the issue of cross-Strait science and technology exchanges, both sides agreed to promote visits by scientific and technological personnel, exchange scientific and technological research publications, look into unifying scienti fi c and technological terminology and standardizing product specifications, and jointly promote exchanges in computing and other industrial science and technology. In terms of cultural and educational exchanges, both sides further agreed on specific projects for youth and news media exchanges. The ARATS and SEF also agreed to establish a system of contacts and talks,including both sides giving special clearance for appropriate personnel from the two committees to travel between Taiwan and the mainland.

In the afternoon of April 29, Wang Daohan and Koo Chen-fu signed the “Wang-Koo talks Joint Agreement,”“Cross-Strait Agreement on a System of Contacts and Talks,” “Cross-Strait Agreement on Notarized Documents”and the “Cross-Strait Agreement on Registered Mail Inquiries and Compensation.”

The Wang-Koo talks attracted widespread attention from Taiwan society as well as the international media, and more than 300 journalists covered the talks, including 100 journalists from Taiwan and the mainland. The major news agencies from the US, Japan, Germany, France and the UK also covered the talks in-depth.

The Wang-Koo talks were the highest level nongovernmental cross-Strait talks held by high level individuals since 1949, and their influence far exceeded their results. Jiang Zemin pointed out that, “The Wang-Koo talks were successful and achieved results, and it marks a historic step forward in cross-Strait relations.” He also stated that, “The reason the Wang-Koo talks was successful is because it reflected the wish of compatriots on both sides of the Strait, compatriots in Hong Kong and Macao and the vast number of overseas Chinese for cross-Strait contact and discussions, cooperation, economic development and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” The Taiwan side felt that the summit “was the fi rst step in establishing cross-Strait contact” and “a milestone in institutionalizing cross-Strait civilian exchanges,” as well as “a major key to developing cross-Strait relations from confrontation to peaceful reuni fi cation over the past half century.”

The Wang-Koo talks had far-reaching historical significance for cross-Strait contact and negotiations, and even for the development of cross-Strait relations.

First of all, the Wang-Koo talks established an institutionalized cross-Strait negotiation mechanism on the basis of the one-China principle; had a large impact on the Taiwan authorities’ “three noes policy” of no contact, no compromise and no negotiations; and made negotiations a fact and idea generally accepted by Taiwan compatriots.By adhering to the one-China principle, both sides could carry out negotiations on an equal footing, and through cross-Strait negotiations, cross-Strait relations stabilized and developed.

Second, the Wang-Koo talks established a model for cross-Strait consultations on an equal footing on the basis of the one-China principle. The Wang-Koo talks embodied the ARATS and the SEF’s spirit of mutual respect, seeking truth from facts, carrying out negotiations on an equal footing and seeking common ground while reserving differences. The talks proved that pragmatic and equal negotiations based on adherence to the one-China principle do not, as the Taiwan authorities put it, “dwarf” Taiwan. They proved that on the basis of the one-China principle, political differences can be temporarily put aside, issues relating to cross-Strait relations can be resolved by seeking common ground while reserving differences, and mutual trust can be enhanced and consensuses reached. They also proved that, on the basis of the one-China principle, Chinese people on both sides of the Strait are entirely capable of finding a suitable way to conduct bilateral negotiations on an equal footing.

Third, the Wang-Koo talks and their outcome provided a strong impetus for the development of cross-Strait economic, trade and civilian exchanges, and they strengthened the Chinese national identity of compatriots on both sides of the Strait. The Wang-Koo talks were the result of the fl ourishing development of economic, trade and civilian exchanges, and were the concentrated expression of intense national sentiment and desire for contact, exchanges and cooperation on the part of compatriots on both sides of the Strait. During the Wang-Koo talks, the spirit and content advocated by the mainland side of strengthening economic cooperation and developing common national interests has not only provided strong impetus to developing economic exchanges and cooperation over the past twenty years, but still has practical signi fi cance for improving and developing cross-Straits relations today.

MAINTAINING CONSENSUS ON THE ONE-CHINA PRINCIPLE

■ Shang Junqi