文/菲利普·T. 霍夫曼 譯/王飛云 審訂/白麗梅

By Philip T. Hoffman

How Europe Conquered the World過去歐洲何以征服世界

文/菲利普·T. 霍夫曼 譯/王飛云 審訂/白麗梅

ByPhilip T. Hoffman

Between 1492 and 1914, Europeans conquered 84 percent of the globe,establishing colonies and spreading their influence across every inhabited1inhabited有人居住的。continent. This was not inevitable. In fact, for decades, historians, social scientists, and biologists have wondered: Why and how did Europe rise to the top, even when societies in Asia and the Middle East were far more advanced?

[2] So far, satisfactory answers have been elusive. But this question is of the utmost importance given that Europe’s power determined everything from who ran the slave trade to who grew rich or remained mired in poverty.

[3] One might think the reasons for Europe’s dominance obvious: the Europeans were the first to industrialize, and they were immune to the diseases, such as smallpox, that devastated indigenous2indigenous土著的，土生土長的。populations. But the latter reason alone cannot explain the conquest of the Americas, since many young Native American warriors survived the epidemics. And it fails to explain Europe’s colonization of India, since the Indians had similar immunity. Industrialization also falls short as an explanation: the Europeans had taken control of more than 35 percent of the planet even before they began to industrialize. Of course,the lead Europeans took in developing the technology of guns, armed ships,and fortifications was critical. But all the other major civilizations in Asia had the same gunpowder technology, and many of them also fought with guns.

1492年至1914年間，歐

洲人征服了全球84%的袤土，建立起多處殖民地，把勢力范圍擴張到每一塊有人類居住的大陸，但這并非不可避免。事實上，歷史學(xué)家、社會科學(xué)家及生物學(xué)家在過去幾十年以來一直心存疑問：在當(dāng)時亞洲和中東社會都更為發(fā)達(dá)的情況下，歐洲為什么能夠崛起，又是憑借何種方式稱霸全球的呢？

[2]迄今為止，尚未找到令人滿意的答案。但是，解決這一問題卻至關(guān)重要，因為當(dāng)時由誰從事奴隸貿(mào)易，是財運亨通還是貧困潦倒，歸根到底都是由歐洲霸權(quán)決定的。

[3]人們或許認(rèn)為，歐洲處于主宰地位的原因顯而易見：首先，歐洲最先步入工業(yè)化；其次，歐洲人對天花等疾病具有免疫力，而這些疾病對土著居民卻是致命的。但是，美洲的許多年輕土著士兵卻在流行病中幸存下來，所以第二個原因并不能解釋歐洲人為什么能夠征服美洲。此外，印度人對這些疾病同樣具有免疫力，因此，這也不能作為印度淪為歐洲殖民地的緣由。同時，工業(yè)化也不足以解釋歐洲的統(tǒng)治地位：工業(yè)化開始之前，歐洲就已經(jīng)控制了世界上35%的地區(qū)。當(dāng)然，歐洲在槍支彈藥、武裝船只和防御工事等技術(shù)方面遙遙領(lǐng)先，這一點也至關(guān)重要。但亞洲其他主要文明國家同樣掌握了火藥技術(shù)，不少國家也在戰(zhàn)爭中使用槍支。

[4] So what did contribute to Europe’s success? Mostly, it derived from the incentives3incentive刺激因素，動機。that political leaders faced in Europe—incentives that drove them not just to make war, but also to spend huge sums on it. Yes, the European monarchs built palaces, but even the huge Chateau at Versailles cost King Louis XIV less than two percent of his tax revenue. The rest went to fighting wars. He and the other kings in Europe had been raised since childhood to pursue glory on the battlefield, yet they bore none of the costs involved—not even the risk of losing their thrones after a defeat. Leaders elsewhere faced radically different incentives, which kept many of them militarily weak. In China, for example,emperors were encouraged to keep taxes low and to attend to people’s livelihoods rather than to pursue the sort of military glory that obsessed European kings.

[4]那么，歐洲成功的原因究竟是什么？主要原因在于歐洲政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人面臨的刺激因素，這些因素不僅驅(qū)使他們發(fā)動戰(zhàn)爭，而且還為此投入巨額資金。沒錯，歐洲各國君主都對興建宮殿樂此不疲，但即使是規(guī)模宏大的凡爾賽宮也只耗費了國王路易十四不足2%的稅收，其余則投入戰(zhàn)爭。路易十四與歐洲其他各國君主一樣，從小受到的教育就是要在戰(zhàn)場上建功立業(yè)，然而，他們不需承擔(dān)任何風(fēng)險，甚至沒有戰(zhàn)敗后失去王位的風(fēng)險，而其他地方的統(tǒng)治者則面對著完全不同的刺激因素，從而導(dǎo)致這些國家軍事羸弱。例如，中國的皇帝從小被勸導(dǎo)關(guān)注民生，減輕稅負(fù)，而不像歐洲君主一樣癡迷于追求所謂的軍事榮耀。

[5] For this and a variety of other reasons, leaders outside of Europe could not match Europe’s innovations in warfare innovation. The huge sums of money showered on fighting in Europe gave military leaders the flexibility to buy new weapons and battleships and try out new tactics, fortifications, and methods of supply. In the process, they learned from their mistakes and improved their technologies. And because European countries were small and geographically close, they could easily learn from their rivals’ errors and copy their improvements. When the Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus constructed one of the earliest two-decked gunships in 1628, for example, it sank shortly after setting sail. But the Swedish navy and other navies across Europe swiftly learned from this failure, and by the eighteenth century they were building warships with two or more gun decks that were not only stable, but also had a longer range and were more maneuverable than seventeenth-century warships.

[5]基于以上以及其他種種緣由，歐洲以外的統(tǒng)治者們在戰(zhàn)爭創(chuàng)新方面無法和歐洲媲美。歐洲統(tǒng)治者在戰(zhàn)爭中投資巨大，這為軍事領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者購買新型武器和戰(zhàn)艦、嘗試新戰(zhàn)術(shù)、構(gòu)筑防御工事及補給方式等提供了便利條件。在這一過程中，他們吸取教訓(xùn)，改進技術(shù)。此外，歐洲各國由于面積較小，彼此鄰近，因而可以輕而易舉地吸取敵方經(jīng)驗教訓(xùn)。例如，瑞典國王古斯塔夫·阿道夫斯在1628年建造了世界上最早的雙甲板武裝戰(zhàn)艦，起航后不久便沉沒了。但瑞典海軍及歐洲其他各國海軍迅速從中汲取教訓(xùn)，到18世紀(jì)時，歐洲各國造出了雙甲板和多甲板戰(zhàn)艦。這些戰(zhàn)艦不僅性能穩(wěn)定，而且與17世紀(jì)的戰(zhàn)艦相比，航程更遠(yuǎn)、操控性更強。

[6] Outside of Europe, political and military conditions kept war innovations,particularly new gunpowder technology,from being advanced at the same relentless pace. China, for instance, had far less tax revenue to spend on the military than the Europeans did. In the late eighteenth century, per-capita taxes were 15 times higher in France than in China, and 40 times higher in England, and much of the tax money China did collect went not toward new forms of fighting but to aid archers on horseback, who were far more effective than musketeers4musketeer步兵。in fighting the nomads5nomad游牧民。who had long been China’s major enemy. What’s more, China was often the dominant power in East Asia,so fewer rivals dared to challenge it,which meant it had little incentive to spend heavily on its military. As a result,there was simply less use for gunpowder weapons in East Asia.

[7] Europe, by contrast, had no such dominant power. And once the Western Europeans took the lead in pushing gunpowder technology forward, it was hard for China to catch up.

[8] Europe’s military lead continued into the nineteenth century. Tax revenues rose as Europe industrialized,and the innovations from the Industrial Revolution—applied science and engineering—made it possible for Europeans to improve their technology not just by waging war, but also by conducting research, which magnified what the Europeans learned on the battlefield.

[6]歐洲之外的各國，由于受政治和軍事條件所限，戰(zhàn)爭技術(shù)，尤其是新型火藥研發(fā)技術(shù)，不斷落后于歐洲。比如中國當(dāng)時用于軍事的稅收遠(yuǎn)不及歐洲。18世紀(jì)末，法國的人均稅收是中國的16倍，英國則是中國的41倍。而且，中國大部分稅收并未用于戰(zhàn)爭技術(shù)的革新，而是供養(yǎng)馬背上的弓箭手，因為弓箭手在應(yīng)對中國長久以來的勁敵——游牧民時要比步兵更具優(yōu)勢。此外，中國在歷史上多數(shù)時間都是東亞地區(qū)的強國，鮮有對手敢于挑釁，也就意味著中國缺乏把稅收用于軍事的動力。因此，火藥武器在東亞地區(qū)幾乎沒有用武之地。

[7]相比之下，歐洲沒有中國這樣的強國。而且，西歐一旦在火藥技術(shù)方面占據(jù)領(lǐng)先地位，對中國來說就望塵莫及了。

[8]進入19世紀(jì)，歐洲在軍事領(lǐng)域依然遙遙領(lǐng)先。隨著歐洲工業(yè)化進程的推進，稅收也隨之增加。工業(yè)革命帶來了應(yīng)用科學(xué)和工程學(xué)等諸多領(lǐng)域的革新，使歐洲人不僅可以通過發(fā)動戰(zhàn)爭，還可以借助研究來改進技術(shù)，因此歐洲人在戰(zhàn)場更具優(yōu)勢。

[9] By 1914, Europe had not only achieved global military dominance, it also had powerful states that could raise huge sums of tax revenue to fund wars.In France and Germany, real per-capita tax revenue had increased 15 fold or more over the previous two centuries. That enormous capacity to tax went well beyond what can be explained by the higher per capita incomes that industrialization brought to Europe. It was the result of the same kind of learning that advanced the gunpowder technology. The only difference was that here the learning involved economics rather than military technology, and the rewards went to political leaders who successfully bargained with the elites to boost tax revenues. The leaders then used the added tax revenue to expand and equip their armies and navies.

[10] Europe’s ability to tax was no small achievement. China could not raise equivalent tax revenues, even in the nineteenth century. And countries in sub-Saharan Africa today still lack the basic capacity to tax, which keeps them from providing security and other basic public goods to their citizens.

[9]到1914年，歐洲不僅在全球軍事領(lǐng)域處于統(tǒng)治地位，而且還出現(xiàn)了一些可以通過征收大量稅款投入戰(zhàn)爭的強國。兩個世紀(jì)以來，法國和德國的實際人均稅收增加了15倍甚至更多。歐洲工業(yè)化大大提高了人均收入，但卻難以解釋歐洲各國所具有的強大的征稅能力，這種能力還是改進火藥技術(shù)的結(jié)果。唯一的區(qū)別在于，這種研究涉及的不是軍事科技，而是經(jīng)濟問題，最終獲益的是與精英協(xié)商成功、提高稅收的政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人。進而用增加的稅收擴員軍隊、提升陸軍和海軍的裝備質(zhì)量。

[10]歐洲各國的征稅能力不容小覷。即使到了19世紀(jì)，中國還征不到同等稅收?，F(xiàn)如今，非洲撒哈拉以南地區(qū)依舊缺乏基本的征稅能力，這也使得當(dāng)?shù)卣疅o法為國民提供安全保障和其他基本公共服務(wù)。

[11] Europe had yet another advantage as well: its entrepreneurs were free to use gunpowder technology to mount expeditions of conquest, colonization,and militarized trade. Although they usually needed official permission to launch a voyage, entrepreneurs were often encouraged by authorities eager to find riches abroad. And they had no trouble acquiring weapons or finding battle-hardened veterans to train military novices6novice新兵。who joined their undertakings. By the seventeenth century, such private expeditions had spawned7spawn使大量生產(chǎn)。gigantic enterprises that raised huge sums on Europe’s burgeoning8burgeoning迅速發(fā)展的，蒸蒸日上的。capital markets to finance ventures abroad, enterprises such as the Dutch East India Company,which was not only a private arm of Dutch foreign policy, but also the first business to issue tradable shares of stock.

[12] A final difference between Europe and the rest of the world lies in political history. From 221 B.C. onward,China, more often than not, was unified in a large empire. The Chinese empire soon developed a centralized bureaucracy that drew local elites into government service and gave them a stake9stake重大利益，重大利害關(guān)系。in the empire’s survival. The rewards of government service helped hold the empire together, and as long as the empire was strong and unified, other East Asian powers hesitated to attack it. This meant that China had little incentive to seek out new enemies or opportunities.

[13] Western Europe, by contrast,experienced no such lasting unification after the collapse of the Roman Empire.What it endured instead were centuries of warfare by bands of warriors whose

[11]歐洲還有另一優(yōu)勢：企業(yè)家可以自由使用火藥進行遠(yuǎn)征、殖民以及軍事貿(mào)易等活動。盡管企業(yè)家通常需要官方批準(zhǔn)才能遠(yuǎn)航，但當(dāng)局往往會鼓勵企業(yè)家到海外尋求財富。同時，這些企業(yè)家可以輕而易舉地獲得武器、招徠身經(jīng)百戰(zhàn)的老兵來幫助訓(xùn)練新兵。到17世紀(jì)，這樣的私人遠(yuǎn)征催生了一些巨型企業(yè)，這些企業(yè)從蒸蒸日上的歐洲新興資本市場募集大批資金以支持海外企業(yè)，其中就包括荷屬東印度公司。該公司不僅是執(zhí)行荷蘭外交政策的秘密組織，還是首家發(fā)行交易股票的企業(yè)。

[12]歐洲與世界其他地區(qū)的最后一點不同在于其政治史。公元前221年以后，中國基本處于大帝國的統(tǒng)一狀態(tài)，很快發(fā)展成為一個中央集權(quán)的封建帝國。帝國招募地方精英參與政府管理，讓其與帝國命運共存亡。精英們從中獲益，有助于維護國家統(tǒng)一。只要帝國繁榮昌盛，上下統(tǒng)一，其他東亞各國便不敢輕易侵犯，也就意味著中國缺少尋求新對手或機會的動力。

[13]相比之下，自羅馬帝國分崩離析之后，西歐地區(qū)就再也沒有經(jīng)歷過如此持久的統(tǒng)leaders resembled modern-day warlords.The incessant fighting groomed10groom培養(yǎng)。leaders who were victorious in war. The conflict also generated enduring enmities between leaders and their followers, enmities that eventually hardened into lasting political borders. It was such ill will—and not Europe’s physical geography—that kept any single leader from ever uniting Western Europe in the sort of durable empire that prevailed for centuries in China. In the long run, the winners in Western Europe were the military leaders who learned how to impose heavy taxes to fund their fighting, and as a result,Europe ended up with kings who spent pharaonic sums on warfare and who had,in the words of Machiavelli, “no object,thought, or profession but war.”

[14] Without a single-minded focus on war and the extraordinary ability to tax, there may never have been any European empires. The wars and the taxes lavished11lavish過分給予，揮霍。on them gave the Europeans an enormous lead in military technology. This enabled their conquests, and allowed them to keep native populations under control without stationing large numbers of European troops abroad.Without such advantages, the Europeans might have grown rich anyway—and perhaps even industrialized early—but they would not have dominated the world in 1914. 一。取而代之的則是長達(dá)幾個世紀(jì)的武士集團之間的爭戰(zhàn)，這些集團的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者類似于現(xiàn)代的軍閥。持續(xù)不斷的戰(zhàn)爭造就了一批在戰(zhàn)爭中大獲全勝的將領(lǐng)，而沖突也滋生了統(tǒng)治者與追隨者之間長久的恩怨，這些恩怨最終演變?yōu)闀缛粘志玫恼畏至选Ｕ侵T如此類的恩怨，而非歐洲的地理因素，使得西歐任何一位君主都不可能建立長久的統(tǒng)一帝國，而在中國，統(tǒng)一的局面已經(jīng)持續(xù)了幾個世紀(jì)。從長遠(yuǎn)角度來看，在西歐軍事角逐中的獲勝者是懂得如何通過征收重稅來維系戰(zhàn)爭的人。因此，歐洲的君主們會在戰(zhàn)爭中投入巨資，并且，正如意大利政治思想家馬基雅維利所言，他們“沒有目標(biāo)、思想或信念，唯有戰(zhàn)爭” 。

[14]如果沒有專注于戰(zhàn)爭，沒有非同尋常的征稅能力，就永遠(yuǎn)也不可能出現(xiàn)歐洲帝國。戰(zhàn)爭和征稅讓歐洲在軍事技術(shù)方面一馬當(dāng)先，這讓各國無須在國外駐扎大批軍隊，就能夠征服和控制當(dāng)?shù)鼐用?。如果沒有諸如此類的優(yōu)勢，歐洲或許也會富有，或許能更早實現(xiàn)工業(yè)化，但不會在1914年就稱霸世界。