論近世琉球的歷史和法律地位
——兼議釣魚島主權歸屬

劉 丹

論近世琉球的歷史和法律地位
——兼議釣魚島主權歸屬

劉 丹*

中日釣魚島爭端中，日方極力撇開《馬關條約》和其取得釣魚島所謂“主權”之間的關聯(lián)，并認為釣魚島列嶼的行政編制隸屬琉球、琉球是日本的領土，所以釣魚島的主權應歸日本，即日方主張包含著“釣魚島屬于琉球、琉球屬于日本，所以釣魚島屬于日本”的荒謬邏輯。本文著重對琉球地位問題“去偽”，即通過探究近世琉球（1609-1879）在歷史和國際法上的地位、中琉歷史上的海上自然疆界，從而進一步印證釣魚島屬于中國，為我國釣魚島主權主張?zhí)峁┯辛φ摀?jù)。

琉球地位 國際法 釣魚島爭端

2012年日本政府“購島”鬧劇后，中日釣魚島①我國稱釣魚島為“釣魚島列嶼”、“釣魚臺”等，日本稱“尖閣列島”。如無特殊說明，本文用“釣魚島”或“釣魚島列嶼”指代釣魚島及其附屬島嶼。爭端使兩國的對立狀態(tài)持續(xù)發(fā)酵，至今仍僵持不下。我國學界尤其是大陸的相關研究中，對日本釣魚島“主權主張”中琉球因素的關注相對較少；由釣魚島爭端引發(fā)的“琉球熱”②近年來，我國民間對琉球主權的關切越來越高，網(wǎng)絡上還出現(xiàn)了“還我琉球”的聲音，學術界如徐勇、唐淳風等人也發(fā)表了“琉球地位未定”的觀點。其實“琉球地位未定論”早期見于臺灣，2012年左右才開始在大陸輿論中凸顯，進而引發(fā)日本和沖繩輿論界的關注。日本政府“國有化”釣魚島并導致中日關系緊張化后，2012年5月8日，《人民日報》刊登學者張海鵬、李國強署名文章《論馬關條約與釣魚島問題》，文末提出“歷史上懸而未決的琉球問題也到了可以再議的時候”。就中國政府對琉球的立場，我國外交部發(fā)言人作出回應：“中國政府在有關問題上的立場沒有變化。沖繩和琉球的歷史是學術界長期關注的一個問題。該問題近來再度突出，背景是日方在釣魚島問題上不斷采取挑釁行動，侵犯中國領土主權。學者的署名文章反映了中國民眾和學術界對釣魚島及相關歷史問題的關注和研究”。是在2012年因“購島事件”導致中日關系緊張期間凸顯出來。釣魚島主權問題和琉球地位問題盤根錯節(jié)，對琉球地位問題，即“琉球主權是否屬于日本”這個命題“去偽”，除了從歷史、地理和國際法加強論證我國釣魚島主權主張外，如再對日本結合琉球和釣魚島隸屬關系的相關主張③日本外務省：《關于“尖閣諸島”所有權問題的基本見解（中譯本）》，下載于http:// www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/senkaku.html，2016年10月8日；日本外務?。骸丁凹忾w諸島”問答（中譯本）》，下載于http://www.cn.emb-japan.go.jp/territory/ senkaku/question-and-answer.html，2016年10月8日。進行有理、有力、有據(jù)的駁斥，將起到“以子之矛，攻子之盾”的效果。

一、琉球的歷史及中日琉三角關系

琉球是有著悠久歷史文化傳統(tǒng)的古老王國。琉球王國曾以東北亞和東南亞貿易的中轉站而著稱，貿易發(fā)達，有“萬國之津梁”的美譽，其疆界的地理范圍也和現(xiàn)在的日本沖繩縣存在較大差別。然而，隨著時間的推移，歷史上琉球和中國的朝貢冊封關系并不為現(xiàn)代人所熟知。1879年日本明治政府正式吞并琉球之前，琉球是有著獨特歷史的王國。琉球歷史分為“先史時代”、“古琉球”和“近世琉球”三個時代?！跋仁窌r代”包括12世紀以前的舊石器時代和貝冢時代；“古琉球”是指從12世紀初到薩摩藩④薩摩藩：日本明治政府“廢藩置縣”前統(tǒng)治九州島南部的地方政權，其勢力范圍涉及古代日本的律令制國家薩摩國（現(xiàn)鹿兒島縣西部）、大隅國（現(xiàn)鹿兒島縣東部和大隅諸島）和日向國諸縣郡（現(xiàn)宮崎縣西南部）等地區(qū)。江戶時代（1603-1868）的“幕藩體制”建立后，該政權遂成為薩摩藩，明治維新后正式命名為鹿兒島藩。參見藤井貞文、林陸郎：《藩史事典》，東京：秋田書店1976年版，第342頁，轉引自袁家冬：《日本薩摩藩入侵琉球與東亞地緣政治格局變遷》，載于《中國社會科學》2013年第8期，第189頁。藩主島津氏入侵琉球的1609年，約500年的時間；“近世琉球”則從1609年薩摩入侵琉球島，到1879年日本明治政府宣布琉球廢藩置縣為止，歷時270年。⑤何慈毅：《明清時期琉球日本關系史》，南京：江蘇古籍出版社2002年版，第3～5頁。

（一）琉球王國歷史及中琉宗藩關系

自1429年琉球統(tǒng)一到1879年琉球王國被日本吞并，琉球王國橫跨了“古琉球”和“近世琉球”兩個時代。自琉球按司察度于明朝洪武五年（1372年）向明朝皇帝朝貢，受冊封為中山王，至清光緒五年（1879）年琉球被日本吞并、改為沖繩縣為止，中國在明清兩代和琉球保持了五百多年的封貢關系，中國遣冊封使共24次，⑥對于清代冊封琉球的次數(shù),中日學者不存在爭議，一般認為清冊封琉球8次，冊封使16名。但是對于明清兩代中國冊封琉球的總次數(shù)，歷史學界的看法各異，一般認為是24次，但也有23次的說法，主要原因是對明朝冊封次數(shù)，學界有不同看法。謝必震、武尚清和赤嶺誠紀一致認為明朝冊封琉球15次，冊使27人；方寶川則認為明朝冊封琉球14次，冊封使26人。有的學者以中央政府是否在琉球本地為琉球國王進行冊封儀式作為標準，沒有把楊載出使琉球統(tǒng)計在列，從該角度看，明清兩代共為琉球國王舉行的冊封典禮是23次而不是24次。參見謝必震、胡新：《中琉關系史料與研究》，北京：海洋出版社2010年版，第125～126頁；徐斌：《明清士大夫與琉球》，北京：海洋出版社2011年，第83頁。琉球來貢者則更多。⑦《明太祖實錄》卷七十一記載，當年明太祖洪武帝遣楊載攜帶詔諭中山王的詔書中寫到：“惟爾琉球，在中國東南，遠處海外，未及報知，茲特遣使往諭，爾其知之?！眳⒁姟睹魈鎸嶄洝肪砥呤?，洪武五年春正月甲子條。中琉建立外交關系后,凡是琉球國王病故,其世子承襲王位,必須經(jīng)過明清兩朝皇帝冊封,才能正式對外稱王。⑧徐斌：《明清士大夫與琉球》，北京：海洋出版社2011年版，第36頁。我國有關釣魚島列嶼的記載，多見于明清兩代冊封使歸國回朝復命的“述職報告”即冊封使錄中。

（二）中日琉多邊關系下的琉球“兩屬”問題

自1609年（明朝萬歷三十七年，日本江戶幕府慶長十四年）薩摩藩攻破琉球，直到1879年明治政府在琉球廢藩置縣，這段時期被史學家稱為琉球的“兩屬”時期。1609年，日本薩摩藩的島津氏發(fā)兵入侵琉球，擄走國王尚寧和主要大臣，史稱“慶長琉球之役”。此后，琉球“明屬中國、暗屬日本”⑨鄭海麟：《釣魚島列嶼之歷史與法理研究（增訂本）》，香港：明報出版社有限公司2011年版，第124頁。的狀態(tài)一直持續(xù)到日本明治維新初年。入清后，琉球進入第二尚氏王朝后期，琉球請求清政府予以冊封。世子尚豐分別于天啟五年（1625年）、天啟六年（1626年）和七年（1627年）上表，請求中國給予冊封。琉球天啟年間的請封是在前述“慶長琉球之役”后，王國受到薩摩暗中掌控下進行的。⑩徐斌：《明清士大夫與琉球》，北京：海洋出版社2011年版，第4頁?！皯c長琉球之役”后，崇禎六年（1633年），在薩摩藩的不斷催促下，琉球恢復和中國的封貢關系、恢復隨貢互市。1872年9月，明治天皇下詔將琉球王室“升為琉球藩王，敘列華族”，①米慶余：《琉球歷史研究》，天津：天津人民出版社1998年版，第112～114頁。為吞并琉球做好了形式上的準備，1879年正式吞并琉球，這就是琉球為中日“兩屬”的由來。

薩摩藩入侵琉球后便從政治、經(jīng)濟等方面控制琉球。但為維持中琉朝貢貿易并從中牟利，就薩琉關系，薩摩藩全面貫徹了對中國的隱瞞策略，具體包括：1.不準琉球改行日本制度及日本名姓，以免為中國天使（冊封使）所發(fā)現(xiàn)。例如，《紀考》稱，“寬永元年”（天啟四年，1624年）八月二十日，國相（薩摩藩對內自稱“國”）承旨，命于琉球，自后官秩刑罰，宜王自制，勿稱倭名，為倭服制。②楊仲揆：《琉球古今談——兼論釣魚臺問題》，臺北：臺灣商務印書館1990年版，第64～65頁。2.冊封使駐琉球期間，薩摩藩為欺瞞耳目所安排的措施為：所有日本官員如在番奉行、大和橫目以及部署，非妥善偽裝混入冊封者，一律遷居琉球東海岸偏僻之地，以遠離中國人活動之西海岸；又如，取締一切日文招貼、招牌；再如，一切典籍、記錄、報告，均諱言慶長琉球之役的日琉關系，等等。③楊仲揆：《琉球古今談——兼論釣魚臺問題》，臺北：臺灣商務印書館1990年版，第64～65頁。3.琉球官方出版和匯編了《唐琉球問答屬》、《旅行人心得》等文件。《唐琉球問答屬》是由首里王府制作的，為避免“琉球漂流事件”④琉球漂流事件：明代中琉交往后，琉球船只或貢船失事飄到中國沿海的有12起。明清兩朝對包括琉球漂民在內的漂風難民均有救助、安置和撫恤遣返的做法，形成以中國為中心，參與國包括朝貢國和非朝貢國（如日本）在內的海難救助機制。由于導致船舶漂流的主要原因是搞錯了季風期，在“兩屬”時期，首里王府下達了嚴格遵守出港、歸港期的命令，但即使這樣，也不免有漂流事件的發(fā)生。參見賴正維：《清代中琉關系研究》，北京：海洋出版社2011年版，第56～60頁；[日]村田忠禧著，韋平和譯：《日中領土爭端的起源——從歷史檔案看釣魚島問題》，北京：社會科學文獻出版社2013年版，第52頁。透露出薩摩藩控制琉球的內幕、以應對中國官府的問答卷。其中第一條回答琉球王國統(tǒng)治疆域時，答案為“統(tǒng)治的疆域有中山府、南山府、北山府，南面的八重山、與那國島，北面的大島、喜界島，西面的久米島，東面的伊計島、津堅島等36島”，而當時（奄美）大島、喜界島已經(jīng)在薩摩藩的管轄范圍內，這顯然在向清朝刻意隱瞞。⑤[日]村田忠禧著，韋平和譯：《日中領土爭端的起源——從歷史檔案看釣魚島問題》，北京：社會科學文獻出版社2013年版，第52～53頁?！堵眯腥诵牡谩烦霭嬗谇《哪辏?759年），是印有中琉“標準答案”的小手冊，為琉球華裔政治家蔡溫所撰，目的是教育琉球入華的官員、官生和一般商人如何答復中國人可能提出的問題，最重要的是有關薩琉關系的問題。⑥楊仲揆：《琉球古今談——兼論釣魚臺問題》，臺北：臺灣商務印書館1990年版，第64～65頁。

二、《萬國公法》視野下藩屬國的國際法地位

亞洲的“宗藩/朝貢體系”是以中國為中心、以中國之周邊各鄰國與中國形成的雙邊“封貢關系”為結構的國際體系。“萬國公法體系”又稱“條約體系”，則指伴隨近代殖民擴張形成的，西方殖民列強主導的以“條約關系”為結構、以“萬國公法”世界的國際秩序為基礎的國際體系。⑦費正清提出了晚清時期與朝貢體制并存的“條約體系”一詞。參見J. K. Fairbank, The Early Treaty System in the Chinese World Order, in J. K. Fairbank ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations, Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press, 1969, pp. 257～275.近代西方國際法正式和有系統(tǒng)的傳入中國是從19世紀開始的。然而，19世紀后期,清廷的藩屬國如越南、緬甸、朝鮮等相繼淪為歐美列強和日本的殖民地或保護國，宗藩/朝貢體制分崩離析。

（一）《萬國公法》的傳入及其對清政府外交的影響

如上所述，近代西方國際法正式和系統(tǒng)的傳入中國是從19世紀開始的。美國傳教士丁韙良(1827-1916)翻譯的《萬國公法》⑧《萬國公法》一書，譯自美國國際法學家亨利·惠頓（1785-1848）于1836年出版的《國際法原理》（Elements of International Law）一書，翻譯者是美國傳教士丁韙良(1827-1916)，于1864年（同治三年）冬由北京崇實館刊印發(fā)行。參見林學忠：《從萬國公法到公法外交：晚清國際法的傳入、詮釋與應用》，上海：上海古籍出版社2009年版，第113頁。是中國歷史上第一本西方法學著作?！度f國公法》在中國一經(jīng)出版，在東亞世界引起很大震撼，翌年在日本便有翻刻本和訓點本出版，在很短的時間內成為日本的暢銷書，后陸續(xù)在朝鮮和越南相繼翻刻刊行。⑨鄒振環(huán)：《丁韙良譯述〈萬國公法〉在中日韓傳播的比較研究》，載于復旦大學韓國研究中心編：《韓國學研究第七輯》，北京：中國社會科學出版社2000年版，第258～278頁。19世紀初，中國逐漸成為西方列強在東亞的殖民目標，其間歷經(jīng)兩次鴉片戰(zhàn)爭，到1901年《辛丑條約》的簽訂，中國徹底淪為半殖民地半封建社會。在這樣的時代背景下，中國社會各階層對西方國際法傳入的態(tài)度是矛盾的。一方面，清政府的確有應用國際法與西方國家外交交涉成功的案例，例如1839年林則徐禁止銷售鴉片⑩茅海建：《天朝的崩潰——鴉片戰(zhàn)爭再研究》，北京：三聯(lián)書店1995年版，第104～112頁。和辦理“林維喜案”，①1839年7月，九龍尖沙嘴村發(fā)生中國村民林維喜被英國水手所殺的案件。對該案的研究，參見林啟彥、林錦源：《論中英兩國政府處理林維喜事件的手法和態(tài)度》，載于《歷史研究》2000年第2期，第97～113頁。又如普魯士在中國領海拿捕丹麥船只事件②1864年4月，普魯士公使李福斯乘坐“羚羊號”軍艦來華，在天津大沽口海面上無端拿獲了3艘丹麥商船?？偫砀鲊聞昭瞄T當即提出抗議，指出公使拿獲丹麥商船的水域是中國的“內洋”（領水），按照國際法的原則，應屬中國政府管轄，并以如普魯士公使不釋放丹麥商船清廷將不予以接待相威脅。在這種情況下，普魯士釋放了2艘丹麥商船,并對第3艘商船賠償1500元，事件最終和平解決。關于此案及清政府援引《萬國公法》的經(jīng)過，參見王維儉：《普丹大沽口船舶事件和西方國際法傳入中國》，載于《學術研究》1985年第5期，第84～90頁。等，這些外交糾紛的順利解決促成清政府較快地批準《萬國公法》的刊??；另一方面，清政府及其官員對國際法則傾向于從器用的層面做工具性的利用，追求對外交涉時可以援引相關規(guī)則以制夷。

甲午戰(zhàn)爭爆發(fā)前后那段時期的“國際社會”是有特定涵義的，它是以歐洲為中心、由主權獨立的歐洲國家組成，進而形成一套體現(xiàn)西方價值觀、有約束力的近代國際法規(guī)則體系，又被稱為“國際法共同體”或“文明共同體”。琉球大學歷史學者西里喜行指出，東亞的近代是東亞各國、各民族與歐美列強間的相互關系的主客顛倒時代，也是東亞傳統(tǒng)的國際制度即冊封進貢體制，被歐美列強主導的近代國際秩序即萬國公法所取代的時代。③[日]西里喜行著，胡連成等譯：《清末中琉日關系史研究（上）》，北京：社會科學文獻出版社2010年版，第17頁。我國汪暉教授也認為，清朝與歐洲列強之間的沖突不是一般的國與國之間的沖突，而是兩種世界體系及其規(guī)范的沖突，即兩種國際體系及其規(guī)范的沖突，④汪暉：《中國現(xiàn)代思想的興起（上卷）》，北京：三聯(lián)書店2004年版，第680頁。這兩種國際體系就是“朝貢體系”和近代“萬國公法體系”。“萬國公法體系”中，世界各國被分為“文明”、“不完全文明”、“野蠻”和“未開化”多個領域（見表1），中國等亞洲國家被視為“野蠻國”，只能適用國際法的部分原則，不能享有國家主體的完全人格。最能反映這種秩序架構上的國家權利的差異，莫過于以片面最惠國待遇、領事裁判權、協(xié)定關稅為核心內容的諸多不平等條約。這種國際秩序是不折不扣的“西方中心主義”，而19世紀末20世紀初的政治現(xiàn)實卻是在這種偏見下展開的。⑤林學忠：《從萬國公法到公法外交：晚清國際法的傳入、詮釋與應用》，上海：上海古籍出版社2009年版，第243頁。

（二）《萬國公法》中的“藩屬國”

比較19世紀《萬國公法》和20世紀《奧本海國際法》⑦《奧本海國際法》可謂是在20世紀對《萬國公法》起到承前啟后作用的巨著。該書的雛形是國際法學者奧本海（1858-1919）在1905-1906年出版的《國際法》兩卷集，奧本海因此當選劍橋大學惠威爾國際法講座教授。之后第二版由奧本海本人修訂。此后《奧本海國際法》經(jīng)過羅納德·羅克斯伯勒、阿諾德·麥克奈爾,以及赫?！谔嘏商氐榷辔粐H法知名學者多次修訂并出版，被稱為“劍橋書”。參見[英]詹寧斯、瓦茨修訂，王鐵崖等譯：《奧本海國際法（第一卷，第一分冊）》，北京：中國大百科全書出版社1998年版，第III～V頁。這兩部國際法經(jīng)典著作不難發(fā)現(xiàn)，“殖民地”其實是現(xiàn)代國際法所稱“國際人格者”中的一種類型。而與“宗藩／朝貢體制”聯(lián)系最密切的“被保護國”、“半主權國”、“藩屬國”等國際法概念，在《萬國公法》中被納入“邦國自治、自主之權”專章論述?，F(xiàn)代國際法意義上的“國際人格者”是指享有法律人格的國際法的主體，“國際人格者”享有國際法上所確定的權利、義務和權力。⑧[英]詹寧斯、瓦茨修訂，王鐵崖等譯：《奧本海國際法（第一卷，第一分冊）》，北京：中國大百科全書出版社1998年版，第90頁。探討近現(xiàn)代國際法“國際人格者”的內涵和法律概念的變化與演進，對于分析琉球近現(xiàn)代國際法地位具有重要啟示。圍繞著琉球地位問題，中日琉三方的外交交涉中，官方曾援引并運用《萬國公法》的原則、規(guī)則和理論。

了解19世紀語境下“國際人格者”的類型和內涵，就要從《萬國公法》中尋找初始的軌跡。參照丁韙良的中譯本⑨應注意的是，《萬國公法》（北京：中國政法大學出版社2003版）的點校人何勤華教授指出，丁韙良在翻譯時，不僅對原書的結構、體系、章節(jié)有過調整，也對其中的內容作了大量刪節(jié)。如第一卷第二章第二十三節(jié)“日耳曼系眾邦會盟”，原文有近90%的內容被丁韙良所刪，翻譯出來的只是幾點摘要。此外，由于受歷史條件和譯者中文水平的局限，還存在較多不成功的翻譯之處（參見[美]惠頓著，[美]丁韙良譯，何勤華點校：《萬國公法》，北京：中國政法大學出版社2003年版，“點校者前言”第51頁）。鑒于此，筆者在寫作本文時，特別注意對比《萬國公法》中英文版本的差異，尤其關注英文版本中有論述，而中文版本中存在刪節(jié)或省略的部分。和1866年由波士頓的利特爾&布朗公司出版的英文第八版⑩中國國家圖書館外文館藏有Elements of International Law的多個版本，該書自1836年第一版問世后就多次再版，主體內容并無大的改動，而是由不同的編輯者加以注釋，或添加國際公約作為附錄。筆者參閱的是1866年在波士頓出版的第八版，該版本由Richard Henry Dana編輯并注釋。參見Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, edited, with notes, by Richard Henry Dana, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1866, p. viii.這2個版本可知，惠頓所著的《萬國公法》①丁韙良翻譯的《萬國公法》由北京崇實館1864年出版，該中文版譯自Elements of International Law: With a Sketch of the History of the Science的第六版，即由William Beach Lawrence (1800-1881)編輯的注釋版（Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1855）。參見林學忠：《從萬國公法到公法外交：晚清國際法的傳入、詮釋與應用》，上海：上海古籍出版社2009年版，第113頁。在第一卷第二章中提到了“國”、“半主之國”、“被保護國”、“藩屬”等具有或部分具有“國際人格者”資格的類型，尤以對“藩屬”主權問題的論述值得關注。

對于“國”的定義，《萬國公法》中有一段文字：“所謂國者，惟人眾相合，協(xié)力相助，以同立者也?！睘檎f明“國家”的構成要件，惠頓特別提到，“蓋為國之正義，無他，庶人行事，常服君上，居住必有定所，且有領土、疆界，歸其自主。此三者缺一，即不為國矣?！雹赱美]惠頓著，[美]丁韙良譯，何勤華點校：《萬國公法》，北京：中國政法大學出版社2003年版，第25～26頁。19世紀的國際法中，“國家”的要件主要是定居的居民、領土和疆界，③Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, edited, with notes, by Richard Henry Dana, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1866, p.22.這和現(xiàn)代國際法對國家的認定標準相比明顯寬松不少?！度f國公法》中，國又分為“自主之國”和“半主之國”?！白灾髦畤笔恰盁o論何等國法，若能自治其事，而不聽命于它國，則可謂自主者矣”；④[美]惠頓著，[美]丁韙良譯，何勤華點校:《萬國公法》，北京：中國政法大學出版社2003年版，第37頁。而“恃他國以行其權者……蓋無此全權，即不能全然自主也”則被稱為“半主之國”，除阿尼合邦、戈拉告依據(jù)條約屬于“半主之國”外，保護國、附庸國也被歸入“半主之國”之列。⑤Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, edited, with notes, by Richard Henry Dana, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1866, pp. 45～46.主權又分為對內主權和對外主權，“主權行于內，則依各國之法度，或寓于民，或歸于君；主權行于外，即本國自主，而不聽命于他國也。各國平戰(zhàn)、交際，皆憑此權”。⑥[美]惠頓著，[美]丁韙良譯，何勤華點校：《萬國公法》，北京：中國政法大學出版社2003年版，第35～36頁。

《萬國公法》中單列一節(jié)論及藩屬國（或藩邦）。⑦惠頓的《萬國公法》第二章第37節(jié)題目就是“Tributary States”，參見Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, edited, with notes, by Richard Henry Dana, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1866, pp. 48～49.“進貢之國并藩邦，公法就其所存主權多寡而定其自主之分”。⑧[美]惠頓著，[美]丁韙良譯，何勤華點校：《萬國公法》，北京：中國政法大學出版社2003年版，第41頁。即藩屬國的主權，并不因為其進貢于宗主國的事實而必然受到減損,而是取決于其自主性。《萬國公法》列舉了幾類“藩邦”：⑨[美]惠頓著，[美]丁韙良譯，何勤華點校：《萬國公法》，北京：中國政法大學出版社2003年版，第41～42頁。第一，“歐羅巴濱海諸國，前進貢于巴巴里（埃及以西的北非伊斯蘭教地區(qū)）時，于其自立、自主之權，并無所礙”，即歐洲主要海洋國家并不因向巴巴里的進貢行為而失去獨立自主的主權國家地位；第二，“七百年來，那不勒斯王尚有屏藩羅馬教皇之名，至四十年前始絕其進貢。然不因其屏藩羅馬，遂謂非自立、自主之國也”。即那不勒斯自17世紀至1818年期間一直向羅馬教皇進貢，但這并不意味著那不勒斯王國的主權有所減損。⑩Wheaton, Elements of International Law, edited, with notes, by Richard Henry Dana, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1866, p. 49.

（三）清朝維護藩屬國朝鮮、緬甸、越南的“公法外交”

宗藩（或藩屬）制度作為中國古代國家政體的重要內容之一,早在漢朝時就已經(jīng)產生。沿襲漢代，唐代的藩屬制度又有所創(chuàng)新，是以在邊疆少數(shù)民族聚居區(qū)廣設羈縻府州為藩屬主要實體的創(chuàng)新階段。明沿襲唐代、元代的藩屬制度亦有新的舉措。清王朝集歷代藩屬制度之大成。①黃松筠：《中國藩屬制度研究的理論問題》，載于《社會科學戰(zhàn)線》2004年第6期，第121頁。宗主國和藩邦之間的經(jīng)濟交流主要是通過“朝貢”、“賞賜”及朝貢附載貿易來實現(xiàn)的。費正清②費正清對朝貢體制的理論基礎——華夏中心主義意識，以及朝貢關系融政治、貿易、外交于一體的特征，都有開創(chuàng)性研究。他還以“沖擊—反應”模式為框架，來研究近代中國的走勢。此后許多學者分別提出“華夷秩序”、“天朝禮治體系”、“中國的世界秩序”、“東亞的國際秩序”等，被視為古代中國的中外關系、外交制度、外交觀念等，但都與朝貢體制有關。費正清的上述觀點雖可概括朝貢體制的結構，但仍應注意，亞洲內陸游牧部落與華夏文化圈內的“朝貢國”雖然同處在“朝貢體系”之中，但仍存在很大的差異；暹羅、緬甸等“朝貢國”與歐洲國家也存在差異，因為這些“朝貢國”與中國保持著正式的“封貢關系”，所以不能和歐洲國家劃歸一類。參見王培培：《“朝貢體系”與“條約體系”》，載于《社科縱橫》2011年第8期，第115～117頁。認為，朝貢體制是以中國為中心形成的圈層結構：第一層是漢字圈，有幾個最鄰近且文化相同的“屬國”構成，包括朝鮮、越南、琉球和一段時期的日本；第二層是亞洲內陸圈，由亞洲內陸游牧和半游牧的“屬國”和從屬部落構成；第三層是外圈，一般由關山阻隔、遠隔重洋的“外夷”組成，包括日本、東南亞和南亞一些國家以及歐洲。③John King Fairbank ed., The Chinese World Order, Traditional China’s Foreign Relations, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968, p. 2.清王朝將海外各國大致分兩類：一是“朝貢國”（見表2），即正式建立外交關系的國家。這7個藩屬國包括朝鮮、琉球、安南（今越南）、暹羅（今泰國）、緬甸、南掌（今老撾）和蘇祿（今菲律賓蘇祿群島）；二是無正式外交關系，而有貿易往來的國家，包括葡萄牙、西班牙、荷蘭、英國、法國等西方國家。④李云泉：《朝貢制度史論——中國古代對外關系體制研究》，北京：新華出版社2004年版，第134～148頁。

表2 清代主要朝貢國的貢封時間一覽表45

清政府與藩屬國之間的外交事務，并不僅限于藩屬國地位問題，往往還關聯(lián)到國際條約、交戰(zhàn)規(guī)則和中立法、國際習慣法、國家領土邊界等復雜問題，實非本文篇幅可以囊括，不過藩屬國的地位仍是清政府外交交涉中繞不開的議題。在對待朝鮮、越南、緬甸這幾個藩屬國自身是否為“自立之國”，以及如何對藩屬國的安全提供保護或支援的問題上，清政府的外交政策和處理方法有所不同。

朝鮮在中國眾多藩屬國有“小中華”之稱。清政府維護中朝宗藩關系是全方位的，不僅派出軍隊，更不惜改變傳統(tǒng)的方式直接介入朝鮮的內政與外交，并應用國際法和條約體制以鞏固宗主國地位，即使1885年《天津會議專條》簽訂后也并不承認朝鮮具有“自主之國”的國際地位。1876年日本制造“江華島事件”后，清政府采用了均勢外交，鼓勵朝鮮對歐美開戰(zhàn)，以圖用勢力均衡的局面保住朝鮮。當中國明白傳統(tǒng)中華世界秩序原理已無法維持中朝關系時，開始改變外交策略，甚至應用國際法的規(guī)則試圖維持中朝藩屬關系，除了1882年“壬午兵變”后在形式上保留朝鮮自主、實質開始介入朝鮮內政外交之外，1882年10月還和朝鮮締結《中國朝鮮商民水陸貿易章程》，用條約體制將傳統(tǒng)中朝宗藩關系明文化。⑥林學忠：《從萬國公法到公法外交：晚清國際法的傳入、詮釋與應用》，上海：上海古籍出版社2009年版，第276～278頁。

清政府出兵援越是基于“保藩固圉”⑦馬大正主編：《中國邊疆通史叢書·中國邊疆經(jīng)略史》，鄭州：中州古籍出版社2000年版，第398頁。的邊防思路，意圖御敵于國門之外，起初并不想和法國直接沖突。然而，法國在吞并越南的進程中，以外交交涉和締結條約為主，以銷毀中越宗藩關系證據(jù)為輔。首先，法國認為，按西方國際法的屬國制度，“如作某國之主，則該國一切政事吏治皆為之作主，代其治理”，所以中國并沒有真正管轄越南。⑧郭廷以等編：《中法越南交涉檔（二）》，臺北：“中央研究院”近代史研究所1962年版，第927頁。隨后法國要求中國在法越戰(zhàn)爭期間作為第三國，必須中立。⑨例如1883年6月，李鴻章收到法國來函稱：“法越現(xiàn)已交兵，按照公法，局外之國不得從旁擾與，似須法越戰(zhàn)事稍定乃可就議”。參見郭廷以等編：《中法越南交涉檔（二）》，臺北：“中央研究院”近代史研究所1962年版，第910頁。其次，法國運用《中法簡明條約》（1884.5.11）、法越《第二次順化條約》（1884.6.6）等系列條約，逐步做實從越南為“自主之國”到越南為法國被保護國的國際地位。尤為甚者，在《第二次順化條約》簽約換文前，法國全權公使巴德諾逼迫阮朝交出清封敕的鍍金駝鈕印璽，熔鑄為銀塊，⑩張登桂等編：《大南實錄（正編第五紀,卷4）》，東京：慶應義塾大學1961-1981年版，第4頁。轉引自李云泉：《中法戰(zhàn)爭前的中法越南問題交涉與中越關系的變化》，載于《社會科學輯刊》2010年第5期，第155頁。借以永久銷毀中越宗藩關系的證據(jù)。對中法就越南藩屬國地位展開的交涉，有評價稱，“從一開始就像中日在朝鮮屬國地位問題上的交涉一樣，注定是一場無果而終的拉鋸戰(zhàn)”。①李云泉：《中法戰(zhàn)爭前的中法越南問題交涉與中越關系的變化》，載于《社會科學輯刊》2010年第5期，第151頁。

中緬官方關系直至18世紀中期才建立。面對英國就緬甸藩屬地位的質疑，駐英公使曾紀澤斷然否認并尋找緬甸為中國屬國的論據(jù)和實物證據(jù)。曾紀澤反駁英國提出的乾隆35年（1770年）中緬條款為兩國平等條約的說法，指出它只是緬甸對華的“降表”而已。②電文內容為：“緬王印，乾隆五十五年頒給，系清漢文尚方大篆，銀質飾金駝紐，平臺方三寸五分，厚一寸，其文曰‘阿瓦緬甸國王之印’。特電。”參見何新華：《試析清代緬甸的藩屬國地位問題》，載于《歷史檔案》2006年第1期，第75頁?？偫硌瞄T把清政府頒給緬甸國王封印的尺寸、封印上的字體及內容都曾給曾紀澤以電文說明。③王彥威：《清季外交史料（卷61）》，北京：故宮博物院1932年刊本，第29頁。至于英方所提緬甸在英緬沖突中沒有向中國提出保護請求這一說法，清政府雖從緬甸違反屬國義務這一角度作了解釋，④何新華：《試析清代緬甸的藩屬國地位問題》，《歷史檔案》2006年第1期，第75頁。但對英國侵占緬甸并沒有采取實質性的干預，對緬外交多體現(xiàn)實用主義色彩。18世紀末至19世紀初，緬甸的南方鄰國暹羅開始強大并對緬甸造成巨大威脅，其后英國進入緬甸南部和西部，緬甸正是在這一時期頻繁進貢中國。緬甸對其藩屬國的身份實際上采取了“曖昧態(tài)度”，⑤緬甸的曖昧態(tài)度表現(xiàn)在緬甸國王對待1790年乾隆賜給的封印態(tài)度上。當“使臣攜歸華文大印，其狀如駝，緬王恐受制于清，初不愿接受，顧又不愿舍此重達三緬斤(十磅)之真金，乃決意接受而使史官免志其事?！眳⒁姡塾ⅲ莨S著，姚梓良譯：《緬甸史（下冊）》，北京：商務印書館1973年版，第453頁。它既不把中國作為天朝上國，也從未主動承認是中國的藩屬國。⑥何新華：《試析清代緬甸的藩屬國地位問題》，載于《歷史檔案》2006年第1期，第72頁。

縱觀19世紀中后期，“英之于緬，法之于越，倭之于球，皆自彼發(fā)難。中國多事之秋，興滅繼絕，力有未逮”。⑦路鳳石：《德宗實錄》（卷232，光緒十二年九月)，北京：中華書局1987年版。19世紀末，甲午一戰(zhàn)、清國敗北。當“宗藩/朝貢體制”崩潰后，中國不得不徹底地放棄天朝觀念，接受了以“萬國公法體制”為基礎的西方世界觀。

三、從中日“琉球交涉”看近世琉球的歷史和國際法地位

19世紀，日本明治政府用近10年的時間，以武力強行將琉球王國劃入日本的版圖，這在歷史上稱為“琉球處分”。圍繞著“琉球處分”，伴隨著同時期歐美列強在亞洲推行的殖民主義，中日兩國展開了漫長的磋商談判，直到1880年“分島改約案”琉球問題擱置，以致成為中日之間的“懸案”。

（一）1871-1880年中日之間的“琉球交涉”

中日之間的“琉球交涉”早期可溯源到1871年的“生番事件”（又稱“牡丹社事件”），⑧生番事件：同治10年（1871年）11月，琉球國太平山島一艘海船69人遇到颶風，船只傾覆。幸存的66人鳧水登山，11月7日，誤入臺灣高山族牡丹社生番鄉(xiāng)內，和當?shù)鼐用癜l(fā)生武裝沖突，54人被殺死，幸存的12人在當?shù)貪h人楊友旺等幫助下，從臺灣護送到福建。同治11年（1872年）2月25日，福州將軍兼署閩浙總督文煜等人將此事向北京奏報，京城邸報對此作了轉載。參見米慶余：《琉球漂民事件與日軍入侵臺灣（1871-1874）》，載于《歷史研究》1999年第1期，第21～36頁。最后以1874年簽訂《北京專條》得以解決。然而該事件不僅由清廷賠款，⑨米慶余：《琉球漂民事件與日軍入侵臺灣（1871-1874）》，載于《歷史研究》1999年第1期，第21～36頁。而且日本在攫取“保民義舉”名義后也仍在加緊對琉球的吞并，1879年日本廢掉琉球藩改名沖繩縣，縣官改由日本委派。⑩鞠德源：《評析30年前日本政府〈關于尖閣諸島所有權問題的基本見解〉》，載于《抗日戰(zhàn)爭研究》2002年第4期，第147～166頁。清政府于當年即對日本單方面處分琉球提出外交照會，表示強烈抗議。

經(jīng)美國卸任總統(tǒng)格蘭特的調停，中日展開了對琉球“分島加約案”的談判，琉球“二分方案”和“三分方案”是當時都曾討論過的方案。①[日]西里喜行著，胡連成等譯：《清末中琉日關系史研究（上）》，北京：社會科學文化出版社2010年版，第312頁。1880年10月21日，依據(jù)日方所傾向的“二分方案”，中日達成協(xié)議并草簽了《琉球條約擬稿》和《酌加條款》。《琉球條約擬稿》（原文為中文）規(guī)定，“大清國大日本國公同商議，除沖繩島以北，屬大日本國管理外，其宮古八重山二島，屬大清國管轄，以清兩國疆界，各聽自治，彼此永遠不相干預”。②《琉球處分條約案に關する件（琉球処分條約案に関する件）》，載于日本外務省編：《日本外交年表并主要文書1840-1945（上巻）》，東京：原書房1965年版，第81～85頁；鞠德源：《評析30年前日本政府〈關于尖閣諸島所有權問題的基本見解〉》，載于《抗日戰(zhàn)爭研究》2002年第4期，第147～166頁。不過最終正式簽約時，清政府拒絕簽署雙方約定的琉球分割方案，《琉球條約擬稿》成為廢約。至于清政府最終拒絕在“分島改約”方案上簽約的原因，史學界有幾種解釋：一是“清俄關系緩和主因說”。該說法主張，圍繞著伊犁問題的俄清談判進展順利，清政府對“分島改約”態(tài)度中途發(fā)生變化也是受其左右；③[日]植田捷雄：《琉球の歸屬を繞る日清交涉》，載于東京大學東洋文化研究所編：《東洋文化研究所紀要（二）》，1951年。二為“清廷內部矛盾說”。由于清廷官員內部嚴重分歧,清政府采納李鴻章“支展延宕”之拖延政策，決定不批準協(xié)議草案,初衷是保存琉球社稷和避免“失我內地之利”。④米慶余：《琉球歷史研究》，天津：天津人民出版社1998年版，第226頁。三是“琉球人林世功自殺影響說”。⑤[日]西里喜行著，胡連成等譯：《清末中琉日關系史研究（上冊）》，北京：社會科學文獻出版社2010年版，第35頁。在清政府內部展開是否應該簽署琉球分割條約的爭論期間，為了阻止該條約簽署，流亡清國的琉球人林世功寫了一份決死的請愿書后自殺身亡。林世功自殺事件也給清廷內部關于是否應當簽署條約爭論的結局以一定的影響。

最終清政府在中日甲午戰(zhàn)爭中戰(zhàn)敗，被迫于1895年簽署《馬關條約》，⑥《馬關條約》又稱《下關條約》，甲午戰(zhàn)爭清朝戰(zhàn)敗后，清政府和日本政府于1895年4月17日（光緒二十一年三月二十三日）在日本馬關（今下關市）簽署的條約，原名《馬關新約》，日本稱為《下關條約》或《日清講和條約》。清朝代表為李鴻章和李經(jīng)芳，日方代表為伊藤博文和陸奧宗光。割讓臺灣、澎湖、遼東半島給日本，對琉球問題更是“無力回天”。不過，直至甲午戰(zhàn)爭爆發(fā)前，中日雙方仍認知琉球的地位懸而未決。日本吞并琉球后，不滿日本統(tǒng)治的琉球人流亡清朝以求復國，被稱為“脫清人”。

（二）近世琉球地位的國際法分析

歷史學者西里喜行觀察到，圍繞著琉球的歸屬即主權問題，不僅中日在不同階段的外交談判中大量運用《萬國公法》，而且1875-1879年琉球王國陳情特使在東京的請愿活動也曾引用《萬國公法》來對抗琉球乃日本專屬的主張。⑦東京的琉球陳情使以波蘭曾經(jīng)附屬于普魯士、奧地利和俄羅斯三國為例，指出《萬國公法》也同樣允許兩屬國家的存在。參見[日]西里喜行，胡連成等譯：《清末中琉日關系史研究（上）》，北京：社會科學文化出版社2010年版，第29～32頁。從時際法⑧時際法，或稱過渡法，是指解決法律時間抵觸的法律，也就是決定法律時間適用范圍的法律。領土爭端中，時際法是需要考慮的重要法律因素。國際法上的“時際法”是在國際常設仲裁法院“帕爾馬斯島案”中，由仲裁員胡伯首先提出,并逐步在領土爭端解決實踐和條約法中得到發(fā)展。他所表述的時際國際法是：“一個法律事實應當按照與之同時的法律，而不是按照因該事實發(fā)生爭端時所實行的法律或解決這個爭端時所實行的法律予以判斷”。參見The Island of Palmas Case (or Miangas), United States of America v. The Netherlands (1928), Permanent Court of Arbitration, pp. 4～6, p. 37.視角看，對待19世紀后半葉琉球國際法地位這樣的議題，運用當時的國際法即《萬國公法》并結合殖民入侵背景下亞洲的政治格局，才能得出相對客觀的結論。當然，現(xiàn)代國際法理論尤其是有關國家和主權以及領土爭端理論和實踐，對于現(xiàn)代人更好地理解琉球的國際法地位是有輔助作用的。近世琉球的歷史和法律地位應從以下幾個方面予以論證。

第一，歷史上近世琉球“暗屬日本”的狀態(tài)，并不意味著該時期薩摩藩對琉球的征服行為符合領土取得的國際法；而中日琉球交涉時日方代表的“琉球專屬日本論”既不符合歷史，從當時的國際法看也站不住腳。如上文所述，自1609年薩摩藩入侵后，琉球與中日維持著“明屬中國、暗屬日本”的兩屬模糊狀態(tài)。然而，以武力征服琉球王國的不是代表中央政權的江戶幕府，而是地方政權——薩摩藩。從1609年到江戶末期，即使是當時的江戶幕府也沒有將琉球并入領土的意圖，而是將琉球視為日本六十余州之外的獨立王國：例證一，1610年5月江戶幕府的大老（幕府最高執(zhí)政官）本多正純寫信給薩摩藩主島津家久，要求按照接待朝鮮國使節(jié)的待遇把被俘的琉球國王帶到江戶；⑨何慈毅：《明清時期琉球日本關系史》，南京：江蘇古籍出版社2002年版，第55頁。例證二，同年9月，幕府秀忠將軍公開向琉球國王承諾，“尚氏世代為琉球國王，現(xiàn)在應速速回國，祀奉祖先，仰本朝之威德，將其國永傳子孫?！雹鈁日]黑板勝美：《德川實紀（第1編）》，載于國史大系編修會編：《新訂增補國史大系（第38卷）》，東京：吉川弘文館1929年版。因此，筆者認為，1609年薩摩藩作為地方政府入侵琉球的行為并未經(jīng)過中央政府的授權或追認，并不符合領土取得的形式要件。那么結合歷史，薩摩藩武力征服琉球之后是否又產生取得琉球領土主權的效果？征服是一國不經(jīng)過他國同意，以武力將其領土置于統(tǒng)治之下，為古代國際法承認的領土轉移方式，但晚近國際法已經(jīng)不再承認這是取得領土主權的合法方式。①蘇義雄：《平時國際法》，臺北：三民書局1993年版，第178頁。而根據(jù)一般國際法，以征服取得領土往往需要完成2個步驟：其一是擊潰并滅亡一國；其二是滅亡一國后吞并該國。②Suya P. Sharma, Territorial Acquisition, Dispute and International Law, The Hague/Boston/ London: Martinus Nijhof f Publishers, 1997, p. 143.與1879年日本中央政府出兵琉球并改其為沖繩縣的做法不同，薩摩藩入侵琉球后，不僅奉中央命令放回琉球國王，琉球還長期維持自己的政體和對琉球的統(tǒng)治。此后為了從中琉貿易中獲利，薩摩藩不但沒有斬斷中琉之間的宗藩/朝貢關系，相反，薩摩藩和琉球都選擇向包括中國在內的國際社會刻意隱瞞琉薩之間的關系。即使從現(xiàn)代國際法看，琉球對內主權和對外主權都得以維系。因此，琉球迫于薩摩藩的威懾維持“暗屬”日本的狀態(tài)并不意味著日本取得近世時期琉球的主權。再后來，中日琉球交涉過程中，清政府認為琉球自成一國，世代受中國冊封，奉中國為正朔，“琉球既服中國，而又服于貴國”；③米慶余：《琉球歷史研究》，天津：天津人民出版社1998年版，第199頁。日本以寺島外務卿《說略》為代表的“琉球專屬日本論”則堅持認為，琉球系日本“內政”,既非“自為一國”，也非“服屬兩國”，④以寺島外務卿《說略》為代表的“琉球專屬日本”論中，明治政府除了強調1609年薩摩藩入侵琉球王國前日本和琉球在地緣、地理、文化、種族等的相通性外，還提到琉球對日本的進貢早于中國，日本特設太宰府對琉球進行管理。日本還強調1609年后日本幕府已把琉球賜給薩摩藩，薩摩藩對琉球實施了包括軍事、稅收、法律制定等多方面的政治統(tǒng)治。米慶余：《琉球歷史研究》，天津：天津人民出版社1998年版，第199頁。雙方交涉的核心是琉球的國際地位問題。日本的說辭無論從歷史還是國際法來看都有很大的漏洞。1609年薩摩藩入侵琉球后，琉球不僅保有自己的政權和年號，還與包括日本幕府在內的亞洲周邊國家展開外交和貿易交往。19世紀中期琉球以現(xiàn)代國際法意義上國家的名義，與美國、法國、荷蘭三國簽訂通商條約?？傊?，從史實和中日琉外交關系史看，1609至1879年間近世琉球為中日“兩屬”符合歷史，但近世琉球為獨立王國也是事實，該時期琉球地位絕不是明治政府所稱的“內政”問題，日本在此時期對琉球的“主權”更是無從談起。

第二，歷史上琉球既“中日兩屬”又為“獨立之國”符合國際法。中日就琉球問題進行外交交涉期間，清政府主張琉球“既服中國，又服貴國”，同時又是自主之國。日本對此反駁，“既是一國，則非所屬之邦土；既是所屬之邦土，則非自成一國，”并用萬國公法指出清國的“邏輯矛盾”，因此堅持琉球乃日本屬邦之主張。⑤日本外務省編：《日本外交文書（第12卷）》，東京：日本國際聯(lián)合協(xié)會1973年版。轉引自[日]西里喜行著，胡連成等譯：《清末中琉日關系史研究（上）》，北京：社會科學文化出版社2010年版，第30頁。西里喜行認為，“從傳統(tǒng)的冊封進貢體制的邏輯來說，內政上的自主國與對外關系上的屬國這二者之間并無矛盾，但對于不承認冊封進貢體制的日本來說，并沒有什么說服力，因此中日兩國的爭論陷入膠著狀態(tài)”。⑥[日]西里喜行著，胡連成等譯：《清末中琉日關系史研究（上）》，北京：社會科學文化出版社2010年版，第30頁。清政府主張琉球既“中日兩屬”又“自成一國”是否有國際法依據(jù)?這就涉及《萬國公法》有關國家構成的相關理論。⑦現(xiàn)有文獻中已有用《萬國公法》提到的歐羅巴濱海諸國和巴巴里之間關系與琉球的地位進行類比的初步嘗試，參見王鑫：《從國際法的角度分析琉球法律地位的歷史變遷》，載于《研究生法學》2009年第2期，第112～120頁；王鑫：《從琉球法律地位歷史變遷的角度透析釣魚島爭端》（碩士論文），北京：中國政法大學2010年版，第8頁；張毅：《琉球法律地位之國際法分析》（博士論文），北京：中國政法大學2013年版，第63～64頁。歷史上也曾有類似解讀，例如，為對抗明治政府提出的琉球“專屬日本”主張，東京的琉球陳情使以波蘭曾經(jīng)附屬于普魯士、奧地利和俄羅斯三國為例，指出《萬國公法》也同樣允許兩屬國家的存在。參見[日]西里喜行編：《琉球救國請愿書集成》，東京：法政大學沖繩文化研究所1992年版?！度f國公法》把現(xiàn)代國際法意義上的“國際人格者”分為“主權之國”、“半主之國”、“被保護國”、“藩屬”等類型。作為區(qū)別于“主權之國”或“半主之國”的藩屬國，“進貢之國并藩邦，公法就其所存主權多寡而定其自主之分”，⑧[美]惠頓著，[美]丁韙良譯，何勤華點校：《萬國公法》，北京：中國政法大學出版社2003年版，第41頁。也就是說，藩屬國的主權，并不因為其進貢于宗主國的事實而必然受到減損，而是取決于其自主性而定。1609年薩摩藩入侵，琉球從此成為明屬中國、暗屬日本的事實上的“兩屬”狀態(tài)，一直持續(xù)到日本明治維新初年。作為藩屬國，琉球有國內事務自主權，宗主國中國不干涉琉球內政，只是琉球國王即位的時候派出使者進行象征性的冊封。⑨修斌、姜秉國：《琉球亡國與東亞封貢體制功能的喪失》，載于《日本學刊》2007年第6期。宗主國中國并不企圖通過朝貢貿易獲取利益，更多的是以賞賜的形式對藩屬國進行經(jīng)濟資助，主要通過強大的政治、經(jīng)濟、文化號召力，保持對藩屬國的影響，絕非靠武力征討和吞并。期間，琉球對內仍維持其政治統(tǒng)治架構、對外則以國家的身份和法國、美國、荷蘭締結雙邊條約；琉球的內政雖受制于薩摩藩，民間風俗也逐漸日化，但只要當清使將到達琉球時，在琉球的日本人就會事先走避。本文認為，結合歷史和當時的國際法，1609-1879年琉球既是中日“兩屬”又是獨立自主的國家，二者并不矛盾。當然，自1879年被日本吞并、列入版圖后，琉球則淪為日本的殖民地，主權也遭到減損，這是不爭的事實。

第三，琉球的自我認知及歐美列強態(tài)度均視琉球王國為“自成一國”。琉球末代國王尚泰將琉球定位為“屬于皇國、支那……兩國乃父母之國?！雹鈁日]喜舍場朝賢：《琉球見聞錄(卷之一二)》，東京：至言社1977年版。轉引自[日]西里喜行著，胡連成等譯：《清末中琉日關系史研究（上）》，北京：社會科學文化出版社2010年版，第31頁。1867年巴黎萬國博覽會時，琉球巖下佐次右衛(wèi)門出席開幕式，自稱是代表琉球王的使節(jié)。日本江戶幕府雖向大會抗議稱“琉球系江戶幕府命令薩摩籓加以征服，因而成為薩摩籓的屬國，不是獨立于日本之外的國家”，但大會并未接受日本的抗議。①李明峻：《從國際法角度看琉球群島主權歸屬》，載于《臺灣國際研究季刊》2005年第2期，第56頁。1875年到1879年，琉球陳情使以東京為中心進行請愿活動，反復強調要遵守“以信義行事”，表明了不愿放棄本國的政治獨立，也不愿斷絕中琉關系的意愿。②[日]西里喜行：《琉球救國請愿書集成》，東京：法政大學沖繩文化研究所1992年版。1879年，向清政府求救的琉球紫巾官向德宏撰文對寺島外務卿的《說略》逐條進行反駁。③向德宏稱，“日本謂敝國國體、國政，皆伊所立，敝國無自主之權。夫國體、國政之大者，莫如膺封爵、賜國號、受姓、奉朔、律令、禮制諸巨典。敝國自洪武五年入貢，冊封中山王，改琉求國號曰琉球。永樂年間賜國主尚姓，歷奉中朝正朔，遵中朝禮典，用中朝律例，至今無異。至于國中官守之職名，人員之進退，號令之出入，服制之法度，無非敝國主及大臣主之，從無日本干預其間者。且前經(jīng)與法、美、荷三國互立約言，敝國書中皆用天朝年月，并寫敝國官員名。事屬自主，各國所深知。敝國非日本附屬，豈待辯論而明哉？”參見王蕓生：《六十年來中國與日本（第一卷）》，天津：大公報社1932年版，第127～129頁。從當時國際社會的態(tài)度看，1840至1879年間歐美列強不僅知道琉球“兩屬”的狀況，還懷著要求琉球開國的目的，秉持實用主義的外交政策在中日間周旋。比如，美國卸任總統(tǒng)格蘭特就曾調停過中日間琉球問題。1879年在與李鴻章商討調解琉球問題時，格蘭特曾表示，“琉球原來為一國，而日欲將其并合而得以自擴。清國所力爭之處，乃土地而非朝貢，甚具道理，將來需另設特別條款”，④[日]西里喜行著，胡連成等譯：《清末中琉日關系史研究（上）》，北京：社會科學文化出版社2010年版，第307頁。此后積極協(xié)調中日“分島改約”的外交談判。琉球以國家的身份和法國、美國、荷蘭締結了雙邊條約（參見表3），對外交往和對外締約能力是當時的國際法對國家身份認定的重要指標，琉球“自成一國”因而也是當時國際社會所公認的。

表3 鴉片戰(zhàn)爭后歐美艦船來琉以及締結條約一覽85

1855.11.6-1855.11.28700名那霸港條約交涉1855.11.24締結《琉法修好條約》1859.5.29 荷蘭艦隊昉·卡佩萊法國船維豪基烏內號等3艘格冉船長等爾那霸港條約交涉1859.7.6締結《琉荷修好條約》

第四，在面臨外來侵略或殖民統(tǒng)治時，與琉球同屬中華“宗藩/朝貢體制”的的外藩藩屬國如越南、朝鮮和緬甸等，均以條約的形式解決其地位問題，隨著時間的推移還最終取得獨立。在中國的朝貢體系中，琉球和朝鮮、越南、緬甸等是同一類型的“外藩”，其中以琉球最為恭順。然而，自從1879年日本在琉球“廢藩置縣”后，琉球就淪為日本的殖民地。與琉球情況不同的是，越南、朝鮮和緬甸脫離中國都有條約可循：1885年中法戰(zhàn)爭后，法國迫使中國簽署《中法新約》，取代中國的宗主國地位，成為越南的保護國；1886年中英簽訂《中英緬甸條約》，英國以緬甸維持“十年一貢”換取中國對英國在緬權利的承認，逐步把緬甸變?yōu)樽约旱闹趁竦兀?894年甲午戰(zhàn)爭后通過中日《馬關條約》，中國放棄對朝鮮的宗主國地位。可見，清末中國周邊藩屬國法律地位變更的“國家實踐”為，不僅用條約予以確認，還經(jīng)過宗主國中國的確認。但是，從1879年日本吞并琉球至二戰(zhàn)結束，中日間除了協(xié)商過1880年“分割琉球條約稿”之外，既沒有就琉球主權之變更，也沒有對琉球疆域的安排達成正式協(xié)議。時過境遷，20世紀，上述原屬中華朝貢體系的藩屬國命運多舛，但都擺脫了殖民統(tǒng)治，如今在聯(lián)合國框架下都是獨立的國家。

19世紀中后期，中日之間的“琉球交涉”是在“宗藩/朝貢體制”和“萬國公法體制”之間“文明的沖突”背景下展開的。事實證明,面對列強的入侵和國際格局的巨大沖擊，國力、軍力衰落的清政府完全寄希望于國際公法并以“據(jù)理詰問為正辦”，⑥1877年4月12日，琉球紫巾官向德宏乘船到閩向清朝求助，面見閩浙總督何璟和福建巡撫丁日昌，呈遞琉王陳情書，乞求代紓其國之難。面對駐日公使何如璋對日“阻貢不已，必滅琉球，琉球既滅，行及朝鮮”的警告和應對建議，李鴻章卻主張：“（何如璋）所陳上、中、下三策，遣兵舶責問及約琉人以必救，似皆小題大作，轉涉張皇。惟言之不聽時復言之，日人自知理絀，或不敢遽廢藩制改郡縣，俾球人得保其土，亦不藉寇以兵。此雖似下策，實為今日一定辦法?！眳⒁姟独铠櫿氯ぷg署函稿》，卷八，第1頁。卻對西方國際法只知其“器用”不知其“巧用”，教訓慘重。晚清維新運動著名活動家唐才常指出,對外交涉挫敗“雖由中國積弱使然，亦以未列公法之故，又無深諳公法之人據(jù)理力爭?！雹咛撇懦＃骸稊M開中西條例館條例》，載于湖南省哲學社會科學研究所編：《唐才常集》，北京：中華書局1980年版，第27頁。中日關于琉案交涉的結局，正好證明了這個道理。

四、琉球法律地位與釣魚島主權爭端

日本外務省對釣魚島的“主權主張”與琉球因素密不可分。為了證明將釣魚島并入版圖的行為符合國際法上的“先占”，日本不僅稱“‘尖閣諸島’在歷史上始終都是日本領土的‘南西諸島’的一部分”，還用沖繩縣在19世紀末對釣魚島所謂的“實地調查”作為“歷史證據(jù)”。⑧日本外務?。骸丁凹忾w諸島”問答》,下載于http://www.cn.emb-japan.go.jp/territory/ senkaku/question-and-answer.html，2016年10月12日；日本外務?。骸蛾P于尖閣諸島的基本見解》，下載于http://www.cn.emb-japan.go.jp/territory/senkaku/basic_view.html，2016年10月12日。日本官方主張中，歷史與國際法的領土爭端理論和條約法結合十分明顯。此外日本學者不僅否認中國對釣魚島的“原始發(fā)現(xiàn)”和“最先主權持有人的地位”，還提出對日本有利的釣魚島“主權主張”。⑨在有關釣魚島的國際法研究中，具有代表性的日本學者論著包括：[日]入江啟四郎：《尖閣列島海洋開發(fā)の基盤》，載于《季刊·沖繩》1971年3月，第56頁；[日]入江啟四郎：《日清講和と尖閣列島の地位》，載于《季刊·沖繩》1972年12月，第63頁；[日]奧原敏雄：《尖閣列島の領有權問題》，載于《季刊·沖繩》1971年3月，第56頁；[日]尾崎重義：《關于尖閣列島的歸屬》，載于《參考》1972年總第263號；[日]綠間榮：《尖閣列島》，那霸：ひるぎ社1984年版；Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations-Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000；Shigeyoshi Ozaki, Territorial Issues on the East China Sea: A Japanese Position, Journal of East Asia and International Law, No. 3, 2010；[日]尾崎重義：《尖閣諸島與日本的領有權》，載于《外交》2012年第12期；[日]石井望：《尖閣前史(ぜんし)、無主地(むしゅち)の一角に領有史料有り》，載于《八重山日報》2013年8月3日（平成二十五年八月三日）。本文認為，考察琉球王國的地理范圍以及中琉疆界分界，對于進一步從歷史和地理角度論證釣魚島主權歸屬具有重要的意義；而1429年至1879年間的中日琉史料更是佐證我國釣魚島主權主張的重要歷史證據(jù)?？偟膩砜?，釣魚島自古屬于中國而不屬于琉球，這不僅有來自中日琉三方的史料佐證，還有社會文化和地理水文等方面的依據(jù)。

（一）釣魚島由中國人而非琉球人先發(fā)現(xiàn)具有社會文化和地理水文等原因

釣魚島自明朝初年以來一直是中國的領土，并被用作航海的航標，從未成為琉球的領土，根本原因是琉球人未能在中國人之前發(fā)現(xiàn)釣魚島。⑩沙學駿：《釣魚臺屬中國不屬琉球之史地根據(jù)》，載于《學粹雜志》1972年第2期，第16頁。而中國人能先發(fā)現(xiàn)釣魚島，除了社會文化因素外，還有地理地質水文等多重因素，具體如下：

1.琉球人的造鐵、造船以及航船技術均較中國落后。琉球自古缺乏鐵砂以供煉制熟鐵，市面上甚至缺乏作為日用品的鐵器，①沙學駿：《釣魚臺屬中國不屬琉球之史地根據(jù)》，載于《學粹雜志》1972年第2期，第16頁。歷史上琉球“地無貨殖”“商賈不通”，琉球人“縛竹為筏，不駕舟楫”，②李廷機著：《李文節(jié)公文集》，載于陳子龍等編：《明經(jīng)世文編（卷460）》，北京：中華書局1962年版。14-15世紀琉球的航海事業(yè)還處于低級階段。由于琉球造船和航海技術落后，1392年朱元璋除了賜海舟給琉球外，還賜“閔人三十六姓善操舟者，令往來朝貢?！雹埤埼谋蛑骸睹鲿ň?7，外藩1，琉球）》，北京：中華書局1956年版。這些因素決定了琉球人不可能先發(fā)現(xiàn)釣魚島，而同時期的中國人具備造船、航海技術等條件，還發(fā)明了航海必需的指南針，中國先發(fā)現(xiàn)釣魚島則在情理之中。

2.從針路距離遠近與指標島嶼多少而言，古代中國人發(fā)現(xiàn)釣魚島更具優(yōu)勢。據(jù)中國史料的針路和距離記載，從閩江口到釣魚島共約330公里，在基隆以西，有白犬嶼、東沙山（島）等小島為（針路的）指標島，十分便利。而基隆到釣魚島只有200公里，又有花瓶嶼和彭佳嶼為指標島嶼。反之從琉球的那霸到釣魚島則有460公里，由古米山到釣魚島也有410公里，比基隆到釣魚島的距離長了一倍有余。尤其重要的是，古米山和釣魚島之間，只有一個面積很小的赤尾嶼作為指標島。僅考慮到赤尾嶼到古米山之間需要“過?！?80公里之遠，對于航海技術和造船工程很落后的琉球人，已經(jīng)是不容易克服的困難；即使此后赤尾嶼到釣魚島的距離僅130公里，但因遠離那霸和古米山，聯(lián)絡十分不便，“過海”更加不容易克服。④沙學駿：《釣魚島屬中國不屬琉球之史地根據(jù)》，載于《學粹雜志》1972年第2期，第17頁。

3.從黑潮流向、釣魚島海域的水文狀況和冊封使路線看，中國人較琉球人更容易“發(fā)現(xiàn)”釣魚島，日本的“無主地論”缺乏依據(jù)。自古以來，中國人航行琉球與日本，均靠信風及洋流，洋流即為黑潮⑤黑潮是太平洋北赤道洋流遇大陸后的向北分支，自菲律賓經(jīng)臺灣海峽及臺灣東部，過八重山、宮古島、釣魚島列嶼，再往日本、韓國。黑潮時速平均為四、五海里，經(jīng)過八重山、宮古島、琉球諸島和釣魚島列嶼時，因風向和海岸沖擊，又形成西側向南洄流現(xiàn)象。參見楊仲揆：《中國·琉球·釣魚島》，香港：友聯(lián)研究所1972年版，第135頁。（也稱為“日本洋流”）。我國古代海船，由閩江經(jīng)臺灣北部前往琉球，正是順著黑潮支流、乘東南季風前進。中國海船由閩江口經(jīng)臺灣北方前往釣魚島，因為是順著黑潮支流前進、速度加快，容易到達釣魚島，故容易發(fā)現(xiàn)釣魚島。而琉球海船欲過琉球海溝前往釣魚島，須逆黑潮前進，因受到阻力而速度減少，航行困難，使琉球“先發(fā)現(xiàn)”釣魚島更為不可能。⑥沙學駿：《釣魚臺屬中國不屬琉球之史地根據(jù)》，載于《學粹雜志》1972年第2期，第17頁。

4.從海底地形看，中琉存在自然疆界。從對馬海峽到釣魚島及赤尾嶼南側，經(jīng)臺灣北部沿海及全部臺灣海峽，以及廣東沿海，都是200米以內的大陸架，這是中國領土的自然延伸。另一方面，琉球群島東南方的短距離以內，海深達到3000米以上，最深處深達7000多米。在琉球群島與釣魚島之間存在的海溝叫“琉球海溝”，大部分深1000～2000米，由北東北向南西南延長，其南部介于八重山列島與臺灣之間。上述黑潮就在琉球海溝之中，由南向北推進。黑潮和琉球海溝共同成為中國和琉球王國領土的自然疆界。⑦沙學駿：《釣魚臺屬中國不屬琉球之史地根據(jù)》，載于《學粹雜志》1972年第14卷第2期，第17頁。自古以來，琉球人在此地帶以東生活，中國人在此地帶以西生活。綜上，由于社會文化因素和地理地質水文等多重因素制約，琉球人無法早于中國先發(fā)現(xiàn)釣魚島。

（二）中琉之間自古存在天然疆界并有各國史料佐證

中琉之間存在疆界、釣魚島屬于中國的事實，早已成為中琉兩國的共識。從1372年（明洪武五年）至1866年（清同治五年）近500年間，明清兩代朝廷先后24次派遣使臣前往琉球王國冊封，釣魚島是冊封使前往琉球的途經(jīng)之地，有關釣魚島的記載大量出現(xiàn)在中國使臣陳侃、謝杰、夏子陽、汪輯、周煌等所撰寫的冊封使錄中。1650年，琉球國相向象賢監(jiān)修的琉球國第一部正史《中山世鑒》中，全文轉載了中國冊封使陳侃《使琉球錄》所記釣魚島列嶼內容，其對《使琉球錄》中“見古米山（亦稱“姑米山”，今久米島），乃屬琉球者”這一中琉地方分界之語并沒有提出異議。⑧鄭海麟：《釣魚島列嶼之歷史與法理研究》，北京：中華書局2007年版，第98頁。此外，1708年，琉球學者、紫金大夫程順則所著《指南廣義》內中附圖將釣魚臺、黃尾嶼、赤尾嶼連為一體，與古米山之間成一明顯的分界線。⑨這幅附圖，實際上也成為（中國的冊封使）陳侃“見古米山，乃屬琉球者”及郭汝霖“赤嶼者，界琉球地方山也”的最佳注釋。參見鄭海麟：《釣魚島列嶼之歷史與法理研究》，北京：中華書局2007年版，第98～99頁。以上的琉球史料印證了這樣的事實：釣魚島、赤尾嶼屬于中國，久米島屬于琉球，分界線在赤尾嶼和久米島間的黑水溝（今沖繩海槽）。日本方面所記載的琉球范圍，典型例證如日本林子平（1783-1793）所繪《三國通覽圖說》（“三國”指蝦夷地、朝鮮、琉球）附圖中的《琉球三省并三十六島之圖》；⑩林子平所繪《三國通覽圖說》出版于日本天明五年，即中國乾隆五十年（1785年）秋?！度龂ㄓ[圖說》共有五幅附圖，分別是：《三國通覽輿地路程全圖》、《蝦夷國全圖》、《朝鮮八道之圖》、《無人島大小之八十余之圖》、《琉球三省并三十六島之圖》。參見［日］村田忠禧：《釣魚島爭議》，載于《百年潮》2004年第6期，第56～62頁。琉球方面的歷史文獻如蔡鐸編纂,由其子蔡溫年改訂的《中山世譜》等都明確記載了琉球的范圍。①據(jù)《中山世譜》記載，琉球本島由“三府五州十五郡”（應為三十五郡）組成。所謂“三府”是中頭的中山府五州十一郡,“島尾”的山南府十五郡,“國頭”的山北府九郡,另外有三十六島。參見［日］村田忠禧：《釣魚島爭議》，載于《百年潮》2004年第6期，第56～62頁。從中日琉三國的史料和地圖來看，屬于琉球的島嶼中，并不包括釣魚嶼、黃尾嶼、赤尾嶼,這是當時中日琉共同的認識。

（三）日本宣稱釣魚島為“無主地”的主張既不合史實也不合國際法

日本宣稱：“自1885年以來曾多次對尖閣諸島進行徹底的實地調查，慎重確認尖閣諸島不僅為無人島，而且也沒有受到清朝統(tǒng)治的痕跡”。②日本外務?。骸蛾P于尖閣諸島所有權問題的基本見解》，下載于http://www.cn.embjapan.go.jp/territory/senkaku/basic_view.html，2016年10月12日。日本政府多年來宣稱釣魚島是依“無主地先占”原則，透過合法程序編入。在此，日本所稱的“多次實地調查”是歷史問題，“無主地先占”則是國際法問題。

日本聲稱自1885年以來，對釣魚島“多次”進行“實地調查”，但是這卻并非事實。明治時期的官方文件證實，日本僅在1885年10月間對釣魚島列嶼進行過一次實地調查，而且只登陸了釣魚島調查，對黃尾嶼、赤尾嶼均未登島調查。③此次調查的結果，體現(xiàn)在石澤兵吾的《魚釣島及另外二島調查概略》和“出云丸號”船長林鶴松的《魚釣島、久場、久米赤島回航報告書》中。二人的報告提交給了代理沖繩縣令西村舍三之職的沖繩縣大書記官森長義。參見[日]村田忠禧著，韋平和譯：《日中領土爭端的起源——從歷史檔案看釣魚島問題》，北京：社會科學文獻出版社2013年版，第166～169頁；李理：《近代日本對釣魚島的非法調查及竊取》，北京：社會科學文獻出版社2013年版，第12～14頁。當時的外務大臣井上馨了解到，釣魚島列嶼是“接近清國國境……臺灣近傍之清國所屬島嶼”。④《美報文章：日應尊重釣魚島相關國際條約》，下載于http://news.xinhuanet.com/ world/2012-10/22/c_123850855.htm，2016年11月1日。外務省“親展第三十八號”文件表明，井上馨對內文卿山縣有朋表達了對建國標事項的反對，稱“此時倘公開建立國標，無疑將招致清國猜疑”；⑤“沖縄県久米赤島、久場島、魚釣島ヘ國標建設ノ件”（JCAHR：B03041152300），載于《日本外交文書（第18卷）》，第572頁。同年11月24日沖繩縣令西村舍三也在公文中證實：“此事與清國不無關系，萬一發(fā)生矛盾沖突，如何處理至關重要，請予以指示?！雹轇03041152300の17，《日本外交文書（第18卷）》，第576頁。1885年11月30日，在太政大臣三條實美給外務大臣井上馨的指令書“秘第二一八號之二”中，最終決定暫緩建設國標。⑦“沖縄県久米赤島、久場島、魚釣島ヘ國標建設ノ件”（JCAHR：B03041152300），載于《日本外交文書（第18卷）》，第572頁。佐證上述結論的證據(jù)還包括：第一，日本海軍省文件表明，1892年1月27日沖繩縣縣令丸岡莞爾致函海軍大臣樺山資紀，鑒于釣魚島列嶼為“調查未完成”之島嶼，要求海軍派遣“海門艦”前往實地調查，但海軍省以“季節(jié)險惡”為由并未派遣。⑧Han-yi Shaw, The Inconvenient Truth Behind the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, The New York Times, 19 September 2012；臺灣“外交部”：《對日本外務省網(wǎng)站有關釣魚臺列嶼十六題問與答逐題駁斥全文》，下載于http://www.mofa.gov.tw/cp.aspx?n=FBFB 7416EA72736F&s=FAA8620A0EE72A91，2015年1月30日。第二，1894年5月間，沖繩縣縣令奈良原繁致函內務省，確認從1885年首次實地調查以來沒有再實地調查。⑨“沖縄県久米赤島、久場島、魚釣島ヘ國標建設ノ件”（JCAHR: B03041152300）；Han-yi Shaw, The Inconvenient Truth Behind the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, The New York Times, 19 September 2012；臺灣“外交部”：《對日本外務省網(wǎng)站有關釣魚臺列嶼十六題問與答逐題駁斥全文》，下載于http://www.mofa.gov.tw/cp.aspx?n=FBFB 7416EA72736F&s=FAA8620A0EE72A91，2015年1月30日。至1894年8月中日甲午戰(zhàn)爭爆發(fā)、清國戰(zhàn)敗之際，1894年12月，日本內務省內務大臣野村靖向外務大臣陸奧宗光發(fā)出“密別一三三號”秘密文件，對如何答復一年前沖繩縣知事第三次申請建立管轄航標一事進行磋商并稱：“業(yè)經(jīng)與貴省磋商后，以指令下達……唯因今昔情況已殊”。⑩“B03041152300の29”，載于《日本外交文書（第18卷）》。這句“唯因今昔情況已殊”充分暴露日本政府趁甲午戰(zhàn)爭竊我領土的密謀過程，更使日本試圖將釣魚島和《馬關條約》分離的主張難以自圓其說。與沖繩縣花費一天時間調查大東島并設立國標①1885年6-7月，內務省發(fā)出密令給沖繩縣令西村舍三，指示其調查位于沖繩本島東部的無人島大東島。在西村舍三的命令下，當年8月29日石澤兵吾等人乘“出云丸號”登陸南大東島，31日登上北大東島，遵照指令進行實地調查，并建立名為“沖繩縣管轄”的國家標志。船長林鶴松建立了題為“奉大日本帝國沖繩縣之命東京共同運輸公司出云丸創(chuàng)開汽船航路”的航標?！俺鲈仆杼枴庇?月1日返回那霸港。參見[日]村田忠禧著，韋平和譯：《日中領土爭端的起源——從歷史檔案看釣魚島問題》，北京：社會科學文獻出版社2013年版，第150～152頁。相比，日本所稱自1885年以來經(jīng)由沖繩當局等多次對釣魚臺列嶼進行實地調查，以及自稱釣魚臺列嶼是“無主地”等完全不是事實。另外，1885年沖繩縣釣魚島調查報告——《魚釣島及另外二島調查概略》，②《魚釣島及另外二島調查概略》記載：“此島與英國出版之日本臺灣間海圖相對照，相當于Hoa Pin su……海圖上以Tia u su標記，實有所誤。久米赤島相當于Raleigh Rock，唯一礁石爾……海圖上以Pinnacle為久場島，亦有所誤。Pinnacle一語為頂點之意……故勘其誤，魚釣島應為Hoa Pin Su，久場島應為Tia u su，久米赤島應為Raleigh Rock。”村田忠禧指出，報告的提交者石澤兵吾實際上是誤將釣魚嶼認作花瓶嶼。參見[日]村田忠禧著，韋平和譯：《日中領土爭端的起源——從歷史檔案看釣魚島問題》，北京：社會科學文獻出版社2013年版，第169頁。也反復提到英國海圖中的“Hoa Pin Su”和“Tia u su”，均為中國對釣魚島列嶼的命名。③鄭海麟：《釣魚島列嶼之歷史與法理研究》，北京：中華書局2007年版，第75頁。

在國際法中，領土取得的“先占”，是一個國家意圖將不屬于任何國家主權下的土地，即無主地置于其主權之下的據(jù)為己有的行為。④英文“occupation”一詞，大陸國際法學家王鐵崖領銜翻譯的《奧本海國際法》（第9版）中被譯為“占領”，臺灣國際法學家丘宏達的《現(xiàn)代國際法》（陳純一修訂）在引用《奧本海國際法》同一版本涉及領土爭端的部分時，將“occupation”翻譯為“先占”。丘宏達認為，“occupation”的翻譯在領土取得方面中文譯為“先占”，但在戰(zhàn)爭法上譯為“占領”，兩者涵義不同。軍事占領不能取得主權。本文采用丘宏達的譯法。參見丘宏達著，陳純一修訂：《現(xiàn)代國際法（修訂第3版）》，臺北：三民書局2013年版，第514～515頁；[英]詹寧斯、瓦茨修訂，王鐵崖等譯：《奧本海國際法（第一卷，第二分冊）》，北京：中國大百科全書出版社1998年版，第74～79頁。先占的成立必須確認是以“無主地”⑤“無主地”的概念一度在18世紀的國際法中流行，被歐洲各國用來為殖民行為辯護。18世紀著名國際法學家瓦特爾的《國家間的法律》中闡述了國際法上的“無主地”。他對英國占有大洋洲，或歐洲各國占有整個北美洲的行為進行合理化，將原住民的土地區(qū)別為“已墾殖”與“未墾殖”兩類。瓦特爾認為，歐洲主導的國際法應當確認人類對于所棲身、使用的土地負有開發(fā)、墾殖的義務。那些居無定所的游牧部落失于開發(fā)、墾殖土地的義務本身，即意味著可以視他們從未“真正而合法地”占有這些土地；因為這些部落沒有成型昭彰的社會組織者，其與土地二者間不得認作國際法上之占有關系，因而其土地為“無主地”，根據(jù)發(fā)現(xiàn)與先占原則，無主地向所有殖民者敞開。參見De Vattel, Les droit des Gens, ou Principles de la Loi naturelle, appliqués a la conduit at aux af f aires des Nations et des Souverains (1758), translated by Charles為前提，即先占的客體只限于不屬于任何國家的土地，這種土地或者完全沒有人居住，或者雖然有土著居民，但該土著社會不被認為是一個國家。⑥雖然此原則在現(xiàn)代國際法中還被應用，但國際公認的無主地越來越少，其影響力與認可度也漸漸衰落。先占取得的方式還必須是有效的而不能僅是擬制的。⑦早期國際法并未規(guī)定先占必須具備占有和行政管理兩個條件，而認為發(fā)現(xiàn)就可以主張主權，但19世紀的國際法理論和國家實踐均支持先占必須有效才能取得領土主權。⑧

1972年日本外務省《關于尖閣諸島所有權問題的基本見解》⑨表明，日本政府宣稱對釣魚島擁有“主權”的“法律依據(jù)”不僅有“無主地先占”原則，還聲稱通過合法程序即1895年1月14日內閣會議決議正式編入日本領土。然而“無人島”是否即為國際法意義上的“無主地”？日本將釣魚島并入其領土的程序是否符合國際法呢？

首先，釣魚島列嶼雖為無人島，但是自明代起就被中國官方列入軍事海防區(qū)域，列入福建的行政管轄范圍，這就是一種“有效”占領的方式。沖繩縣在19世紀末對包括大東島在內的無人島的調查研究表明，日本有很多無人島。但無人并不意味著沒有主人或所有者，必須尋找無人島的所有者。然而，1885年日本政府便放棄了在釣魚島列島建設國標，是因為已經(jīng)知道這些島嶼與清國存在關系。那么，如果不向清國詢問這些無人島的主權，并從清國那里得到“不屬于清國領土”的答復，日本政府就無法申領所謂的無人島。⑩事實上日本當時并非不了解國際法“無主地”的確認與占領宣告的原則，例如明治政府于1891年編入硫磺島時，

Ghequiere Fenwick, Washington: Carnegie institution of Washington, 1916, p. 194.⑥中國大百科全書出版社1998年版，第74頁。

⑦ [英]詹寧斯、瓦茨修訂，王鐵崖等譯：《奧本海國際法（第一卷，第二分冊）》，北京：中國大百科全書出版社1998年版，第75頁。

⑧ Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. I, 9th ed., Harlow: Longmans Group UK Limited, 1992, pp. 689～690.

⑨ 日本外務?。骸蛾P于尖閣諸島所有權問題的基本見解》，下載于http://www.cn.embjapan.go.jp/territory/senkaku/basic_view.html，2016年10月12日。

⑩ [日]村田忠禧著，韋平和譯：《日中領土爭端的起源——從歷史檔案看釣魚島問題》，北京：社會科學文獻出版社2013年版，第150～177頁。在1891年8月19日內閣決議后，曾于同年9月9日以勅令第190號公布；之后，明治政府1898年編入南鳥島時，在1898年7月1日內閣決議后，也于同年7月24日以東京府告示第58號公布。可見日本秘密先占釣魚島列嶼不但與國際法與國際慣例不符，亦和它自己的國內實踐不一致。①臺灣“外交部”：《對日本外務省網(wǎng)站有關釣魚臺列嶼十六題問與答逐題駁斥全文》，下載于http://www.mofa.gov.tw/cp.aspx?n=FBFB7416EA72736F&s=FAA8620A0 EE72A91，2015年1月30日。

其次，日本稱，1896年由沖繩縣郡編制的敕令第13號將沖繩縣編制成五郡。然而編制中沒有提及釣魚島及其附屬島嶼，也并未將釣魚島、黃尾嶼等與八重山諸島并列在一塊。也就是說，釣魚島、黃尾嶼并未被納入敕令第13號的編制對象。即使在甲午中日戰(zhàn)爭結束后，日本政府也未對釣魚島列島正式辦理領有手續(xù)。②[日]村田忠禧著，韋平和譯：《日中領土爭端的起源——從歷史檔案看釣魚島問題》，北京：社會科學文獻出版社2013年版，第222～223頁。被內閣會議批準設置的標樁，實際上沖繩縣此后并沒有設置。1968年聯(lián)合國亞洲和遠東經(jīng)濟委員會發(fā)布了對東海海底資源調查的結論性報告。在此情況下，1969年5月9日，石垣市才匆匆在釣魚島上設置了界標。③[日]村田忠禧著，韋平和譯：《日中領土爭端的起源——從歷史檔案看釣魚島問題》，北京：社會科學文獻出版社2013年版，第201～202頁。再次，合法的權利，不能源自非法的行為，還有兩點可以證明日方主張自始無效：其一是“沖繩縣”水產技師（官名）1913年編纂的《宮古郡、八重山郡漁業(yè)調查書》。關于“尖閣群島”，文中提到日本人古賀辰四郎想向日本政府租借，然而由于當時“不無清國所屬之說，因此遲遲不見（日本）政府處置。適逢日清戰(zhàn)役，依其結果臺灣新入我國領土、該島（尖閣群島）之領域亦隨之明朗?！边@透露出明治政府在編入釣魚島之前，已知其并非“無主地”。其二是1920年12月9日《官報》第2507號。其中有“所屬未定地之編入”與“字名設定”記載二則?！八鶎傥炊ǖ亍敝傅氖浅辔矌Z，而新設名稱是“大正島”。這表示1895年1月14日秘密內閣決議，既未合乎日本國內法或國際法，而且在編入范圍上有重大疏漏，以至于日本于甲午戰(zhàn)爭結束25年后，才將赤尾嶼片面編入，改名大正島。④Han-yi Shaw, The Inconvenient Truth Behind the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, The New York Times, 19 September 2012.

綜上，先占成立必須確認是以“無主地”為前提。其次，依據(jù)文明國家所承認的一般國際法原則，無主地的確認與占領的宣告都是國際法上“無主地”有效先占原則不可或缺的要件。再次，國際法“一國不得以違法作為或不作為取得合法權利或資格”的原則，更充分說明日本竊取釣魚島的違法行為不得作為取得合法權利的基礎。大量事實證明，日本援引“無主地先占”原則以主張釣魚島主權，其依據(jù)并不充分。

五、結 論

本文認為，即使在中日“兩屬”時期，綜合考察琉球“近世”時期的歷史，并結合19世紀以《萬國公法》為代表的近代國際法，琉球仍可以定性為一個主權國家，具體為：

第一，可以從琉球自身的歷史，以及與琉球類似的藩屬國來考察琉球的歷史地位。首先，以時間軸為維度的琉球三個階段的歷史地位，第一階段即1609年薩摩藩入侵“慶長之役”前，琉球為獨立的王國，各國史家爭議不大。第二階段即1609-1872年琉球“兩屬”時期，琉球王國是否為獨立的王國則有爭議。這一時期琉球不僅保有自己的政權和年號，與包括日本幕府在內的亞洲周邊國家展開外交和貿易交往，1854至1859年間還以現(xiàn)代國際法意義上主權國家的名義與美、法、荷蘭三國簽訂過通商條約，更重要的是，為便于薩摩從中琉貿易中獲利，薩摩藩和琉球向包括中國在內的國際社會刻意隱瞞琉薩之間的關系。從中日琉外交關系史和國際法來看，日本并不因薩摩藩的入侵而擁有對琉球的“主權”，因此，不僅琉球“兩屬”的說法成立，而且琉球為獨立王國的說法也成立。第三階段，即1872-1880年中日琉球交涉時期，琉球的地位懸而未決。該時期中日之間就琉球所屬問題頻繁的外交交涉、第三國對中日間琉球問題的斡旋，以及1880年中日“分島改約案”（清政府沒有簽署），都印證該時期琉球地位為“懸案”的歷史事實。其次，在“琉球交涉”前后，清廷和西方列強展開針對另外三個藩屬國（朝鮮、越南、緬甸）的外交交涉。與琉球不同的是，清末中國的藩屬國越南、朝鮮和緬甸之法律地位的變更，不僅以條約予以確認，而且經(jīng)過宗主國中國的確認。然而從1879年日本以武力吞并琉球國到二戰(zhàn)結束，中日之間除進行過1880年分割琉球條約稿的磋商外，既沒有就琉球主權變更、更沒有對琉球疆域的安排達成正式協(xié)議。更重要的是，這些原為中華朝貢體系的藩屬國如今都已擺脫殖民統(tǒng)治，是聯(lián)合國框架下的獨立國家。

第二，基于“時際法”，從近、現(xiàn)代國際法考察琉球的國際法地位。眾所周知，近代國際法的代表著作為美國人惠頓的《萬國公法》。日清圍繞琉球問題進行外交交涉時，“琉球兩屬”期間的地位問題曾成為雙方爭議的焦點，《萬國公法》成為中日琉三方都曾援引的法律依據(jù)。根據(jù)《萬國公法》的主權、“國際人格者”理論，1609-1879年琉球既為中日“兩屬”又是獨立自主的國家，二者并不矛盾。當然，自1879年被日本吞并、列入版圖后，琉球則淪為日本的殖民地，從此琉球的主權遭到減損，這也是不爭的事實。1879年日本武力吞并琉球后，“脫清人”和琉球本土的“復國運動”都表明琉球人民的反抗，琉球的宗主國——中國也從未公開承認吞并的合法性。日本自1879年到二戰(zhàn)期間對琉球的占領狀態(tài)，實為國際法領土取得理論中的“征服”，然而這并不能掩蓋“琉球法律地位未定”的事實。其次，根據(jù)現(xiàn)代國際托管制度，開羅會議中美會談時曾達成共同托管琉球之共識，而二戰(zhàn)后琉球被美國單獨實行“事實托管”。此后，美國無視琉球人民獨立的意愿，通過《琉球移交協(xié)議》把琉球的施政權“返還”給日本，更違反了“國際托管四原則”和托管制度的信托法法理。同時，按照“剩余主權”理論，日本僅取得琉球的施政權而非主權。⑤劉丹：《琉球托管的國際法研究——兼論釣魚島的主權歸屬問題》，載于《太平洋學報》2012年第12期，第82～87頁。

總之，從1372年到1879年，作為中國外藩的琉球是國際法意義上的主權國家。1879年日本以武力吞并琉球，遭到琉球人民的反抗，琉球的宗主國——中國也從未公開承認吞并的合法性，琉球法律地位未定有理有據(jù)。日本以釣魚島隸屬于“法律地位未定”的琉球來主張釣魚島主權本身就是站不住腳的。

The Japanese government attempted to purchase the Diaoyu Islands in 2012. Since this “farce” staged by the Japanese side concerning the Sino-Japanesedisputes over Diaoyu Islands,①Diaoyu Islands is also called “Diaoyu Dao” or “Diaoyutai” in China, or “Senkaku Islands”in Japan. Except as otherwise stated herein, the term Diaoyu Islands is used throughout this paper to refer to Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islets.the tensions between the two States escalated, and an acrimonious standof f between them still continues. In Chinese academia, especially in Chinese Mainland, few studies have paid enough attention to Ryukyu when examining Japanese claims to the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. The debate on Ryukyu,②In recent years, concerns over the sovereignty of Ryukyu grew quickly in Chinese civil society. Calls for the “restoration of Ryukyu Kingdom” appeared in the internet social media. In Chinese academia, Xu Yong, Tang Chunfeng and other scholars also argue that the status of Ryukyu is uncertain. This argument, frst raised by Taiwanese scholars, rose to prominence in Chinese Mainland around 2012, which sparked the attention of media in Japan and Okinawa. Sino-Japanese relations have become strained after Japan’s move to“nationalize” the Diaoyu Islands. On 8 May 2012, People’s Daily, the official newspaper of China, published an article titled “The Treaty of Shimonoseki and the Diaoyu Dao Issue”, by Zhang Haipeng and Li Guoqiang. This article, in its conclusion, says that “it is the high time to reconsider the pending issue of Ryukyu.” As to the position of Chinese government toward Ryukyu, a Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman asserted, “Chinese government has never changed its position to some relevant issues. The history of Okinawa and Ryukyu is a long-time concern in the academia, which stood up again recently, against the backdrop where the territorial sovereignty of China was jeopardized by Japan’s provocative acts concerning the Diaoyu Islands issue. The articles by scholars reflect the concerns and studies on the Diaoyu Islands and the relevant historical issues by Chinese civil society and academia”.becomes more heated during the tense standof f following the Japanese move to “purchase the Diaoyu Islands” in 2012. The issue of the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands is intertwined with the status of the Ryukyu Islands. We should eliminate the misstatements about the status of Ryukyu. In other words, when discussing whether the sovereignty over Ryukyu rests with Japan, if we fortify China’s claims to the Diaoyu Islands from the perspectives of history, geography and international law, and rationally and forcefully refute Japan’s claims based on the subordination of the Diaoyu Islands to Ryukyu③Ministry of Foreign Af f airs of Japan, The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/basic_view.html, 8 October 2016; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Senkaku Islands Q&A, at http://www.mofa. go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html, 8 October 2016.with convincible facts, then we can reject Japan’s claims with its own arguments.

I. The History of Ryukyu and Its Relationship with China and Japan

Ryukyu is an ancient kingdom with a long historical and cultural tradition.With its thriving trade, the kingdom was known as a trade transit center in Northeast and Southeast Asia, which earned itself a reputation of “Bridge of Nations”. The geographical boundary of the kingdom is greatly dif f erent from that of today’s Okinawa Prefecture. However, as time goes by, Ryukyuan tributary relations with China is lesser known to the modern generation. Ryukyu was a kingdom having its unique history before 1879, when it was formally annexed by Meiji Japanese government. Ryukyuan history was briefy divided into three times: the primeval, the ancient and the pre-modern times. The primeval Ryukyu includes the old stone age and the shell mound age. The ancient Ryukyu starts with the early 12th century and ends with the invasion of the Ryukyu Kingdom by the Shimazu clan of Satsuma Domain④Satsuma Domain is the local authority controlling the southern Kyushu Island before the Meiji Government replaced its feudal domain system with prefecture system. It is associated with the provinces of Satsuma in the western modern-day Kagoshima Prefecture, Osumi in the eastern modern-day Kagoshima Prefecture and Osumi Islands, and Hyūga in southwestern modern-day Miyazaki Prefecture. After the creation of the Tokugawa regime in the Edo period (1603-1868), this authority became the Satsuma Domain, which was formally named the Kagoshima Domain following the Meiji Restoration. See Sadafumi Fujii and Rokurō Hayashi, Hanshi Jiten, Tokyo: Akita Shoten, 1976, p. 342, quoted from Yuan Jiadong, The Japanese Satsuma Invasion of Ryukyu and the Changes in East Asian Geopolitics, Social Sciences in China, No. 8, 2013, p. 189. (in Chinese)in 1609, spanning 500 years. And the pre-modern Ryukyu covers a period of 270 years, beginning from Satsuma’s invasion of Ryukyu in 1609 until 1879, when the Meiji government abolished the Ryukyu Kingdom and transformed it into the Okinawa Prefecture⑤He Ciyi, The History of the Relations between Ryukyu and Japan in Ming and Qing Dynasties, Nanjing: Jiangsu Ancient Books Publishing House Co. Ltd., 2002, pp. 3～5. (in Chinese)

A. The History of Ryukyu Kingdom and the Tributary Relations between Ryukyu and China

From the unification of the Ryukyu Kingdom in 1429, to the annexation of the kingdom by Japan in 1879, the Ryukyu Kingdom spans two periods, i.e., the ancient and the pre-modern Ryukyu. King Satto became, in 1372, the first Ryukyuan king to submit to Chinese suzerainty. Investiture (cefeng) mission confrmed Satto as king of Chūzan. From 1372 to 1879, when the Ryukyu Kingdom was annexed and transformed into Okinawa Prefecture by Japan, the tributary relations between China and Ryukyu had been maintained for more than 500 years. In all, investiture missions were undertaken 24 times during the Ming and QingDynasties.⑥There is little debate, among the Chinese and Japanese scholars, over the times that the Qing Court sent imperial envoys to Ryukyu. It is generally maintained that the Qing Court sent envoys 8 times to perform investiture ceremony for Ryukyuan kings, involving 16 envoys in all. However, historians failed to reach a consensus over the total times that China dispatched envoys to Ryukyu in the two dynasties of Ming and Qing. It is generally believed to be 24 times, but some scholars also assert that it is 23 times. The main dif f erence lies in their dif f erent views on the times of investiture missions sent in the Ming Dynasty. Xie Bizhen, Wu Shangqing and Akamine Seiki all believe that the Ming Court sent investiture missions 15 times, involving 27 envoys; in contrast, Fang Baochuan asserts that the numbers are 14 (times) and 26 (envoys) respectively. Some scholars contend that the times of investiture missions should be determined on whether the central government has sent envoys to perform investiture ceremony for Ryukyuan King on the land of the kingdom, therefore, the mission carried out by Yang Zai should not be counted, and the Ming and Qing Courts sent envoys 23 times, rather than 24 times to Ryukyu to perform investiture rituals for its kings. See Xie Bizhen and Hu Xin, Historical Data and Research on the History of Sino-Ryukyuan Relations, Beijing: China Ocean Press, 2010, pp. 125～126 (in Chinese); Xu Bin, Literati and Officialdom in Ming and Qing Dynasties and Ryukyu, Beijing: China Ocean Press, 2011, p. 83. (in Chinese)Ryukyu Kingdom sent more envoys to China.⑦Veritable Records of Emperor Ming Taizu (Vol. 71) stated, the imperial edict that Ming Taizu, also known as the Hongwu Emperor, ordered Yang Zai to carry along to confirm King Satto as king of Chūzan said: “only your country Ryukyu, which is located to the southeast of China and far away in the oversea land, was not informed of the news. Therefore, now I send my envoys to tell you the news.” See Veritable Records of Emperor Ming Taizu, Vol. 71, 16 January 1372 (lunar calendar).Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two States, upon the accession of a new king after the death of an old king, Chinese envoys would be dispatched to perform investiture ceremonies for the new king, formally acknowledging him as king on behalf of the Chinese Imperial Court. Only after the performance of imperial investitures, can the king officially declare himself to the world as the king of Ryukyu.⑧Xu Bin, Literati and Officialdom in Ming and Qing Dynasties and Ryukyu, Beijing: China Ocean Press, 2011, p. 36. (in Chinese)Historical descriptions of the Diaoyu Islands can mostly be found in the detailed written reports submitted by the envoys to the Ming and Qing Emperors about their journeys upon return to China.

B. Issue concerning Ryukyu’s Dual Subordination to China and Japan

in the Context of Multilateral Relationship among the Three States

The period between 1609 (the year Ryukyu was invaded by the Satsuma Domain) and 1879 (the year that the Ryukyu Domain was abolished and transformed into a prefecture by the Meiji Government), is called “a period of dual subordination” in Ryukyuan history by historians. In 1609, the Shimazu clanof the Satsuma Domain dispatched troops to invade Ryukyu, and Ryukyuan King Shō Nei and his councilors were taken prisoner. This battle is known to history as“Satsuma Invasion of Ryukyu 1609”. After the battle, Ryukyu was subordinated to China nominally but to Japan technically and secretly.⑨Zheng Hailin, The History of Diaoyu Islands and the Relevant Jurisprudence (Revised and Enlarged Edition), Hong Kong: Ming Pao Publications Ltd., 2011, p. 124. (in Chinese)This situation continued to the early years of Meiji Restoration. In the Chinese Qing Dynasty, the late Second Shō Dynasty of Ryukyu began, during which Ryukyu requested Chinese Qing Court for investiture. Sh? H?, then known as Prince Sashiki Ch?sh?, fled petitions to Chinese Imperial Court for investiture in 1625, 1626 and 1627 respectively. Such petitions were made under the secret control of Satsuma Domain after the“Satsuma Invasion of Ryukyu 1609”.⑩Xu Bin, Literati and Officialdom in Ming and Qing Dynasties and Ryukyu, Beijing: China Ocean Press, 2011, p. 4. (in Chinese)Thereafter, constantly pushed by Satsuma Domain, Ryukyu restored its tributary and trade relations with China in 1633. In September 1872, the Meiji Emperor issued an imperial decree, granting the royal linage of Ryukyu the title “seignior, and included them in the kazoku of Japan”.①Mi Qingyu, A Research on Ryukyuan History, Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 1998, pp. 112～114. (in Chinese)This decree set the stage for Japan’s annexation of Ryukyu, which was formally annexed by Japan in 1879. The facts mentioned above explain the origin of the dual subordination of Ryukyu.

Following the Satsuma invasion of Ryukyu, Satsuma controlled the kingdom politically and economically. However, in order to gain benefts from the tributary and trade relations between Ryukyu and China, Satsuma made great efforts to obscure its domination of Ryukyu from the Chinese Court. The measures Satsuma took in this regard include: a). to forbid Ryukyu from adopting Japanese system, and the Ryukyuans from adopting Japanese names, so that Chinese envoys would not discover the real relations between Satsuma and Ryukyu. For example, Ji Kao (A Research) said that, on 20 August 1624, the premier (the Satsuma Domain internally called itself a State) was appointed to serve in Ryukyu according to an imperial decree; thereafter, Ryukyuan hierarchical court system and criminal law and policies would be decided by the Ryukyu king himself; Ryukyuans were forbidden from adopting Japanese names, clothes, or customs.②Yang Chungkui, Ancient and Modern Ryukyu, and the Issue of Diaoyutai, Taipei: The Commercial Press, Ltd., 1990, pp. 64～65. (in Chinese)b). During the stay of Chinese envoys in Ryukyu, for the sake of hiding truths from Chinese envoys,Satsuma required all Japanese officials residing in Ryukyu, including zaibanbugyou and yamatoyokome, if not properly camoufaged, to move to some remote places on east coast of Ryukyu, which were far away from the west coastal areas frequented by Chinese; also, Satsuma banned all posters and shop signs written in Japanese; moreover, it required all books, records and reports not to mention the relationship between Japan and Ryukyu in the “Satsuma Invasion of Ryukyu 1609”.③Yang Chungkui, Ancient and Modern Ryukyu, and the Issue of Diaoyutai, Taipei: The Commercial Press, Ltd., 1990, pp. 64～65. (in Chinese)c. The authorities of Ryukyu compiled and published some books or documents, which included, among others, Questions & Answers about Ryukyu and Experiences of a Traveler. Questions & Answers about Ryukyu is a list of questions and answers developed under the auspice of the king residing in Shuri, with an aim to prevent the “Ryukyuan castaways”④Ryukyuan castaways incidents: since the establishment of tributary relations between China and Ryukyu in the Ming Dynasty, 12 Ryukyuan ships or ships used for tribute missions had been wrecked and wandered into the coastal areas of China. Both the Qing and Ming Courts had the practice of salvaging and resettling the castaways, including those from Ryukyu, granting pensions to them, and sending them back to their home countries. Such practices formed a sino-centric marine salvage mechanism, with participation from its tributary and non-tributary States (such as Japan). Since the shipwrecks were caused mainly by the miscalculation of the monsoon season, in the period of dual subordination, Shuri Royal Government ordered its subjects to strictly follow the right time to leave or return to its ports. Even in that case, shipwreck incidents still happened. See Lai Zhengwei, A Research on the Sino-Ryukyuan Relations in the Qing Dynasty, Beijing: China Ocean Press, 2011, pp. 56～60 (in Chinese); [Japan] Murata Tadayoshi, The Origin of Sino-Japanese Territorial Disputes: the Diaoyu Islands Issue Seen from Historical Archives, translated by Wei Pinghe, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2013, p. 52. (in Chinese)from telling Satsuma’s technical control of Ryukyu. In this list, the first question is about the territory ruled by the Ryukyuan king. The answer given to this question is: “the territory includes three principalities: Chūzan, Nanzan and Hokuzan, and 36 islands, including Yaeyama and Yonagunijima islands in the south, Amami-ōshima and Kikaigashima in the north, Kume Island in the west, and Ikei and Tsuken Islands in the east”. However, at that time, Amami-ōshima and Kikaigashima were actually under the jurisdiction of Satsuma Domain. Obviously, it deliberately concealed this situation from the Chinese Qing Court.⑤[Japan] Murata Tadayoshi, The Origin of Sino-Japanese Territorial Disputes: the Diaoyu Islands Issue Seen from Historical Archives, translated by Wei Pinghe, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2013, pp. 52～53. (in Chinese)Experiences of a Traveler, published in 1759, is a pamphlet by a Chinese-Ryukyuan politician named Cai Wen, which is full of standard answers to questions regarding China and Ryukyu. It aims to tell the Ryukyuan officials, students whose fathers are officials, and ordinary businessmen in China how to reply to questionsthat Chinese people may raise, most importantly, the questions concerning the relationship between Satsuma and Ryukyu.⑥Yang Chungkui, Ancient and Modern Ryukyu, and the Issue of Diaoyutai, Taipei: The Commercial Press, Ltd., 1990, pp. 64～65. (in Chinese)

II. The Status of a Vassal State in International Law: A Perspective from Elements of International Law

The Asian tributary system was a China-centered international structure featured by suzerain-vassal relations between China and its neighbors. The system of the law of nations, also known as the treaty system, is an international system based on the international order in the world upholding the law of nations, which is a network of treaty relations dominated by the Western colonial powers shaped during the colonial expansion in modern times.⑦The term “treaty system”, which coexisted with the tributary system in late Qing Dynasty, was proposed by Fairbank. See J. K. Fairbank, The Early Treaty System in the Chinese World Order, in J. K. Fairbank ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations, Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press, 1969, pp. 257～275.Western modern international law was first formally and systematically introduced into China in the 19th century. However, in the late 19th century, when Vietnam, Burma, Korea and other vassal States of Qing Court turned into colonies and protectorate of occidental powers and Japan, the tributary system disbanded.

A. The Introduction of Elements of International Law into China and Its Inf l uences on the Diplomacy of Qing Government

As mentioned above, Western modern international law was first formally and systematically introduced into China in the 19th century. The Chinese edition of Elements of International Law,⑧The Chinese version of Elements of International Law (named “萬國公法” in Chinese) is translated by William A. P. Martin (1827-1916), an American missionary, from its English version, which was published by the American publicist Henry Wheaton (1785-1848) in 1836. This Chinese version was printed by Beijing Chongshi School in the winter of 1864. See Lin Xuezhong, From Elements of International Law to Diplomacy Based on International Law: the Reception, Interpretation, and Application of International Law in the Late Qing, Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Books Publishing House, 2009, p. 113. (in Chinese)which was translated by William A. P. Martin (1827-1916), an American missionary to China, was the first work on Western jurisprudence in Chinese history. When frst published in China, the book causeda stir in the East Asia. In the following year, recarved and kunten-marked editions appeared in Japan, which became one of Japanese bestsellers in a short time. Subsequent editions also appeared in Korea and Vietnam.19 In the early⑨Zou Zhenhuan, A Comparative Study on the Distribution of the Elements of International Law Translated by W. A. P. Martin in China, Japan and Korea, in Center for South Korea Studies of Fudan University ed., South Korea Studies, Vol. 7, Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2000, pp. 258～278. (in Chinese)th century, China became a country occidental powers plotted to colonize in East Asia. China was afterwards drawn into the Opium Wars. In 1901 when the Boxer Protocol was signed, China completely turned into a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. Against this backdrop, the attitudes towards the introduction of Western international law into China are sometimes contradictory among different social strata in China. On one hand, cases really existed where the Qing Government won in diplomatic negotiations against Western countries by applying international law, such as Lin Zexu’s prohibition of the sale of opium⑩Mao Haijian, Collapse of the Celestial Empire: A Re-examination on the Opium Wars, Beijing: Joint Publishing, 1995, pp. 104～112. (in Chinese)and the handling of Lin Weixi Case①In July 1839, a local named Lin Weixi in the village of Tsim Sha Tsui was beaten to death by a British sailor. For research on this incident, see Lam Kai-yin and Lam Kam-yuen, On the Approaches and Attitudes of the Chinese and British Governments in Dealing with the Lin Weixi Incident, Historical Research, No. 2, 2000, pp. 97～113. (in Chinese)in 1839, and the settlement of the dispute concerning Prussia’s seizure of Danish ships in Chinese territorial sea;②In April 1864, when the Prussian minister H. Von Rehfues came to China by the warship Gazelle, he, without causes, captured three Danish commercial ships in the waters of Dagu Port, Tianjin, China. Zongli Yamen (Ministry of Foreign Af f airs) of Qing China protested against Prussia’s act immediately, by invoking international legal concepts. The Prussian minister was accused of capturing Danish ships in Chinese “inner ocean” (or “territorial sea”), over which China had jurisdiction. The Prussians were further informed that should the ships not be released then China could refuse a reception to their officials. Ultimately, Prussia released two of the captured ships, and paid a compensation at the amount of $1500. This incident was thus settled peacefully. For the details of this incident and the invocation of international law by Qing Court, see Wang Weijian, Prussian-Danish Incident in Dagu Port and the Introduction of Western International Law into China, Academic Research, No. 5, 1985, pp. 84～90. (in Chinese)to some extent, the successful resolution of these diplomatic disputes led to Qing Government’s quick approval of the printing of Elements of International Law. On the other hand, Qing Government and its officials inclined to use international law as an instrument, seeking to invoke relevant rules to defeat foreigners in diplomatic negotiations.

The international community, in the wake of the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), has its unique connotation. This community, also called an “international law community” or “civilized community”, is a Euro-centric binding system

of rules of modern international law, which is composed of European sovereign States, reflecting Western values. Kikoh Nishizato, a historian with University of the Ryukyus, stated that the modern East Asia has undergone an era where the relationship between the East Asian States and nations and occidental powers was reversed, and also an era where the traditional international system in East Asia, i.e., the tributary system, was replaced by the modern international order dominated by the occidental powers, which was also known as the system of the law of nations.③[Japan] Kikoh Nishizato, A Study on the History of Relations between Ryukyu and Japan in the Late Qing Dynasty (I), translated by Hu Liancheng et al., Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2010, p. 17. (in Chinese)Chinese professor Wang Hui contended that, the conficts between Chinese Qing Court and European powers were not ordinary inter-State conflicts, but rather those between two world (or international) systems and their rules.④Wang Hui, The Rise of Modern Chinese Thoughts, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2004, p. 680. (in Chinese)Here, the two systems refer to the tributary system and the modern system of the law of nations respectively. In the latter system, the world was divided into civilized, partially civilized, barbarous and savage States (Table 1). Being considered as “barbarous States”, China and other Asian States were not full legal persons as States, where only partial principles of international law could be applied. Such dif f erentiation of States rights under this international order can be best explained by those unequal treaties, whose principal provisions include unilateral most-favoured-nation treatment, consular jurisdiction and agreement tariff. Such an international order is utterly based on Euro-centrism. However, in the political arena in the late 19th century and the early 20th century, everything was staged exactly under this kind of prejudice.⑤Lin Xuezhong, From Elements of International Law to Diplomacy Based on International Law: the Reception, Interpretation, and Application of International Law in the Late Qing, Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Books Publishing House, 2009, p. 243. (in Chinese)

Table 1 The International Order in the World Upholding the Law of Nations in the Late 19th Century26

B. Tributary/Vassal States Def i ned in the Elements of International Law

A comparison of two masterpieces in international law - Elements of International Law written in the 19th century and Oppenheim’s International Law⑦Oppenheim’s International Law is considered as another internationally renowned book, following the Elements of International Law, in the 20th century. This book fnds its early form in the two volumes of International Law: A Treatise initially published in 1905-1906, by the internationalist L. F. L. Oppenheim (1858-1919). This work won him enough prestige to be appointed as the Whewell Professor of International Law in the University of Cambridge. The second edition of the book was revised by Oppenheim himself. Oppenheim’s International Law was afterwards edited by Ronald Francis Roxburgh, Arnold Duncan McNair, Hersch Lauterpacht and other renowned scholars of international law, and is known as a “Cambridge Monograph”. Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts eds., Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. 1, No. 1, translated by Wang Tieya et al., Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 1998, pp. III～V. (in Chinese)in the 20th century, shows that “colony” is one category of the “international persons”in modern international law. The international law concepts closely related to the tributary system, such as “protectorate”, “half sovereign State” and “tributary State”, were discussed in the chapter “Nations and Sovereign States” under the Elements of International Law. An “international person”, in the modern international law, is one who possesses legal personality in international law, meaning one who is a subject of international law so as itself to enjoy rights, duties or powers established in international law.⑧Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts eds., Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. 1, No. 1, translated by Wang Tieya et al., Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 1998, p. 90. (in Chinese)An analysis of the meaning and evolutions of the concept “international person” in modern international law would provides some important insights into the discussion on the status of Ryukyu in modern international law. With regards to the status of Ryukyu, authorities have invoked and applied the principles, rules and theories embodied in the Elements of International Law in the diplomatic negotiations between China, Japan and Ryukyu.

In order to understand the categories and meaning of international persons in the 19th century, we need to trace the concept back to its origin - Elements ofInternational Law. From its Chinese edition translated by William A. P. Martin⑨It is noteworthy that, Prof. He Qinhua, the proofreader of the Chinese version of Elements of International Law (Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2003) stated, William A. P. Martin’s translation was abridged and adjusted from the original work, with some contents deleted and its structure, style or chapters adjusted. For example, nearly 90% of original words of Volume 1, Chapter 2, Section 23 (titled “Germanic Confederation”) were deleted by William in his translation, only retaining a summary. Additionally, subject to the historical conditions and the translator’s Chinese profciency, the Chinese version is fraught with translation errors. See Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, translated by William A. P. Martin, proofread by He Qinhua, Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2003, Preface by Proofreader, p. 51 (in Chinese). By virtue of it, the paper pays a special attention to the dif f erence between the Chinese and English versions, particularly those parts deleted or omitted in the Chinese version.and the eighth English edition published by Little, Brown and Company, a publisher based on Boston, in 1866,⑩The National Library of China collected several editions of Elements of International Law in its House of Foreign Literature. This book has been reprinted many times since its frst publication in 1836. The main contents of this book remained unchanged, but with notes or international conventions added by editors as appendix. The author referred to the 8th edition published in Boston in 1866, edited with notes, by Richard Henry Dana. See Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, edited, with notes, by Richard Henry Dana, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1866, p. viii.we can find that Wheaton’s Elements of International Law①William A. P. Martin’s translation of Elements of International Law was published in 1864 by Beijing Chongshi School. This Chinese edition is translated from the 6th edition of Elements of International Law: With a Sketch of the History of the Science, which was edited with notes by William Beach Lawrence (1800-1881) (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1855). See Lin Xuezhong, From Elements of International Law to Diplomacy Based on International Law: the Reception, Interpretation, and Application of International Law in the Late Qing, Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Books Publishing House, 2009, p. 113. (in Chinese)mentioned, in Volume I, Chapter II, “State”, “semi-sovereign State”, “protectorate”, “vassal State” and other categories enjoying full or partial international personality. Particularly, the discussion on the sovereignty of a vassal State in this book deserves our attention.

Quoting the words of Cicero, Elements of International Law defined “a State to be, a body of politic, or society of men, united together for the purpose of promoting their mutual safety and advantage by their combined strength.” In order to explain the requisite of a State, Wheaton added, “the legal idea of a State necessarily implies that of the habitual obedience of its members to those persons in whom the superiority is vested, and of a fixed abode, and definite territorybelonging to the people by whom it is occupied.”②Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, translated by William A. P. Martin, proofread by He Qinhua, Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2003, pp. 25～26. (in Chinese)In the international law of the 19th century, the indispensible requisites of a State include persons of fxed abode, defnite territory and borders,③Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, edited, with notes, by Richard Henry Dana, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1866, p. 22.which are much easier to meet than those requisites set in modern international law. Elements of International Law divided States into sovereign and semi-sovereign ones. A sovereign State means “a community or a number of persons permanently organized under a sovereign government of their own, and by a sovereign government we mean a government, however constituted, which exercises the power of making and enforcing law within a community, and is not itself subject to any superior government.”④Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, translated by William A. P. Martin, proofread by He Qinhua, Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2003, p. 37. (in Chinese)And semi-sovereign States were termed as “States which are thus dependent on other States, in respect to the exercise of certain rights, essential to the perfect external sovereignty”. In addition to the United States of the Ionian Islands and Cracow, which were prescribed as “semi-sovereign States” by treaties, protectorate or dependent States also fell under this category.⑤Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, edited, with notes, by Richard Henry Dana, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1866, pp. 45～46.Sovereignty may be exercised either internally or externally.“internal sovereignty is that which is inherent in the people of any State, or vested in its ruler, by its municipal constitution or fundamental laws … External sovereignty consists in the independence of one political society, in respect to all other political societies. It is by the exercise of this branch of sovereignty that the international relations of one political society are maintained, in peace and in war, with all other political societies.”⑥Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, translated by William A. P. Martin, proofread by He Qinhua, Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2003, pp. 35～36. (in Chinese)

Elements of International Law contains a section entitled “Tributary States”.⑦Section 37, Chapter 2 of Wheaton’s Elements of International Law is entitled “Tributary States”, see Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, edited, with notes, by Richard Henry Dana, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1866, pp. 48～49.In the eye of international law, the autonomy of a tributary or vassal State dependson the sovereignty it enjoyed.⑧Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, translated by William A. P. Martin, proofread by He Qinhua, Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2003, p. 41. (in Chinese)That is to say, tributary States are still considered as sovereign, as far as their sovereignty is not affected by the tribute. Wheaton illustrated some categories of tributaries:⑨Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, translated by William A. P. Martin, proofread by He Qinhua, Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2003, pp. 41～42. (in Chinese)First, the tribute, formerly paid by the principal maritime powers of Europe to Barbary, did not at all af f ect the sovereignty and independence of the former; Second, “the King of Naples had been a nominal vassal of the Papal See, ever since the eleventh century, but this feudal dependence, abolished in 1818, was never considered as impairing the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Naples.”⑩Wheaton, Elements of International Law, edited, with notes, by Richard Henry Dana, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1866, p. 49.

C. Diplomacy Based on International Law that Qing Court Used to Defend Its Vassal States - Korea, Burma and Vietnam

The tributary system, as an important constituent of the political structure of ancient China, traces its roots to the Han Dynasty. The Tang Dynasty continued this system while making some innovations, by establishing Jimo Prefectures, another kind of vassal, in its border areas inhabited by minority nationalities. Following the tributary system of the Tang and Yuan Dynasties, the Ming Dynasty also devised some new measures to improve the system. And the system fourished in the Qing Dynasty①Huang Songyun, Theoretic Problems in the Study of Chinese Tributary System, Social Science Front, No. 6, 2004, p. 121. (in Chinese)The economic exchanges between the suzerain and tributary States were primarily conducted through tributes paying, gifting, and tributarytrades. The tributary system is termed by John King Fairbank②John King Fairbank has done some pioneering researches on the Sino-centrist worldview, which is the theoretic basis of Chinese tributary system, as well as on the characteristics of the tributary system which merge politics, trade and diplomacy into its network. Plus, he also studied the trend of modern China with his impact-response model. Many concepts advanced by scholars afterwards, such as “Huayi Order”, “Chinese Confucian system”,“Chinese world order” and “East Asian world order”, are considered as related to ancient China’s foreign relations, diplomatic institutions and thoughts, which, however, are all associated with Chinese tributary system. Fairbank’s views above described the structure of the tributary system. Yet, it should be noted, inner Asian Nomads were greatly dif f erent from the tributary States within the Chinese culture circle, albeit in the same tributary system. Siam, Burma and other tributaries also varied from European States, which cannot be put under the same category, because the former States maintained an official tributary relations with China. See Wang Peipei, Tributary and Treaty Systems, Social Sciences Review, Vol. 26, No. 8, 2011, pp. 115～117. (in Chinese)as a graded and concentric hierarchy of foreign relations with peoples and States grouped in three main zones: firstly, the Sinic Zone, consisting of the most nearby and culturally similar territories, including Korea, Vietnam, Ryukyu Islands and, at brief times, Japan; secondly, the Inner Asia Zone, consisting of tributary tribes and States of the nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples of Inner Asia; thirdly, the Outer Zone, consisting of the “Outer barbarians”, generally at a farther distance over land or sea, including Japan, some Southeast and South Asian States and Europe.③John King Fairbank ed., The Chinese World Order, Traditional China’s Foreign Relations, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968, p. 2.The Qing Court roughly classifed foreign States into two groups: one is “tributaries” (see Table 2), which are States having formal diplomatic relations with China, including Korea, Ryukyu, Annam (today’s Vietnam), Siam (today’s Thailand), Burma, Laos and Sulu (Sulu Archipelago in today’s Philippines); the other group is States that traded with China but had no formal diplomatic relations, including Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, the UK, France and other European States.④Li Yunquan, The History of Tributary System: A Study on Institutions Related to the Foreign Relations of Ancient China, Beijing: Xinhua Press, 2004, pp. 134～148. (in Chinese)

Table 2 Timetable for Chinese Main Tributaries in the Qing Dynasty to First Pay Tributes and Receive Investiture45

Siam16641673 Sulu1726 Loas17301795 Burma17501790

Diplomatic af f airs that the Qing Government had to handle with its tributary States, are not limited to the status of the latter; they are also closely related to complex issues like international treaties, rules of engagement, law of neutrality, customary international law and territorial boundaries of States, which this paper is not able to exhaust. Nevertheless, the status of tributary States is an issue that the Qing Government has to deal with in its diplomatic negotiations. When it comes to the issues like whether Korea, Vietnam, Burma and other tributaries were autonomous on their own, and how to protect or support them, Qing’s actual approaches to these issues deviated a bit from its diplomatic policy.

Among the tributaries of China, Korea was called a “junior Middle-Kingdom”. In order to maintain their suzerain-vassal relation, Qing provided omnibearing protection to Korea. It not only send troops to Korea, but also directly interfered with its internal and foreign af f airs at the cost of changing the traditional approach, and reinforced its suzerainty over Korea by applying international law and the treaty system. Even after the signing of the Convention of Tientsin, also known as the Tianjin Convention, in 1885, Qing did not recognize Korea as a sovereign State. In the aftermath of Ganghwa Island Incident started by the Japanese in 1876, following the traditions of “balance-of-power” diplomacy, Qing encouraged Korea to open fre with Europe and America, struggling to maintain its suzerainty over Korea by building a balance of power there. Being aware that the tenets underpinning traditional Chinese world order was unable to maintain Sino-Korean relationship any more, Qing changed its diplomatic strategies, even attempting to continue their suzerainty-vassal relationship through the application of rules of international law. After the Imo Incident in 1882, Qing recognized Korea’s autonomy in form, but in substance, Qing started to interfered with its internal and foreign af f airs; additionally, Qing concluded the Sino-Korean Commercial Treaty with Korea in October 1882, proclaiming its traditional suzerainty over Korea in writing under the treaty system.⑥Lin Xuezhong, From Elements of International Law to Diplomacy Based on International Law: the Reception, Interpretation, and Application of International Law in the Late Qing, Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Books Publishing House, 2009, pp. 276～278. (in Chinese)

Adhering to the border security idea of “protecting China’s tributaries to consolidate its own borders”,⑦Ma Dazheng ed., An Outlined History of Chinese Borders/Book Series on the General History of China’s Borders, Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou Ancient Books Publishing House, 2000, p. 398. (in Chinese)Qing dispatched troops to aid Vietnam, trying to keep its enemy from the gates, but with no intention to have any direct confict with France initially. France annexed Vietnam mainly through diplomatic negotiations and conclusion of treaties, during which it also destroyed many evidences supporting China’s suzerainty over Vietnam. First, France asserted, in accordance with the tributary system in Western international law, “if a State is superior to another, then the former should decide and manage all the government and administrative af f airs for and on behalf the latter”, therefore China had no effective jurisdiction over Vietnam.⑧Kuo Ting-yee et al. eds., Archives on Sino-French Negotiations over the Vietnam Issue (II), Taipei: Institute of Modern History, “Academia Sinica”, 1962, p. 927. (in Chinese)Subsequently, France required China to remain neutral, as a third State, in the wars against Vietnam.⑨For example, Li Hongzhang, in June 1883, received a letter from France, which said:“Currently, France and Vietnam are at war, which, in accordance with international law, any third States should not intervene, therefore, we should discuss the matter after a ceasefre between France and Vietnam.” Kuo Ting-yee et al. eds., Archives on Sino-French Negotiations over the Vietnam Issue (II), Taipei: Institute of Modern History, “Academia Sinica”, 1962, p. 910. (in Chinese)Second, it used a series of treaties, including Tientsin Accord, concluded on 11 May 1884 between France and China, and the Treaty of Hue, concluded on 6 June 1884 between France and Annam (Vietnam), to gradually effect the change of Vietnam from a “sovereign State” to a French protectorate. Particularly, before the execution and exchange of text of the Treaty of Hue, Jules Paten?tre, the French minister to China, coerced the Nguyen Dynasty to turn in the gold plated seal presented by the Qing Emperor several decades earlier to the Vietnamese king, which was then melted down,⑩Zhang Denggui et al. eds., ?ai Nam Thuc Luc, Tokyo: Keio University, 1961-1981, p. 4, quoted from Li Yunquan, Sino-French Negotiations over the Vietnam Issue before the Sino-French War and the Change of Sino-Vietnamese Relations, Social Science Journal, No. 5, 2010, p. 155. (in Chinese)so as to permanently destroy the proof evidencing China’s suzerainty over Vietnam. In this regard, one comment says, “resembling those negotiations between China and Japan over the tributary status of Korea, the negotiations between China and France over the tributary status of Vietnam are doomed to be a fruitless tug-of-war.”①Li Yunquan, Sino-French Negotiations over the Vietnam Issue before the Sino-French War and the Change of Sino-Vietnamese Relations, Social Science Journal, No. 5, 2010, p. 151. (in Chinese)

Burma’s official relation with China was not established until the mid-18th century. In response to UK’s question towards the tributary status of Burma, Marquis Zeng Jize, China’s minister to Britain, denied UK’s claims and demonstrated that Burma was tributary to China based on sound grounds and tangible evidences. The British government claimed that the treaty concluded between China and Burma in 1770 was an equal treaty between the two; Marquis Zeng refuted this claim, pointing out that the treaty was only a declaration of surrender to China made by Burma.②The text of the telegraph reads: “The Seal of Burma King was presented in 1790. The writing style of the characters on the seal was Shangfang Dazhuan (one type of greater seal scripts in ancient China) in the languages of Han and Manchu. The seal is made of silver and has a camel-shaped golden handle. The base of the seal is 3.5 * 3.5 Chinese cun (1 cun = 31?3cm) and 1 Chinese cun thick. And the words on the seal reads ‘Seal of Burma King in Mandalay’.” See He Xinhua, An Analysis on the Tributary Status of Burma in Qing Dynasty, Historical Archives, No. 1, 2006, p. 75. (in Chinese)And he had received a telegraph from Zongli Yamen (Ministry of Foreign Af f airs) of Qing China, informing him of the size, font and content of the seal that the Qing Emperor presented to the Burma King.③Wang Yanwei, Historical Documents on Qing’s Foreign Relations (Vol. 61), Beijing: The Palace Museum, 1932, p. 29. (in Chinese)The UK also proposed that Burma, in the process of their conficts, failed to raise any request for protection from Qing Court. Qing explained it by saying that Burma violated its obligations as a tributary,④He Xinhua, An Analysis on the Tributary Status of Burma in Qing Dynasty, Historical Archives, No. 1, 2006, p. 75. (in Chinese)but did not, in substance, intervene in British occupation of Burma, which indicated that Qing adopted a pragmatist approach to deal with its relations with Burma. In the late 18th and early 19th century, Siam, Burma’s southern neighbor, grew in power and brought huge threats to Burma. Afterwards, the UK invaded into the southern and western Burma. Under this context, Burma frequently sent tributes to China exactly in this period. In practice, Burma maintained an “ambiguous attitude”⑤Burma’ ambiguous attitude can be detected from Burma King’s attitude towards the seal presented by Qianlong Emperor in 1790. When “Chinese envoys carried the camel-shaped seal signifying Burma’s subordination to China, the Burma King, fearing to be controlled by Qing Court, was initially reluctant to accept the seal. However, he was also unwilling to reject such a piece of gold weighing 3 peittha (10 lb), eventually he decided to accept it, but ordering his court recorder not to recount this matter.” G. E. Harvey, History of Burma (Vol. 2), translated by Yao Ziliang, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1973, p. 453. (in Chinese)towards its tributary status; it neither treated China as a “Middle Kingdom”, nor proactively acknowledged its tributary relation with China.⑥He Xinhua, An Analysis on the Tributary Status of Burma in Qing Dynasty, Historical Archives, No. 1, 2006, p. 72. (in Chinese)

In the middle and late 19th century, “British invasion of Burma, French invasion of Vietnam and Japanese invasion of Ryukyu, were all started by the foreign sides. Caught in troubled times, China struggled to rise from the ashes, but beyond its strength.”⑦Lu Fengshi, Veritable Records of Qing Emperor De Zong (Vol. 232, September 1886), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1987. (in Chinese)Qing was eventually defeated in the First Sino-Japanese War by the end of the 19th century. After the collapse of the tributary system, China was forced to abandon its idea of Middle Kingdom, and to accept Western values based on the system of the law of nations.

III. The Historical and International Law Status of Pre-modern Ryukyu Viewed from Sino-Japanese Negotiations concerning Ryukyu

In 19th century, Japanese Meiji government incorporated Ryukyu Kingdom into its territories with armed forces within about 10 years, which is called the“Disposal of Ryukyu” in history by Japanese. With regards to the “Disposal of Ryukyu”, against the backdrop where the colonialism pursued by great powers of Europe and America in Asia was spreading at that time, China and Japan carried out decades-long negotiations. The dispute over Ryukyu was shelved, when the formal negotiations between Japan and China over the division of Ryukyu Islands and revision of the treaty concerned was completed in 1880. This Sino-Japanese dispute is still pending.

A. Sino-Japanese Negotiations over Ryukyu in the Period between 1871 and 1880

The early Sino-Japanese Negotiations over Ryukyu can be tracked back to theMudan Incident of 1871,⑧The Mudan Incident of 1871: in the November of 1871, a Miyako Island ship encountered a violent storm at sea and was shipwrecked. 66 crewmen landed on November 7, at the Mudan Community where Gaoshan people (raw or wild tribes in Taiwan ) lived. Unfortunately, an armed confict erupted between the crewmen and the local aborigines. Of the 66 crewmen, 54 were killed, and 12 were rescued by Yang Youwang and other Han Chinese and were transferred to Miyako via Fujian. On 25 February 1872, Wen Yu, the Fuzhou General and Governor of Fujian and Zhejiang Provinces, reported the incident to Beijing. And Dibao, a kind of newspaper distributed in the capital of Qing Empire, also covered this incident. See Mi Qingyu, The Ryukyuan Shipwreck Incidence and Japanese Invasion of Taiwan (1871-1874), Historical Research, No. 1, 1999, pp. 21～36. (in Chinese)which was fnally settled with the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peking Treaty in 1874. However, Qing China paid great compensation to Japan against the incident,⑨Mi Qingyu, The Ryukyuan Shipwreck Incidence and Japanese Invasion of Taiwan (1871-1874), Historical Research, No. 1, 1999, pp. 21～36. (in Chinese)while Japan quickened its step in annexing Ryukyu, even after forcing China to recognize its invasion of Taiwan as an act to protect its citizens. Further, Japan abolished Ryukyu Domain in 1879, which was renamed Okinawa Prefecture with governor appointed by Japan.⑩Ju Deyuan, A Comment on the Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands Issued by the Japanese Government 30 Years Ago, The Journal of Studies of China’s Resistance War against Japan, No. 4, 2002, pp. 147～166. (in Chinese)Immediately after that, Qing Government submitted notes verbales to Japan, strongly protesting against its unilateral disposal of Ryukyu.

Mediated by U.S. ex-president Ulysses S. Grant, Japan and China started the negotiations on the divisions of Ryukyu Islands and revisions of the treaty concerned, where division of the islands into two or three parts were deliberated.①[Japan] Kikoh Nishizato, A Study on the History of Relations between China, Ryukyu and Japan in Late Qing Dynasty (I), translated by Hu Liancheng et al., Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2010, p. 312. (in Chinese)On 21 October 1880, in line with the plan favored by Japan (dividing the islands into two parts), China and Japan came to an agreement and temporarily signed the Draft Treaty of Ryukyu and the Supplementary Provisions. The Draft Treaty of Ryukyu (originally in Chinese) provides, “the Qing Empire and the Imperial Japan agreed, except the territory at the north of Okinawa Island is under the jurisdiction of Japan, Miyako and Yaeyama Islands are under the jurisdiction of Qing, so as to clarify the boundaries of the two States; the two States should administratetheir own territories without mutual intervention forever.”②Matters Relating to the Treaty concerning the Disposal of Ryukyu, in Ministry of Foreign Af f airs of Japan ed., An Chronological Table of Japanese Foreign Policy and Important Documents, 1840-1945 (I), Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1965, pp. 81～85 (in Japanese); Ju Deyuan, A Comment on the Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands Issued by the Japanese Government 30 Years Ago, The Journal of Studies of China’s Resistance War against Japan, No. 4, 2002, pp. 147～166. (in Chinese)Nevertheless, Qing refused to formally sign the agreed scheme on the division of Ryukyu Islands at the end, which made the Draft Treaty of Ryukyu an abrogated treaty. As to why Qing eventually refused to sign the scheme on the division of Ryukyu Islands and revision of the treaty concerned, historians have varied views. One view holds that it is primarily caused by the easement of the Qing-Russian relations. Since Qing and Russia had smooth negotiations concerning the Ili issue, Qing changed its attitude midway, towards the division of Ryukyu Islands and revision of the treaty concerned.③Ueda Toshio, Negotiations between Japan and China over the Sovereignty of Ryukyu, in Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia ed., The Memoirs of the Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, No. 2, 1951. (in Japanese)Another believes that it is mainly caused by the internal conflicts within the Qing Court. Due to the severe disagreements among the Qing officials, the government adopted the strategy of delaying the issue, as proposed by Li Hongzhang, and decided not to ratify the draft treaty, with an initial aim to protect the kingdom of Ryukyu and avoid “l(fā)osing Chinese interests in its hinterland”.④Mi Qingyu, A Research on Ryukyuan History, Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 1998, p. 226. (in Chinese)The third argues that it is chiefy af f ected by the suicide of Lin Shigong (aka Rin Seikou), a Ryukyuan aristocrat.⑤[Japan] Kikoh Nishizato, A Study on the History of Relations between Ryukyu and Japan in the Late Qing Dynasty (I), translated by Hu Liancheng et al., Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2010, p. 35. (in Chinese)While Qing officials were discussing about whether to sign the treaty on the division of Ryukyu or not, Lin, who fed secretly to China before that, committed suicide in Beijing after submitting a petition to Qing Court, seeking to stop the Qing Court from signing the treaty. Lin’s suicide af f ected, to some extent, the result of the internal debates over the signing of the treaty in Qing Court.

Eventually, Qing was defeated in the First Sino-Japanese War, and forced tosign the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895,⑥The Treaty of Shimonoseki (Japanese: 下関條約, “Shimonoseki Jōyaku”) was a treaty signed in Shimonoseki, Japan on April 17, 1895, between the Empire of Japan and the Qing Empire, ending the First Sino-Japanese War. It was signed by Li Hongzhang and Li Jingfang on behalf of the Emperor of China and Ito Hirobumi and Mutsu Munemitsu for the Emperor of Japan.which provided that China should cede to Japan the Pescadores group, Formosa (Taiwan) and Liaodong Peninsula. At that time, Qing was unable to resume its relation with Ryukyu. Nonetheless, up until the breakout of the First Sino-Japanese War, both States still considered the status of Ryukyu as unsettled. Unsatisfed with Japan’s governance after its annexation of Ryukyu, many Ryukyuans fed to Qing China, seeking to restore the kingdom.

B. The Status of Pre-modern Ryukyu in International Law

Japanese historian Kikoh Nishizato observed that, when debating the issue of the sovereignty over Ryukyu, both China and Japan had, in different stages of diplomatic negotiations, frequently or voluminously invoked the Elements of International Law; moreover, during the period between 1875 and 1879, the Ryukyuan envoys, who were sent to Tokyo to give a full account of Ryukyu’s situation, also invoked the Elements of International Law, in a petition ef f ort, to protest against Japan’s exclusive claims over Ryukyu.⑦Ryukyuan envoys sent to Tokyo asserted that the existence of a State subordinated to two other States was permitted under the Elements of International Law, since, for example, Poland was once subject to three States: Prussia, Austria and Russia. [Japan] Kikoh Nishizato, A Study on the History of Relations between Ryukyu and Japan in the Late Qing Dynasty (I), translated by Hu Liancheng et al., Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2010, pp. 29～32. (in Chinese)Viewed from intertemporal law,⑧Intertemporal Law, also known as Transitory Law, deals with the complications caused by the conflict of laws in time, which determines the time when a law is applicable. In territorial disputes, intertemporal law is a critical legal element to be considered. The origins of Intertemporal Law as a legal theoretical concept, are to be found in arbitrator Huber’s discussion in the Palmas Arbitration Case before the Permanent Court of Arbitration, where he stated “a juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it, and not of the law in force at the time when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be settled.” This concept has gradually developed in the practice of territorial disputes settlement and treaty laws. See The Island of Palmas Case (or Miangas), United States of America v. The Netherlands (1928), Permanent Court of Arbitration, pp. 4～6, p. 37.the international law status of Ryukyu in the second half of the 19th century can only be determined impartially, by applying the international law at that time, i.e., Elements of International Law, and considering the political pattern of Asia in the context of colonial invasion. Obviously, theories of modern internationallaw, especially the theories and practices relating to States, sovereignty and territorial disputes, would facilitate a better understanding of the international law status of Ryukyu. The historical and legal status of pre-modern Ryukyu should be demonstrated in the following aspects.

First, Ryukyu’s secret subordination to Japan in history, does not imply that Satsuma’s invasion of Ryukyu, at that time, conformed to the international law rules regarding acquisition of territory. On the contrary, the claim that Japan had exclusive sovereignty over Ryukyu, which was raised by Japanese representatives in Sino-Japanese negotiations over Ryukyu, is ill-founded both in history and in international law at that time. As described above, after Satsuma’s invasion of Ryukyu in 1609, Ryukyu had undergone a stage called “dual subordination to Japan and China”. However, the Ryukyu Kingdom was conquered by the local authorities of Satsuma Domain, rather than the Tokugawa Shogunate on behalf of the Japanese central government. From 1609 to the end of the Edo period, Tokugawa Shogunate did not intend to incorporate Ryukyu into its territory, but considered it a separate kingdom, independent from more than 60 provinces under its jurisdiction. This fact can be illustrated by the following examples. Example 1: in May 1610, Honda Masazumi, the rōjū (one of the highest-ranking government posts under the Tokugawa Shogunate) of Tokugawa Shogunate, wrote to Shimazu Iehisa of Satsuma Domain, commanding the latter to take the captured Ryukyuan King, like a Korean envoy, to Edo;⑨He Ciyi, The History of the Relations between Ryukyu and Japan in Ming and Qing Dynasties, Nanjing: Jiangsu Ancient Books Publishing House Co. Ltd., 2002, p. 55. (in Chinese)Example 2: in September of the same year, Tokugawa Hidetada, the second shogun of the Tokugawa dynasty, publicly promised the Ryukyuan King, saying, “the Shō family has been the King of Ryukyu for generations; they should return to their kingdom as soon as possible, so as to enshrine and worship their ancestors, to promote the prestige and good name of this dynasty, and hand down the throne to their later generations forever.”⑩[Japan] Kuroita Katsumi, Tokugawa Jikki (Chapter 1), in Shintei Zoho, Kokushi Taikei (Vol. 38), Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1929. (in Japanese)In this connection, the author asserts that being a local authority, Satsuma’s invasion of Ryukyu in 1609 had not been authorized, or retroactively recognized, by the central government, therefore this invasion fails to meet the requisite in form for acquisition of territory. Then take the historical facts into account, does Satsuma’s conquest of Ryukyu by violence have the effect of obtaining the territorialsovereignty of Ryukyu? Conquest means a State, without the consent of other States, places the territory of other States under its control by force of arms. It is a way of territory transfer acknowledged by the ancient international law, but no longer a legal means to obtain territorial sovereignty in recent international law.①Su Yi-xiong, International Law in Peacetime, Taipei: San Min Book Co., Ltd., 1993, p. 178. (in Chinese)Furthermore, in general international law, the acquisition of territory by conquest often has to take two steps: the frst is to defeat and dissolve a State (de bellatio); the second is to annex the defeated State into the victor’s national territory after its dissolution.②Suya P. Sharma, Territorial Acquisition, Disputes and International Law, The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhof f Publishers, 1997, p. 143.This is greatly dif f erent from the act of Japanese central government in 1879, when Japanese forces were sent to Ryukyu and Ryukyu was transformed into Okinawa Prefecture. After its invasion of Ryukyu, Satsuma was ordered by the central government to send the Ryukyuan King back to the kingdom; and Ryukyu had maintained its political regimes and rule over the kingdom for a long period. Thereafter, in order to seek gains from Sino-Ryukyuan trades, Satsuma did not cut off the tributary relation between China and Ryukyu; instead, both Satsuma and Ryukyu chose to hide their own relations from the international community, including China. It can be argued that Ryukyu had maintained both internal and external sovereignty, even in modern international law. Therefore, Ryukyu’s secret subordination to Japan, due to the threats from Satsuma, does not imply that Japan had obtained the sovereignty over the pre-modern Ryukyu. In later negotiations between China and Japan over Ryukyu, the Qing Court asserted that Ryukyu, an independent State, accepted China’s investiture for generations, and considered China as its suzerainty; “Ryukyu was subordinated both to China and Japan”.③Mi Qingyu, A Research on Ryukyuan History, Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 1998, p. 199. (in Chinese)However, the claim of Japan’s exclusive sovereignty over Ryukyu, mainly proposed by Japanese foreign minister Terashima in his book A Brief Introduction, insisted that the issue over Ryukyu was the “internal af f airs” of Japan, since it was not anindependent State, nor “subordinated to both China and Japan”.④The claim of Japan’s exclusive sovereignty over Ryukyu was mainly proposed by Japanese foreign minister Terashima in his book A Brief Introduction. With regards to this claim, the Meiji Government stressed the similarity and connection between Ryukyu and Japan, prior to the Satsuma Invasion of Ryukyu in 1609, in terms of geographical relationship and location, as well as culture and ethnics, and also mentioned that Ryukyu paid tributes to Japan earlier than to China, which was subject to the administration of Daizaifu specially set up by Japan. Japan also emphasized, after 1609, Shogunate had already given Ryukyu to Satsuma Domain, which exercised political rule over Ryukyu in many aspects, including military, tax, and law-making. Mi Qingyu, A Research on Ryukyuan History, Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 1998, p. 199. (in Chinese)The core issue underlining these negotiations was the international status of Ryukyu. Japanese claims have big loopholes both in history and international law. After Satsuma’s invasion of Ryukyu in 1609, the latter not only retained its political institutions and reign title, but also had diplomatic and trade exchanges with its Asian neighbors, including the Japanese shogunate. In the mid-19th century, Ryukyu, in the name of a State under modern international law, signed commercial treaties with the U.S., France and the Netherlands. In a word, historical facts concerning the diplomatic relations between China, Japan and Ryukyu reveal that, it is historically true that albeit an independent kingdom, the pre-modern Ryukyu, in the period between 1609 and 1879, was subordinated both to Japan and China; the issue concerning the status of Ryukyu at that period does not fall under the category of “Japanese internal affairs”, as claimed by the Meiji Government, not to say Japanese“sovereignty” over Ryukyu.

Second, the fact that Ryukyu, as an independent State, was subordinated both to China and Japan in history, is consistent with international law. During Sino-Japanese diplomatic negotiations on the issue of Ryukyu, the Qing Government claimed that Ryukyu was “subordinated both to China and Japan”, but at the same time, it was also an independent and autonomous State. Japan refuted China’s claims, pointing out that “if it is a State, it can not be subordinated to other States; likewise, if it is subordinated to other States, then it cannot be an independent State.” Japan further invoked the Elements of International Law to prove the illogicality of Qing’s claims, and insisted that Ryukyu was a part of Japan.⑤Ministry of Foreign Af f airs of Japan ed., Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, Vol. 12, Tokyo: International Association of Japan, 1973, quoted from [Japan] Kikoh Nishizato, A Study on the History of Relations between Ryukyu and Japan in the Late Qing Dynasty (I), translated by Hu Liancheng et al., Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2010, p. 30. (in Chinese)In this connection, Kikoh Nishizato observed, “deduced from the logic of the traditionaltributary system, a State can be autonomous in terms of internal af f airs, and also tributary to other States in terms of foreign relations, which are not contradictory to each other. However, this logic is not so persuasive to Japan, which did not accept the tributary system. In this context, the debate between the two States stalled.”⑥[Japan] Kikoh Nishizato, A Study on the History of Relations between Ryukyu and Japan in the Late Qing Dynasty (I), translated by Hu Liancheng et al., Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2010, p. 30. (in Chinese)Does Qing’s argument that Ryukyu, being an independent State, was subordinated to both China and Japan, square with international law? The answer lies in the theories, as contained in the Elements of International Law, relating to the constitution of a State.⑦Existing literature has attempted, by invoking the relations between the principal maritime powers of Europe and Barbary States, to draw an analogy between the status of Ryukyu and these powers of Europe. See Wang Xin, Historical Changes of the Legal Status of Ryukyu under International Law, Graduate Law Review. CUPL, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 112～120 (in Chinese); Wang Xin, An Exploration of the Diaoyu Islands Disputes Seen from the Historical Changes of the Legal Status of Ryukyu (master thesis), Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law, 2010, p. 8 (in Chinese); Zhang Yi, The Study on Legal Status of the Ryukyu Islands on International Law (doctoral thesis), Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law, 2013, pp. 63～64. (in Chinese) Such practice has appeared in history: in order to protest against the Meiji Government’s claim of exclusive sovereignty over Ryukyu, Ryukyuan envoys sent to Tokyo asserted that the existence of a State subordinated to two other States was permitted under the Elements of International Law, since, for example, Poland was once subject to three States: Prussia, Austria and Russia. [Japan] Kikoh Nishizato ed., Petitions for Salvation of Ryukyu Kingdom, Tokyo: Hosei University Institute for Okinawan Studies, 1992. (in Japanese)Elements of International Law divided “international persons”, a concept in modern international law, into several categories, including sovereign State, semi-sovereign State, protectorate and tributary. Different from sovereign and semi-sovereign States, the autonomy of a tributary or vassal State depends on the sovereignty it enjoyed.⑧Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, translated by William A. P. Martin, proofread by He Qinhua, Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2003, p. 41. (in Chinese)That is to say, tributary States are still considered as sovereign, as far as their sovereignty is not af f ected by the tribute. After Satsuma’s invasion of Ryukyu in 1609, Ryukyu entered into a stage called“dual subordination”, to China nominally and to Japan technically and secretly. This stage continued up until the early years of the Japanese Meiji Restoration. As a tributary State, Ryukyu had the autonomy to handle its internal af f airs, which were not interfered by its suzerain - China; China only dispatched envoys to perform symbolic investiture ceremonies for new kings of Ryukyu.⑨Xiu Bin and Jiang Bingguo, The Subjugation of Ryukyu and Losing the Function of the Investiture-Tributary System in East Asia, Japanese Studies, No. 6, 2007. (in Chinese)China, being a suzerainState, did not attempt to seek interests from tributary trades, but of f er fnancial aid to its tributaries by gifting. China strove to maintain its infuence on its tributaries, mainly through its own strong political, economic and cultural appeal and vitality, rather than military conquest and annexation. During this period, Ryukyu relied on its original political structure to deal with internal af f airs, and in terms of foreign relations, it concluded bilateral treaties with France, the U.S., and the Netherlands as a State. Although the internal af f airs of Ryukyu were subject to Satsuma, and Ryukyuan customs were gradually integrated into Japanese culture, Japanese residing in Ryukyu would leave in advance, when they were aware of the arrival of Qing envoys. This paper holds, based on the historical facts and the international law at that time, Ryukyu was dually subordinated to China and Japan, but still independent and autonomous at the same time, which are not contradictory to each other. Certainly, it is undeniable, when Ryukyu was annexed and incorporated into Japanese territory in 1879, it became a colony of Japan, which impaired the sovereignty of Ryukyu.

Third, Ryukyu and the great powers of Europe and America all considered the kingdom as an independent State. Shō Tai, the last king of Ryukyu, believed that the kingdom “belonged to Japan and China … the two are the parent countries of Ryukyu.”⑩[Japan] Chōken Kishaba, Ryukyu kenbunroku (Vols. 1～2), Tokyo: Perikansha Publishing Inc., 1977 (in Japanese), quoted from [Japan] Kikoh Nishizato, A Study on the History of Relations between Ryukyu and Japan in the Late Qing Dynasty (I), translated by Hu Liancheng et al., Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2010, p. 31. (in Chinese)In 1867, Michihira Iwashita attended the opening ceremony of the Paris Exposition, presenting himself as the envoy representing the Ryukyuan king. In protest, Japanese Tokugawa Shogunate, declared to the Exposition that“Ryukyu was conquered by the Satsuma Domain as commanded by the Tokugawa Shogunate, therefore, it became a vassal State of Satsuma, rather than a State independent from Japan.” However, this protest had not been accepted.①Ming Juinn Li, The Sovereignty of the Ryukyu Islands from the Perspective of International Law, Taiwan International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2005, p. 56. (in Chinese)During the period from 1875 to 1879, the Ryukyuan envoys, who were sent to give a full account of Ryukyu’s situation, initiated petition ef f orts in Tokyo and nearby areas. In these ef f orts, Ryukyuan envoys reiterated the need to “act in good faith”, and expressed their reluctance to renounce the political independence of the kingdom, and the unwillingness to cut of f its relations with China.②[Japan] Kikoh Nishizato ed., Petitions for Salvation of Ryukyu Kingdom, Tokyo: Hosei University Institute for Okinawan Studies, 1992.In 1879, Shō Tukukō, a

Ryukyuan aristocrat and government official who fed to China to seek help from Qing Court, refuted the views expressed by Japanese foreign minister Terashima in his book A Brief Introduction.③Shō Tukukō argued, “Japan claims that the government system and political structure of Ryukyu was established by Japan, and Ryukyu is not a sovereign and independent State. However, to determine a State’s government system and political structure, the following rituals or factors are critical: investiture rituals, granting title of a reigning dynasty, giving a royal name, following the calendar, laws and decrees, and rites of a certain dynasty. Ryukyu has paid tribute to China since 1372, when King Satto was conferred as king of Chūzan by China, and the country’s name was changed from “琉求” to “琉球” in Chinese. During the reign of Yongle Emporor, Ryukyu King was given the surname of Shō. Ryukyu follows the calendar, rites and rituals, as well as laws and statutes of China, which has never changed up till now. The post and rank of Ryukyuan officials, the recruitment and resignation of its staf f, the issuing and abolishment of imperial orders or decrees, and the clothing system, are all decided by the King and councilors of Ryukyu, without being intervened by Japan. In the treaties signed by Ryukyu with France, the United States, and the Netherlands respectively, Ryukyu signed the date following Chinese calendar and the names of its own officials. Ryukyu is a sovereign State, which is known to all States. That Ryukyu is not subject to Japan is a self-evident fact, which does not need to be proved through debate.” See Wang Yunsheng, China and Japan in the Last Six Decades, Vol. 1, Tianjin: Ta Kung Pao, 1932, pp. 127～129. (in Chinese)In terms of the attitudes of the international community, the major powers of Europe and America, in the period between 1840 and 1879, not only had the knowledge of Ryukyu’s dual subordination, but also mediated between China and Japan by adopting the pragmatic diplomatic policy, seeking to open the country to trade. For example, U.S. ex-president Grant had mediated between China and Japan concerning the issue of Ryukyu. In 1879, when discussing the Ryukyu issue with Li Hongzhang, Grant said: “Ryukyu is an independent State, but Japan intends to expand its own territory by annexing it. China is fghting for land, rather than tribute, which is reasonable. In this regard, it is better for China and Japan to sign a separate treaty in the future.”④[Japan] Kikoh Nishizato, A Study on the History of Relations between Ryukyu and Japan in the Late Qing Dynasty (I), translated by Hu Liancheng et al., Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2010, p. 307. (in Chinese)Afterwards, Grant actively coordinated the diplomatic negotiations between Japan and China over the division of Ryukyu Islands and revision of the treaty concerned. Further, Ryukyu concluded bilateral treaties (see Table 3) with France, the U.S., and the Netherlands as a State. The capability to carry out exchange activities and conclude treaties with foreign States, in the eye of international law at that time, is an important index to determine the status of a State. Therefore, the sovereignty of Ryukyu was widely acknowledged by the then international community.

Table 3 List of European and American Ships Visiting Ryukyu and the Treaties Concluded85

Fourth, when facing foreign invasion or colonial rule, other tributary States having the same status with Ryukyu under Chinese tributary system, such as Vietnam, Korea and Burma, had settled the issue concerning their status through the conclusion of treaties, and eventually won their independence in the 20th century. In Chinese tributary system, Ryukyu, Vietnam, Korea and Burma fell under the same category of tributary or vassal States, among which Ryukyu was the most submissive one. However, when Ryukyu domain was abolished and transformed into a prefecture by Japan in 1879, Ryukyu became a Japanese colony. In contrast with Ryukyu, Vietnam, Korea and Burma renounced their traditional links with China in accordance with the relevant treaties. Specifcally, in the wake of the Sino-French War (1885), France forced China to sign the Treaty of Tientsin, supplanting China’s suzerainty over Vietnam, and placing Vietnam under French protection. The Convention Relating to Burma signed between China and Britain in 1886, agreed that China would recognize Britain’s rights in Burma while Britain continued the Burmese payment of tribute every ten years to China, by which Britain gradually turned Burma into its colony. After the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894, China was forced to agree to renounce its suzerainty over Korea in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. These facts show, in the late Qing, the change of status of China’s neighboring tributaries was provided by treaties, and also recognized by their suzerain State - China. Nevertheless, from Japanese annexation of Ryukyu in 1879 to the end of World War II, China and Japan, with respect to the change of the sovereignty of Ryukyu and the arrangement of Ryukyuan territory, failed to conclude any formal agreements, except the negotiations over the draft treaty on the division of Ryukyu. In the 20th century, those tributaries (other than Ryukyu) under Chinese tributary system, after suffering many mishaps, freed themselves from colonial rule, and became independent States in the UN framework.

In the middle and late 19th century, Sino-Japanese negotiations over Ryukyu were carried out against the backdrop, where the tributary system came into conflicts with the system of the law of nations. It is proved that, hugely impacted by the invasion of great powers and the international situation at large, Qing China, with declining national and military strength, only hoped to invoke international law to “convince its opponents with just grounds and settle disputesappropriately”.⑥On 12 April 1877, Shō Tukukō, the Grand Master with the Purple-Golden Ribbon (a government official of Ryukyu), sailed to Fujian Province to seek assistance from Qing Court. When meeting He Jing, the Viceroy of Minzhe, and Fujian Provincial Governor Ding Richang, Shō submitted the petitions written by the Ryukyu King to them, requesting Qing Government to help Ryukyu settle its problems. He Ruzhang, a Chinese envoy sent to Japan, warned and suggested, “Japan incessantly prevented Ryukyu from paying tribute to China, it would surely annex Ryukyu. When Ryukyu is annexed, Korea would be in peril.”However, Li Hongzhang asserted, “among the best, the second best and the worst plans (presented by He Ruzhang), the best plan is to dispatch forces to call Japan to account, and the second best is to reach an agreement with Ryukyuans to require them to resist the Japanese and China would assist them, when necessary. These two plans seem to make a great fuss about nothing, which might cause panic. However, if we repetitively debate with Japan, Japan would become aware that it is in the wrong, then it might not dare to transform the Ryukyu domain into a prefecture. In that way, Ryukyuans would retain their land, and the invaders would withdraw without violence being used. The last plan seems to be the worst, however, it is actually the one we have to choose today.” See Complete Works of Li Hongzhang - Letters to the Imperial Prince in Charge of Zongli Yamen, Vol. 8, p. 1.However, it merely knew how to use Western international law as an instrument or tool, but had little knowledge on how to use it flexibly and skillfully, as such, Qing learned many painful lessons for that. Tang Caichang, a well-known activist in the Constitutional Reform Movement in late Qing Dynasty, pointed out the reasons for China’s failure in foreign negotiations, saying that “the failure was caused by China’s declining strengths, also by its failure to invoke international law, as well as the lack of talents familiar with international law to fght for China’s rights and interests based on reasonable grounds.”⑦Tang Caichang, Rules about the Establishment of a School of Chinese and Western Law, in Hunan Provincial Institute of Philosophy and Social Science ed., Collection of Tang Caichang’s Works, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1980, p. 27. (in Chinese)The result of Sino-Japanese negotiations over Ryukyu proved this point exactly.

IV. The Legal Status of Ryukyu and the Disputes over the Sovereignty of Diaoyu Islands

The claims to sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan are closely related to the issue of Ryukyu. In order to demonstrate that Japan’s incorporation of Diaoyu Islands into its territory was an act of “occupation” under international law, Japan argued that “the Senkaku Islands have historically and consistently been part of the Nansei Shoto Islands which have been part of the territory of Japan”, using the surveys of the Diaoyu Islands conducted by the agencies of Okinawa Prefecture in the late 19th centuryas “historical evidences”.⑧Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Senkaku Islands Q&A, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/ region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html, 12 October 2016; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, at http://www.mofa. go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/basic_view.html, 12 October 2016.These claims, apparently, have been raised by Japanese authorities after considering historical facts, international law theories associated with territorial disputes and law of treaties. In addition, China’s “initial discovery”of the Diaoyu Islands, and China being the “initial holder of the sovereignty” over the Diaoyu Islands, were denied by the Japanese academia, which, instead, made some claims to these islands favorable to Japan.⑨In all the researches on the Diaoyu Islands from the perspective of international law, the most representative works or papers by Japanese scholars include: Keishiro Iriye, The Basis for the Development of the Oceans Surrounding Senkaku Islands, Kikan Okinawa [Okinawa Quarterly], March 1971, p. 56 (in Japanese); Keishiro Iriye, Sino-Japanese Peace Talk and the Status of Senkaku Islands, Kikan Okinawa [Okinawa Quarterly], December 1972, p. 63 (in Japanese); Okuhara Toshio, The Sovereignty Issue of Senkaku Islands, Kikan Okinawa [Okinawa Quarterly], March 1971, p. 56 (in Japanese); Ozaki Shigeyoshi, Territorial Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, Reference, No. 263, 1972 (in Japanese); Midorima Sakae, The Senkaku Islands, Naha: Hirugisha, 1984 (in Japanese); Unryu Suganuma, Sovereign Rights and Territorial Space in Sino-Japanese Relations-Irredentism and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000; Ozaki Shigeyoshi, Territorial Issues on the East China Sea: A Japanese Position, Journal of East Asia and International Law, No. 3, 2010; Ozaki Shigeyoshi, Senkaku Islands and Japan’s Territorial Rights, Diplomacy, No. 12, 2012 (in Japanese); Ishii Nozomu, The Available Historical Data and Materials about the Prehistory of Senkaku and Terra Nullius (Land without Owner), Yaeyama Nippo, 3 August 2013. (in Japanese)This paper holds, an examination of the geographical scope of Ryukyu Kingdom and the delimitation of Sino-Ryukyuan boundary, would provide significant insights into a further discussion over the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands from the perspectives of history and geography. Chinese, Japanese and Ryukyuan historical accounts, concerning the period between 1429 and 1879, are important historical evidences supporting China’s sovereignty claims to the Diaoyu Islands. Overall, the Diaoyu Islands has constituted an inherent part of China, rather than Ryukyu, ever since ancient times, which can be substantiated by historical accounts from China, Japan and Ryukyu, and also by social, cultural, geographical and hydrological evidences.

A. Social, Cultural, Geographical and Hydrological Factors Supporting

China’s, rather than Ryukyu’s, First Discovery of the Diaoyu Islands

The Diaoyu Islands, since the early Ming Dynasty, has always been a part of Chinese territory, which was employed as sea marks to aid navigation. Theseislands have never been a part of Ryukyu, basically because the Ryukyuans failed to discover them before the Chinese.⑩Sha Xuejun, Historical and Geographical Evidences Supporting China’s, Rather Than Ryukyu’s Ownership of Diaoyutai, Journal of Xuecui, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1972, p. 16. (in Chinese)Chinese frst discovery of the Diaoyu Islands was greatly facilitated by its suitable social and cultural, as well as geographical and hydrological conditions.

First, Ryukyu was inferior to China, with respect to iron producing and shipbuilding technology, as well as sailing skills. Since ancient times, Ryukyu lacked the iron sand needed in the production of wrought iron, therefore even ironware of every uses was not available in its market.①Sha Xuejun, Historical and Geographical Evidences Supporting China’s, Rather Than Ryukyu’s Ownership of Diaoyutai, Journal of Xuecui, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1972, p. 16. (in Chinese)At some time in history, Ryukyu “had no commercial, industrial or mineral industry, nor traders or merchants”, and its people “used bamboo to make rafts, instead of taking ships or boats”.②Li Tingji, Li Wen Jie Gong Wen Ji (Collected Works of H.E. Mr. Li), in Chen Zilong et al. eds., Ming Jing Shi Wen Bian (The Collection of the Articles on the Management of State Affairs in the Ming Dynasty), Vol. 460, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1962. (in Chinese)In the 14-15th century, the Ryukyuan shipping industry was still at a primary stage. Considering the poorly-developed shipbuilding and shipping technology of Ryukyu, Zhu Yuanzhang, the frst emperor of Chinese Ming Dynasty, presented, in 1392, Ryukyu with sea-going ships, and also sent “Fujian citizens bearing 36 dif f erent surnames, who are good at shipping, to Ryukyu, and ordered them to carry out tributary missions.”③Long Wenbin, Ming Hui Yao (Records of Ming Dynasty), Vol. 77, Foreign State 1, Ryukyu, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1956. (in Chinese)These factors decide the impossibility for the Ryukyuans to first discover the Diaoyu Islands. In contrast, the Chinese, at that time, had good shipbuilding and shipping skills, and invented the compass, a necessary tool used in navigation, it is therefore justifed to say that China frst discovered the Diaoyu Islands.

Second, judging from the distance to the compass route and the number of islands serving as navigational aids, ancient Chinese had better chance to first discover the Diaoyu Islands. According to Chinese historical records about compass routes and the distance concerned, the distance between Minjiang River estuary and the Diaoyu Islands was 330 km approximately; on west of Keelung, there were islands used for navigational aids, such as White Dog Islands, andDongshashan (island), hence it was quite convenient for the Chinese to reach the Diaoyu Islands. Plus, Keelung was only 200 km away from the Diaoyu Islands, and HoapinSu and Pengjia Islet were used as sea marks between them. In contrast, the distance between Naha of Ryukyu and the Diaoyu Islands, and that between Kume-jima and the Diaoyu Islands were 460 km and 410 km respectively, both of which were one times longer than that from Keelung to the Diaoyu Islands. More importantly, a small island called Chiwei, also used as a navigation mark, was lying between Kume-jima and the Diaoyu Islands. To cross the distance of 280 km on the sea between Chiwei Island and Kume-jima, seemed to be an impossible challenge to Ryukyuans, since their navigation and shipbuilding technology was poorly developed. Even though Chiwei Island was only 130 km away from the Diaoyu Islands, it was still difficult for the Ryukyuans to reach there by sea, due to the long distance from the Diaoyu Islands to Naha and Kume-jima and the resulting inconvenience of contact and communication④Sha Xuejun, Historical and Geographical Evidences Supporting China’s, Rather than Ryukyu’s Ownership of Diaoyutai, Journal of Xuecui, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1972, p. 17. (in Chinese)

Third, based on the fow direction of the Black Tide, the hydrological conditions of the waters surrounding Diaoyu Islands, and the routes of the investiture missions, we can see that the Chinese were more inclined than the Ryukyuans to discover the Diaoyu Islands, and Japanese claim of these islands being terra nullius is groundless. From time immemorial, the Chinese, relying on the monsoon and Black Tide (also called “Japan Current”),⑤“Black Tide” is a north-flowing branch of the Pacific North Equatorial Current when it flows along the coast of mainland. It begins off the Philippines, Taiwan Strait, the east coast of Taiwan and fows northeastward past Yaeyama, Miyako and Diaoyu Islands, and then towards Japan and South Korea. It fows at a speed of 4-5 nautical miles per hour on average. When it pasts Yaeyama, Miyako, Ryukyu Islands and Diaoyu Islands, its western part returns south, owing to the wind direction and impact of coast. See Yang Chungkui, China, Ryukyu and Diaoyu Islands, Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1972, p. 135. (in Chinese)had travelled to Ryukyu and Japan. In ancient times, Chinese ships usually sailed from Minjiang River to Ryukyu, via northern Taiwan. The Chinese ships were sailing downward with the branch of the Black Tide and the southeast monsoon, implying that these ships could travel faster and had greater chances to discover the Diaoyu Islands. In contrast, to reach the Diaoyu Islands, Ryukyuan ships had to frst go through the Ryukyu Trench, and sail against the Black Tide, which would drag down the sailing speed and further add to the difficulties of sailing. Therefore, the Ryukyuans had lesser chances to frstdiscover the Diaoyu Islands.⑥Sha Xuejun, Historical and Geographical Evidences Supporting China’s, Rather Than Ryukyu’s Ownership of Diaoyutai, Journal of Xuecui, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1972, p. 17. (in Chinese)

Fourth, the relevant submarine topography information tells that a natural boundary exists between China and Ryukyu. From Tsushima Strait, to South of the Diaoyu Island and the Chiwei Island, the northern coast of Taiwan, the entire Taiwan Strait, and then to the coast of Guangdong Province, there are continental shelves within 200 meters, which are the natural prolongation of China’s land territory. In comparison, the waters near the Southeastern Ryukyu Islands is, on average, more than 3,000 meters deep, with a maximum depth of 7,000 meters above. Plus, the trench located between the Ryukyu Islands and the Diaoyu Islands is called the Ryukyu Trench. Most part of the trench is 1000～2000 meters deep. The trench trends north-northeast to south-south west, with its southern part lying between the Yaeyama Islands and Taiwan. The Black Tide, which moves from south to north in the Ryukyu Trench, together with the trench, forms the natural boundary between China and the Ryukyu Kingdom.⑦Sha Xuejun, Historical and Geographical Evidences Supporting China’s, Rather Than Ryukyu’s Ownership of Diaoyutai, Journal of Xuecui, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1972, p. 17. (in Chinese)From time immemorial, the Ryukyuans have lived on the eastern side of this boundary, and the Chinese on the western side. To conclude, due to the social, cultural, geographical, geological and hydrological factors above, the Ryukyuan did not have the chance to discover the Diaoyu Islands earlier than the Chinese.

B. The Existence of a Natural Boundary Between China and Ryukyu: Evidences from Historical Accounts of Many States

The fact that a boundary exists between China and Ryukyu, and that the Diaoyu Islands is a part of Chinese territory, is a common understanding reached between the two States. During almost fve centuries, spanning from 1372 to 1866, the imperial courts of the Ming and Qing Dynasties sent imperial envoys to Ryukyu 24 times to perform investiture ceremonies and rituals for Ryukyuan kings, and the Diaoyu Islands was exactly located on their route to Ryukyu. Ample volume of records about the Diaoyu Islands could be found in the mission reports written by Chinese imperial envoys, including Chen Kan, Xie Jie, Xia Ziyang, Wang Ji andZhou Huang. In 1650, Shō Shōken, the Ryukyuan sessei (“prime minister”) at that time, compiled the frst history of the Ryukyu Kingdom, chuzan seikan (Mirror of Chūzan). This book quoted the full passage concerning the Diaoyu Islands from the Record of the Imperial Envoy’s Visit to Ryukyu, a book written by Chinese envoy Chen Kan. Notably, Shō Shōken raised no objection to the sentence “Then Gumi Mountain (known as Kume Island today) comes into sight, that is where the land of Ryukyu begins”, which was used to describe the boundary between China and Ryukyu in Chen’s book.⑧Zheng Hailin, The History of Diaoyu Islands and the Relevant Jurisprudence, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 2007, p. 98. (in Chinese)In addition, in 1708, Tei Junsoku, a noted scholar and the Grand Master with the Purple-Golden Ribbon (a government official) of Ryukyu, attached a map in his book A General Guide, which put Diaoyutai together with Huangwei and Chiwei Islands, forming a clear boundary line between Kume Island.⑨This map, in practice, best explained the following statements by Chinese envoys Chen Kan and Guo Rulin: “Then Gumi Mountain comes into sight, that is where the land of Ryukyu begins”, and “Chi Yu is the mountain that marks the boundary of Ryukyu”. See Zheng Hailin, The History of Diaoyu Islands and the Relevant Jurisprudence, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 2007, pp. 98～99. (in Chinese)These Ryukyuan historical accounts indicate that Chiwei and Huangwei Islands belong to the territory of China, while Kume Island belongs to Ryukyu, and that Hei Shui Gou (today’s Okinawa Trough), lying between Chiwei Island and Kume Island, constitutes the boundary line between the two States. The boundary of Ryukyuan territory can also be found in Japanese records. A perfect example in this case is the Map of the Three Provinces and 36 Islands of Ryukyu, which was attached in the book Sangoku Tsuran Zusetsu (An Illustrated Description of Three Countries) written by Hayashi Shihei (1783 - 1793).⑩Sangoku Tsuran Zusetsu (An Illustrated Description of Three Countries) by Hayashi Shihei was published in Japan in the Autumn of 1785. This illustrated book is attached with fve maps, namely: Complete Picture of World Distances of the Outline of the Three Countries, Complete Picture of the Country of Ezo, Complete Picture of the Country of Korea, Picture of the Uninhabited Islands, and the Map of the Three Provinces and 36 Islands of Ryukyu. See [Japan] Murata Tadayoshi, The Diaoyu Islands Disputes, Hundred Year Tide, No. 6, 2004, pp. 56～62. (in Chinese)Historical documents of Ryukyu, including Chuzan Seifu, which was edited by Sai Taku and rewritten by his son Sai On, have all clearly depicted the boundary of Ryukyu Kingdom.①According to Chuzan Seifu, the Ryukyu Island was composed of three principalities, five provinces and 15 prefectures (35 prefectures in fact). The three principalities were Chūzan, which was constituted of five provinces and 11 prefectures, Nanzan (15 prefectures) and Hokuzan (9 prefectures). In addition to that, there were also 36 islands. See [Japan] Murata Tadayoshi, The Diaoyu Islands Disputes, Hundred Year Tide, No. 6, 2004, pp. 56～62. (in Chinese)In a word, historical accounts and maps from the three States, China, Japan and Ryukyu, all show that, Ryukyuan islands do not include Diaoyu, Huangwei and Chiwei Islands, which was a common understanding among the three States.

C. Japanese Claim of the Diaoyu Islands Being Terra Nullius Is Ill-grounded in Historical Facts and International Law

Japan declared, “[f]rom 1885 on, surveys of the Senkaku Islands were thoroughly carried out by the Government of Japan … Through these surveys, it was confirmed that the Senkaku Islands had been uninhabited and showed no trace of having been under the control of the Qing Dynasty of China.”②Ministry of Foreign Af f airs of Japan, The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/basic_view.html, 12 October, 2016.The Government of Japan has alleged for years that it has, in accordance with the principle of “occupation of terra nullius”, legally incorporated the Diaoyu Islands into its territory. In this regard, “surveys of the Senkaku Islands”, in the words of Japan, concerns the issue of history, and “occupation of terra nullius” is a question of international law.

Japan maintained that it had conducted on-site surveys of the Senkaku Islands time and again since 1885, which, however, is contrary to the truth. Official documents of the Meiji Government confrm that, Japan only carried out one survey of the Diaoyu Islands in October 1885, where the Japanese merely landed on the Diaoyu Island, but not Huangwei and Chiwei Islands.③The results of this survey can be seen in the Summary Report of Inspection of Uotsuri Island and Two Other Islands submitted by Ishizawa Heigo, and the Report of Voyage to Uotsuri Island, Kuba Island, and Kumeakashima Island by Hayashi Tsurumatsu, the captain of the Ship Izumo Maru, to Mori Nagayoshi, the senior executive secretary of Okinawa Prefecture, who was acting on behalf of the Okinawa Governor Nishimura Sutezo. See [Japan] Murata Tadayoshi, The Origin of Sino-Japanese Territorial Disputes: the Diaoyu Islands Issue Seen from Historical Archives, translated by Wei Pinghe, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2013, pp. 166～169 (in Chinese); Li Li, Japan’s Illegal Investigation and Theft of Diaoyu Islands in Modern Times, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2013, pp. 12～14. (in Chinese)Inoue Kaoru, Japan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, came to know that the Diaoyu Islands“which are close to the national border of Qing China and adjacent to TaiwanIsland … belong to Qing China”.④An American Newspaper Article: Japan Should Respect the International Treaties concerning the Diaoyu Islands, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2012-10/22/ c_123850855.htm, 1 November 2016. (in Chinese)The document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Qin Zhan No. 38) indicated that, Inoue Kaoru expressed its objection to the setting up of national sovereignty markers on the Diaoyu Islands, saying to the Home Minister Yamagata Aritomo: “At this time, if we were to publicly place national markers, this must necessarily invite China’s suspicion.”⑤Construction of National Markers on the Kumeakashima Island, Kuba Island and Uotsuri Island of Okinawa Prefecture (JCAHR: B03041152300), Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, Vol. 18, p. 572. (in Japanese)This point can also be proved by the statement in an official document prepared by Nishimura Sutezo, the governor of the Okinawa Prefecture, on November 24 of the same year: “since this matter is not unrelated to China, if conflicts do arise, please give me instructions on how to deal with them.”⑥B03041152300の17, Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, Vol. 18, p. 576.On November 30, 1885, Japan’s Chancellor of the Realm Sanjō Sanetomi gave an order [Mi No. 218(2)] to Inoue Kaoru, deciding to put of f the setting of sovereignty markers.⑦Construction of National Markers on the Kumeakashima Island, Kuba Island and Uotsuri Island of Okinawa Prefecture (JCAHR: B03041152300), Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, Vol. 18, p. 572. (in Japanese)The following evidences can substantiate this conclusion. First, documents unearthed from the Navy Ministry of Japan indicated, the governor of the Okinawa Prefecture Maruoka Kanji, on January 27, 1892, wrote to the Navy Minister Kabayama Sukenori, saying that “surveys of the Diaoyu Islands are incomplete”. Consequently, he requested that the naval ship Kaimon be sent to survey the islands, but ultimately the “bad weather” made it impossible for the survey to take place.⑧Han-yi Shaw, The Inconvenient Truth Behind the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, The New York Times, 19 September 2012; “Ministry of Foreign Af f airs” of Taiwan, Taiwan Government Response to the Diaoyutai Islands Q&A on the Website of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Af f airs, at http://www.mofa.gov.tw/cp.aspx?n=FBFB7416EA72736F&s=FAA8620A0EE7 2A91, 30 January 2015. (in Chinese)Second, the Okinawa governor Narahara Shigeru wrote, in May of 1894, to the Home Ministry of Japan, confirming that ever since the islands were first investigated in 1885, there had been no subsequent feld surveys conducted.⑨Construction of National Markers on the Kumeakashima Island, Kuba Island and Uotsuri Island of Okinawa Prefecture (JCAHR: B03041152300) (in Japanese); Han-yi Shaw, The Inconvenient Truth Behind the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, The New York Times, 19 September 2012; “Ministry of Foreign Af f airs” of Taiwan, Taiwan Government Response to the Diaoyutai Islands Q&A on the Website of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Af f airs, at http://www.mofa.gov.tw/cp.aspx?n=FBFB7416EA72736F&s=FAA8620A0EE72A91, 30 January 2015. (in Chinese)Aftera number of Chinese defeats in the Sino-Japanese War (started in the August of 1894), Japan’s Home Minister Nomura Yasushi, in December 1894, sent a secret document (Classified No. 133) to the Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu. On how to reply the request for setting up sovereignty markers on the Diaoyu Islands, which was submitted by the governor of Okinawa Prefecture a year ago for the third time, this document stated, “this matter has already been discussed with your ministry, and an order has been made … but the situation today is greatly dif f erent from back then.”⑩“B03041152300の29”, Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, Vol. 18.The sentence “but the situation today is greatly dif f erent from back then”, completely uncovered the conspiracy of the Japanese Government to steal Chinese territory, by taking advantage of the First Sino-Japanese War, and also made it difficult for the Japanese to justify its claim that the Diaoyu Islands was irrelevant to the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The truth is that the Okinawa Prefecture only carried out a one-day survey on the Daito Islands and then placed markers on them.①In June and July, 1885, the Home Ministry of Japan sent a secret order to Okinawa Governor Nishimura Sutezo, asking him to survey the Daito Islands located to the east of Okinawa Island. Ordered by Nishimura, on 29 August of the same year, a group led by Ishizawa Heigo landed on Minamidaito Island by the ship Izumo Maru. On 31 August, they came to the Kita-Daito Island, where they conducted field surveys, as ordered, and erected a national marker saying “under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture”. And Captain Hayashi Tsurumatsu set up a navigation mark, saying “under the order of the Okinawa Prefecture, Empire of Japan, Izumo Maru, a ship owned by Osaka Shosen, created this sea route for steamships”. Izumo Maru returned to the port of Naha on 1 September. See [Japan] Murata Tadayoshi, The Origin of Sino-Japanese Territorial Disputes: the Diaoyu Islands Issue Seen from Historical Archives, translated by Wei Pinghe, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2013, pp. 150～152. (in Chinese)In contrast, the so-called “on-site surveys time and again” carried out by the authorities of Okinawa Prefecture and the Diaoyu Islands being terra nullius, are fictions made by the Japanese against China. Furthermore, the survey report prepared by the Okinawa Prefecture in 1885, titled Summary Report of Inspectionof Uotsuri Island and Two Other Islands,②Summary Report of Inspection of Uotsuri Island and Two Other Islands stated, “this island, when compared with the map of the sea areas between Japan and Taiwan published by Great Britain, refers to ‘Hoa Pin su’, which is recorded as ‘Tia u su’ on the map. The use of ‘Tia u su’ is actually a misnomer. ‘Kumeakashima Island’ refers to Raleigh Rock, which is merely a rock … The map also mistook ‘Pinnacle’ for ‘Kuba Island’. The word‘Pinnacle’ means “a high pointed piece of rock” … Therefore, these mistakes are hereby corrected: ‘Uotsuri Island’ should be recorded as ‘Hoa Pin Su’, ‘Kuba Island’ as ‘Tia u su’, and ‘Kumeakashima Island’ as ‘Raleigh Rock’.” Murata Tadayoshi pointed out that, Ishizawa Heigo, the submitter of the Summary Report, mistook “Hoa Pin Su” for “Uotsuri Island”. See [Japan] Murata Tadayoshi, The Origin of Sino-Japanese Territorial Disputes: the Diaoyu Islands Issue Seen from Historical Archives, translated by Wei Pinghe, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2013, p. 169. (in Chinese)repetitiously mentioned “Hoa Pin Su” and “Tia u su”. These two names appearing on maps charted by British cartographers are, actually, names of the Diaoyu Islands given by the Chinese.③Zheng Hailin, The History of Diaoyu Islands and the Relevant Jurisprudence, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 2007, p. 75. (in Chinese)

Under international law, acquisition of territory through occupation is an act of a State intending to place the territory which has never been subject to the sovereignty of any State, i.e., terra nullius, under its own sovereignty.④The term “occupation” was translated into “占領” in the Chinese version of Oppenheim’s International Law (9th edition), by scholars led by Wang Tieya, an internationalist from Chinese Mainland. However, this term was translated into “先占” by Taiwanese internationalist Chiu Hungdah in his book Modern International Law (edited by Chan Shun-yee), when he quoted the wording concerning territorial disputes from the same edition of Oppenheim’s International Law. In the view of Chiu, in the context of territorial acquisition, “occupation” should be translated into“先占” in Chinese; however, under law of war, it should be translated into “占領”; they have different connotations. Sovereignty cannot be acquired through military occupation. The Chinese version of this paper adopted Chiu’s translation. See Chiu Hungdah, Modern International Law (3rd edition), edited by Chan Shun-yee, Taipei: San Min Book Co., Ltd., 2013, pp. 514～515 (in Chinese); Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts eds., Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. 1, No. 2, translated by Wang Tieya et al., Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 1998, pp. 74～79. (in Chinese)One prerequisite of occupation is that the land subject to occupation is terranullius,⑤Terra nullius is a prevailing concept of the international law in the 18th century, which was employed by European States to defend their colonial activities. The concept terra nullius in international law was expounded by Emmerich De Vattel, a renowned internationalist in the 18th century, in his book Le Droit des Gens. He justifed British occupation of Oceania or European States’ occupation of the whole North America. He divided the land of indigenous peoples into two categories: cultivated or uncultivated. Vattel argued, the Europe-led international law should provide that humans were obliged to exploit and cultivate the land they inhabited and used. The failure of unsettled hordes to fulfill such an obligation implied that they had never “actually and legally” occupied these lands. Due to the lack of any recognizable forms of social leaders, these hordes cannot be considered as having occupied the lands under international law, which means that their lands were terra nullius. In that case, according to the principle of discovery and occupation, terrae nullius were open to all colonizers. See De Vattel, Les droit des Gens, ou Principles de la Loi naturelle, appliqués a la conduit at aux af f aires des Nations et des Souverains (1758), translated by Charles Ghequiere Fenwick, Washington: Carnegie institution of Washington, 1916, p. 194.which belongs to no State. Such a piece of land is either uninhabited or inhabited by indigenous peoples that do not sustain social and political organization qualified as a State.⑥Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts eds., Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. 1, No. 2, translated by Wang Tieya et al., Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 1998, p. 74. (in Chinese)Although the doctrine of occupation is still used in modern international law, internationally accepted terra nullius is increasingly fewer. As a result, the infuence and public acceptance of this doctrine is gradually declining. Moreover, occupation of territory should be effective rather than fctitious⑦Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts eds., Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. 1, No. 2, translated by Wang Tieya et al., Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 1998, p. 75. (in Chinese)The international law, in its early stage, failed to provide that to constitute an act of occupation, two requirements (possession and administration) need to be met; instead, it asserted that discovery alone is sufficient to create title of sovereignty. Nonetheless, international law theories and state practice in the 19th century uphold that only an effective occupation can acquire territorial sovereignty.⑧Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. I, 9th ed., Harlow: Longmans Group UK Limited, 1992, pp. 689～690.

The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands,⑨Ministry of Foreign Af f airs of Japan, The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/basic_view.html, 12 October 2016.issued by the Foreign Af f airs of Japan in 1972, shows that the Japanese Government, based on the doctrine of the occupation of terra nullius, raised its claim to the sovereignty of Diaoyu Islands, and also alleged that the formal incorporation of the DiaoyuIslands into its territory was conducted through a legal procedure, i.e., through the adoption of a Cabinet Decision on 14 January 1895. However, is the concept“uninhabited island” identical with the concept of terra nullius in international law? Further, does the procedure that Japan relied on to incorporate the Diaoyu Islands into its territory comply with international law?

First, albeit uninhabited, the Diaoyu Islands has been included in the coastal defense areas, and placed under the jurisdiction of Fujian Province, by Chinese authorities ever since the Ming Dynasty. This act qualifes as an ef f ective occupation. The surveys of uninhabited islands, including Daito Islands, carried out by the authorities of Okinawa Prefecture in the 19th century, showed that Japan possessed many uninhabited islands. However, the fact that an island is uninhabited does not imply that this island is subject to no owner or possessor, or an owner should be found for it. The Japanese Government gave up its intention to place national markers on the Diaoyu Islands in 1885, because it was knowledgeable of the relevance between these islands and Chinese Qing Empire. In that case, the Japanese Government cannot claim the sovereignty of these “uninhabited islands”, if it had not inquired the Qing Court about their sovereignty and received a reply from Qing Court, saying these islands “do not belong to Chinese territory”.⑩[Japan] Murata Tadayoshi, The Origin of Sino-Japanese Territorial Disputes: the Diaoyu Islands Issue Seen from Historical Archives, translated by Wei Pinghe, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2013, pp. 150～177. (in Chinese)In practice, at that time, the Japanese was not unaware of the principle that terra nullius should be confirmed and occupation thereof should be proclaimed. For example, when the Meiji Government incorporated Iwo Jima into its territory in 1891, the incorporation was made public by the Imperial Decree No. 190 issued on 9 September of the same year, following the Cabinet Decision dated 19 August 1891; and when the Meiji Government incorporated Minami-Tori-shima in 1898, the incorporation was publicized by the Official Gazette of Tokyo Prefecture (No. 58) issued on 24 July of the same year, after the Cabinet Decision dated 1 July 1898. These facts demonstrate that Japan’s clandestine occupation of the Diaoyu Islands deviated from international law and international customs and practices, and also from its domestic practices.①“Ministry of Foreign Af f airs” of Taiwan, Taiwan Government Response to the Diaoyutai Islands Q&A on the Website of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Af f airs, at http://www.mofa. gov.tw/cp.aspx?n=FBFB7416EA72736F&s=FAA8620A0EE72A91, 30 January 2015. (in Chinese)

Second, Japan alleged that, by virtue of its Imperial Decree No. 13 concerningthe division of Okinawa Prefecture into several districts in 1896, the prefecture was divided into fve districts. However, the decree said nothing about the Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islands, nor listed Diaoyu, Chiwei and other islands together with the Yaeyama Islands. That is to say, Diaoyu and Chiwei Islands had not been included in the Okinawa Prefecture by the Imperial Decree No. 13. Even after the end of the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese Government did not formally go through the procedure to take possession of the Diaoyu Islands.②[Japan] Murata Tadayoshi, The Origin of Sino-Japanese Territorial Disputes: the Diaoyu Islands Issue Seen from Historical Archives, translated by Wei Pinghe, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2013, pp. 222～223. (in Chinese)Additionally, the national markers approved to be erected on the Diaoyu Islands by the Cabinet Council, actually, had not been set up by the authorities of Okinawa Prefecture. In 1968, the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, also known as the “ECAFE”, issued a conclusive report on the seabed resources in the East China Sea. It is against this backdrop that the authorities of Ishigaki promptly placed boundary markers on the Diaoyu Island on 9 May 1969.③[Japan] Murata Tadayoshi, The Origin of Sino-Japanese Territorial Disputes: the Diaoyu Islands Issue Seen from Historical Archives, translated by Wei Pinghe, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 2013, pp. 201～202. (in Chinese)Furthermore, legal rights cannot derive from illegal acts. Two other documents can prove that Japanese claims are void ab initio. One is the Fishery Survey of Miyako and Yaeyama Districts, edited by the Aquaculture Technician (an official title) of Okinawa Prefecture in 1913. This Fishery Survey recorded the following facts about “Senkaku Islands”: Tatsushiro Koga intended to lease the islands from Japanese Government, but at that time, “it is said that these islands belong to Qing China, therefore, Koga has not received a reply from the government for a long time. However, with the advent of the Sino-Japanese War, resulting in the incorporation of Taiwan into Japanese territory, the ownership of these islands (Senkaku Islands) becomes clear.” This passage reveals that, prior to the incorporation of the Diaoyu Islands, the Meiji Government had already known that they were not terra nullius. The second document is the Government Gazette No. 2507 dated 9 December 1920. This gazette includes two items: “the incorporation of territories whose ownership is uncertain” and their “naming”. Here, “territories whose ownership is uncertain” refer to Chiwei Island, which was renamed “Taishōtō” by the Japanese. It implies that Japan’s secret Cabinet Decision of 14 January 1895 neither complied with its national law, nor the international law. Further,when listing the territories to be incorporated, it contained such a major omission that Japan had to unilaterally incorporate Chiwei Island and renamed it as “Taishōtō” after 25 years upon the end of the Sino-Japanese War④Han-yi Shaw, The Inconvenient Truth Behind the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, The New York Times, 19 September 2012

To sum up, one prerequisite of occupation is that the land subject to occupation should be terra nullius, or land without owner. Second, in accordance with the general international law rules recognized by civilized States, the doctrine of effective occupation of terra nullius under international law requires that terra nullius should be confirmed and occupation thereof should be proclaimed, which are two indispensible requirements in this regard. Third, by virtue of the international law principle that a State cannot acquire legal rights or entitlements through unlawful acts or omissions, Japan’s stealing of Diaoyu Islands, as an illegal act, cannot be served as the ground to obtain legal rights. Great volumes of facts demonstrate that Japan’s claims to the sovereignty of Diaoyu Islands by invoking the doctrine of occupation of terra nullius, is not well grounded.

V. Conclusions

This paper argues, taking into account of the history of the pre-modern Ryukyu and the international law of the 19th century, represented by the Elements of International Law, Ryukyu should be defned as a sovereign State, even in the period when it was subordinated both to China and Japan.

First, the historical status of Ryukyu can be examined by reviewing its own history and other tributary States under the same tributary system with Ryukyu. Chronologically, the historical status of Ryukyu may be discussed in three stages. In the period before the Satsuma’s invasion of Ryukyu in 1609 (Stage 1), Ryukyu was an independent Kingdom, which is without much debate among the historians of many States. In the period between 1609 and 1872, also called “the period of dual subordination” (Stage 2), whether Ryukyu was an independent Kingdom, is full of opposing views. In this stage, Ryukyu not only retained its political institutions and reign title, but also had diplomatic and trade exchanges with its Asian neighbors, including the Japanese shogunate. From 1854 to 1859, Ryukyu, in the name of a sovereign State under modern international law, signed commercial treaties with the U.S., France and the Netherlands. More importantly, in order toseek gains from Sino-Ryukyuan trades, both Satsuma and Ryukyu deliberately hid the relations between them from the international community, including China. Viewed from the history of the diplomatic relations between China, Japan and Ryukyu, and from international law, Japan cannot acquire the sovereignty over Ryukyu through Satsuma’s invasion of the latter, therefore, it is true to say: Ryukyu was subordinated both to China and Japan, and simultaneously remained an independent Kingdom. In the third stage, that is the period from 1872 to 1880 when the Sino-Japanese negotiations about Ryukyu were conducted, the status of Ryukyu was pending. The frequent diplomatic negotiations between China and Japan over the ownership of Ryukyu, and the mediation or good offices of f ered by some third State to settle the Sino-Japanese dispute over Ryukyu in this Stage, as well as the draft treaty with regards to the division of the Ryukyu Islands and the revision of the treaty concerned in 1880 (which was not signed by Qing Court at the end), all prove that the status of Ryukyu was pending at this stage. Additionally, around the time Japan and China were negotiating, Qing Court also negotiated with the major powers of Europe concerning the other three tributaries, Korea, Vietnam and Burma. Dif f erent from the case of Ryukyu, the change of the legal status of these three tributary States had been confrmed through treaties, and acknowledged by their suzerainty - China. In contrast, from 1879 when Japan annexed Ryukyu by violence, to the end of World War II, Japan and China failed to reach any formal agreements with respect to the change of the sovereignty over Ryukyu and the arrangement for Ryukyuan territories, except some negotiations over the draft treaty concerning the division of the Ryukyu Islands in 1880. More importantly, those tributaries (other than Ryukyu) under Chinese tributary system, had freed themselves from colonial rule, and now become independent States in the UN framework.

Second, based on the doctrine of intertemporal law, the international law status of Ryukyu should be viewed in the eye of modern and contemporary international law. As we know, Elements of International Law, by Henry Wheaton, is a masterpiece, representing modern international law. When Japan and Qing were negotiating over the Ryukyu issue, the status of Ryukyu in the period of dual subordination became a focus of contention, where China, Japan and Ryukyu all invoked the book Elements of International Law as legal grounds to support their own arguments. In accordance with the theories concerning sovereignty and legal persons contained in the said book, Ryukyu’s dual subordination to China and Japan, did not contradict with its status of being an independent Kingdom.However, after 1879, when Ryukyu was annexed by Japan and incorporated into its territories, Ryukyu became a colony of the latter, which impaired the sovereignty of Ryukyu. This is an undeniable truth. Following Japan’s annexation of Ryukyu in 1879, many Ryukyuans fled to Qing China, seeking to restore the kingdom, and the “restoration movement” was also staged in the homeland of Ryukyu, which vividly manifest the resistance from Ryukyuans. Furthermore, China, being the suzerainty of Ryukyu, had never publicly recognized the legality of Japan’s annexation. Japan’s occupation of Ryukyu in the period between 1879 and the end of World War II, actually, is a kind of conquest in light of the theories of territorial acquisition under international law. Nevertheless, the Japanese cannot, by virtue of its conquest, evade the truth that the legal status of Ryukyu at that time was uncertain. In addition, according to the modern international trusteeship system, China and the U.S., in the Cairo Conference of 1943, agreed to joint administration of Ryukyu by the two States under the trusteeship of an international organization. However, after the end of the World War II, Ryukyu was under the de facto administration of the U.S. alone. Thereafter, despite the desire of many inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands for independence, the U.S., through signing the Okinawa Reversion Agreement of 1971, “returned” the power of administration of Ryukyu to Japan, which severely violated the four principles of international trusteeship and the juridical logic of trust law in the trusteeship system. At the meantime, in view of the concept of “residual sovereignty”, Japan only obtained the power of administration rather than sovereignty of Ryukyu⑤Liu Dan, Ryukyu Trusteeship Viewed from International Law: A Related Analysis of the Sovereignty Problem of Diaoyu Islands, Pacif i c Journal, Vol. 20, No. 12, 2012, pp. 82～97. (in Chinese)

In conclusion, during the time from 1372 to 1879, Ryukyu, being a tributary State of China, was a sovereign State under international law. Japan’s annexation of Ryukyu by violence was resisted by the inhabitants on the islands, whose legality had never been publicly recognized by China, the suzerainty of Ryukyu. Therefore, it is well grounded to consider the legal status of Ryukyu uncertain in this period. Due to the uncertainty of Ryukyu’s own legal status, Japan’s claim to the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, based on the assertion that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to Ryukyu, must be ill-founded and unjustifed.

Translator: XIE Hongyue

The Historical and Legal Status of Pre-modern Ryukyu and the Sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands

LIU Dan*

In the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, Japan, on the one hand, strives to evade the relations of its acquisition of “sovereignty” over these islands with the Treaty of Shimonoseki; on the other hand, it assumes that the Diaoyu Islands is a part of Ryukyu under its administrative system, and Ryukyu constitutes a part of Japanese territory, therefore, Japan has the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands. In this regard, Japan’s absurd logic lies in that “the Diaoyu Islands belongs to Ryukyu, and the latter belongs to Japan, hence the Diaoyu Islands belongs to Japan”. This paper attempts to eliminate the misstatements about the status of Ryukyu, by examining the status of pre-modern Ryukyu (1609-1879) in history and international law, and the marine boundaries between China and Ryukyu in history. In doing so, the paper further demonstrates that the Diaoyu Islands is an inherent part of China, thereby providing compelling evidences to support China’s claim to the sovereignty of these islands.

Status of Ryukyu; International law; Diaoyu Islands dispute

* 劉丹，法學博士，上海交通大學凱原法學院海洋法治研究中心副研究員。電子郵箱：lbanyliudan@163.com。本研究為劉丹副研究員主持的國家社科基金青年項目《釣魚島爭端視角下琉球法律地位問題研究》(13CFX123)、上海交通大學文理交叉海洋專項基金項目《以國際法為中心的南海法律戰(zhàn)研究》（16JCHY09）的階段性成果，本文也受到中國海洋發(fā)展研究會重大項目《中國在推進海洋戰(zhàn)略過程中的法制完善研究》（CAMAZDA201501）的資助。

? THE AUTHOR AND CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEW

⑥ James Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations: A Treaties on the Jural Relations of Separate Political Communities, Vol. 1, Edinburgh/London: W. Blackwood & Sons, 1883-1884, pp. 102～103.

⑤ 李云泉：《朝貢制度史論——中國古代對外關系體制研究》，北京：新華出版社2004年版，第137頁。

85 [日]西里喜行，胡連成等譯：《清末中琉日關系史研究（上）》，北京：社會科學文獻出版社2010年版，第154～155頁。

* LIU Dan, SJD, is an associate researcher at the Center for Rule of Ocean Law Studies, KoGuan Law School, Shanghai Jiao Tong University. E-mail: lbanyliudan@163.com. This paper is a part of the research achievements of her programs: a Youth Program sponsored by the National Social Science Foundation of China (No. 13CFX123) and an Intersection Art and Science Program of 2016 by Shanghai Jiao Tong University (16JCHY09). This paper is also sponsored by a Major Program of China Association of Marine Affairs (CAMAZDA201501).

? THE AUTHOR AND CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEW

45 Li Yunquan, The History of Tributary System: A Study on Institutions Related to the Foreign Relations of Ancient China, Beijing: Xinhua Press, 2004, p. 137. (in Chinese)