論南海地區(qū)國家航空行為的研判與合法性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)

李亞凝

LI Yaning*

論南海地區(qū)國家航空行為的研判與合法性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)

李亞凝*

南海地區(qū)上空是中國管理和開發(fā)其東沙群島、中沙群島、西沙群島、南沙群島及其附近海域的重要支撐體的一部分，中國對南海上空享有的權(quán)利包括維持中國大陸領(lǐng)土與其密不可分的群島水域之間的主權(quán)聯(lián)系，以及群島自身發(fā)展所必需的既有的以及將來應(yīng)當(dāng)具有的一切權(quán)利。其他國家的“航行及飛越自由”不能干擾到此種權(quán)利的實(shí)現(xiàn)。學(xué)術(shù)界與實(shí)務(wù)界對航空器與航空行為的混淆使用，以及國家航空行為的概念研究缺失，使得國家航空行為以及國家航空行為國際運(yùn)行的研判標(biāo)準(zhǔn)不明。本文通過對既有概念與定義的梳理，厘清了“航空器”與“航空行為”的區(qū)別，并在此基礎(chǔ)上，通過分析國家航空器的目的屬性與行為屬性，界定了國家航空行為的概念。本文最后還對判定國家航空國行為國際運(yùn)行的合法性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)進(jìn)行了整理。

民用航空行為 國家航空行為 國際法 民用航空公約

一、問題的提出

目前，南海作為一個具有戰(zhàn)略通道功能和能源基地功能的特殊區(qū)域，對于作為陸海復(fù)合型國家的中國具有特別重要的戰(zhàn)略意義。①杜德斌、范斐、馬亞華：《南海主權(quán)爭端的戰(zhàn)略態(tài)勢及中國的應(yīng)對方略》，載于《世界地理研究》2012年第2期，第1頁。特別是目前對南海地區(qū)的“U形線”存在著不同認(rèn)知，主要存在“歷史性水域說”、“歷史性權(quán)利說”、“海上疆域說”和“島嶼歸屬線說”等4種學(xué)說。根據(jù)“島嶼歸屬線說”，中國對東沙群島、中沙群島、西沙群島、南沙群島及其附近海域擁有無可爭辯的主權(quán)。②李金明：《南海斷續(xù)線的法律地位：歷史性水域、疆域線、抑或島嶼歸屬線?》，載于《南洋問題研究》2010年第4期，第22～29頁；李金明：《南海斷續(xù)線：產(chǎn)生背景及其法律地位》，載于《現(xiàn)代國際關(guān)系》2012年第9期，第7～14頁。國家海洋局海洋發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略研究所所長高之國認(rèn)為，中國地圖上的“U形線”與其說是傳統(tǒng)的海上疆域線，不如說是島嶼歸屬線。他寫道：“仔細(xì)研究中國文件可以看出，中國從未對南海整個海域提出過聲稱，而僅是對斷續(xù)線內(nèi)的群島及其周圍海域”。這就意味著南海諸島是中國不可分割的一部分，而國家航空器在南海地區(qū)的運(yùn)行，特別是外國國家航空器的運(yùn)行將會成為各國關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)。

一方面，根據(jù)《芝加哥公約》第三條的規(guī)定，“一締約國的國家航空器，未經(jīng)特別協(xié)定或其他方式的許可并遵照其中的規(guī)定，不得在另一締約國領(lǐng)土上空飛行或在此領(lǐng)土上降落”。另一方面，我國與多國簽訂了雙邊航空協(xié)定，允許民用航空飛機(jī)進(jìn)入我國領(lǐng)空。

近期，某些國家頻頻以所謂的“航行自由”為借口，妄圖將南海問題國際化，而“航行自由”與“飛越自由”主要是針對公海的，而U形線所表明的是島嶼歸屬及資源管轄線。③金永明：《中國南海斷續(xù)線的性質(zhì)及線內(nèi)水域的法律地位》，載于《中國法學(xué)》2012年第6期，第36～48頁。中國對U形線內(nèi)水域享有特殊權(quán)利，因此有必要對航空行為進(jìn)行探討。

隨著科技的發(fā)展，法學(xué)傳統(tǒng)概念的內(nèi)涵與外延不可避免將要發(fā)生相應(yīng)的變化，特別是對于航空活動而言。因此，與之相關(guān)的基礎(chǔ)概念的探究就顯得尤為重要。

首先，無論是我國的《民用航空法》，還是相關(guān)的國際公約，都混淆使用了“航空器”和“航空行為”這兩個概念。例如在《芝加哥公約》第三條“民用航空器和國家航空器”中，將國家航空器定義為“用于軍事、海關(guān)和警察部門的航空器”。④我國《民用航空法》第五條也采用了同樣的表述方法，表述為“本法所稱民用航空器，是指除用于執(zhí)行軍事、海關(guān)、警察飛行任務(wù)外的航空器?！睂?shí)際上，“用于軍事、海關(guān)和警察部門……”討論的內(nèi)涵是“航空行為”，但是卻采用“航空器”進(jìn)行概念化處理，使得“物”與“行為”發(fā)生了錯位。因此在實(shí)踐中，民用航空器執(zhí)行國家任務(wù)，或者國家航空器執(zhí)行民用任務(wù)時，非常容易發(fā)生研判錯誤。例如，美國聯(lián)邦航空局認(rèn)為任何擊落無人機(jī)的行為都視同犯罪，⑤FAA Says Shooting Down Drones Is a Federal Crime, at http://www.engadget. com/2016/04/18/faa-says-shooting-down-drones-is-a-federal-crime/, 22 November 2016.其依據(jù)的規(guī)范是《美國法典》第18部第32節(jié)。⑥18 USC 32: (a) Whoever willfully - (1) sets fire to, damages, destroys, disables, or wrecks any aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States or any civil aircraft used, operated, or employed in interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce; ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years or both. 這一表述中顯然也是采用了“aircraft”，并沒有區(qū)分航空行為。這一做法顯然混淆了“物”與“行為”。

其次，雖然學(xué)術(shù)界與實(shí)務(wù)界較多關(guān)注民用航空行為的研究，而對于何為國家航空行為，以及對于國家航空行為的研判并沒有進(jìn)行深入的探討，這就可能會出現(xiàn)概念邊界不清的問題。作為與民用航空行為最鄰近的概念，國家航空行為概念的厘清不僅會使得民用航空行為的范圍更加明晰，而且對于航空活動的基礎(chǔ)概念體系發(fā)展具有重要意義。

最后，自有記錄到目前所發(fā)生的疑似武裝擊落民用航空器的8起案例之中，大部分都是因?yàn)閷⒚裼煤娇招袨檎`認(rèn)為國家航空行為，究其本質(zhì)乃是將民用航空行為與國家航空行為相混淆所造成的悲劇，一旦具備國家航空行為屬性的航空器進(jìn)入他國領(lǐng)空，則有可能觸發(fā)自衛(wèi)權(quán)，這也成為國家航空行為迫切需要研究的重要原因。

筆者將從分析航空器性質(zhì)與航空活動性質(zhì)入手，通過討論現(xiàn)有的侵略行為定義，來確定國家航空器的目的屬性與行為屬性，并籍此界定國家航空行為。

二、基于海洋權(quán)益對南海上空法律地位的分析

對于民用航空活動而言，確定空域的屬性無疑是非常重要的。國際民航組織標(biāo)準(zhǔn)中把空域分為A、B、C、D、E、F、G等7類，⑦1）A類只允許IFR飛行，所有航空器之間配備間隔，提供ATC服務(wù)，要求實(shí)現(xiàn)地空雙向通信，進(jìn)入空域要進(jìn)行ATC許可；2）B類允許IFR和VFR飛行，其它同A類；3）C類只要求IFR飛行之間、IFR和VFR飛行之間配備間隔，對IFR飛行之間、IFR和VFR飛行之間提供ATC服務(wù)，其它同B；4）D類只要求IFR飛行之間配備間隔，對IFR飛行之間提供ATC服務(wù)，對VFR飛行提供飛行情報服務(wù)，其它同C；5）E類只需要IFR飛行實(shí)現(xiàn)地空雙向通信，VFR飛行進(jìn)入空域不需要ATC許可，其他同D；6）F類空域?qū)FR飛行提供交通資訊和情報服務(wù)，VFR飛行提供飛行情報服務(wù)，所有航空器進(jìn)入空域都不需要ATC許可，其它同E；7) G類空域不需要提供間隔服務(wù)，對飛行提供飛行情報服務(wù)，只要求IFR飛行實(shí)現(xiàn)地空雙向通信，進(jìn)入空域不需要ATC許可，其它同F(xiàn)。但是這種技術(shù)上的空域劃分是以空域的基礎(chǔ)屬性為前提的。因此要確定南海上空的法律地位，就需要從南海島礁及其附近水域的地位出發(fā)。

（一）南海U形線內(nèi)區(qū)域的法律地位

西沙群島是中國的領(lǐng)土，1996年中國政府還公布了西沙群島的領(lǐng)海基線，依據(jù)直線型領(lǐng)海基線向外延伸12海里的海域?yàn)橹袊I(lǐng)海。這進(jìn)而引發(fā)了如何界定U形線內(nèi)其他區(qū)域的地位的問題。1982年《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》（以下簡稱“《海洋法公約》”）第四部分建立了一套獨(dú)特的群島制度，但是并沒有明確非群島國家是否可以使用群島制度。

根據(jù)相關(guān)法律文件以及實(shí)踐，筆者認(rèn)為，首先，中國對東沙群島、中沙群島、西沙群島、南沙群島及其附近海域擁有無可爭辯的主權(quán)。

其次，群島制度不適用于南海特殊權(quán)利領(lǐng)域。非群島國家的洋中群島問題成為《海洋法公約》中的一個缺失。⑧傅崐成、鄭凡：《群島的整體性與航行自由——關(guān)于中國在南海適用群島制度的思考》，載于《上海交通大學(xué)學(xué)報（哲學(xué)社會科學(xué)版）》2015年第6期，第5～13頁。中國的領(lǐng)土大部分為大陸，因此與《海洋法公約》第四部分所定義的“全部由一個或多個群島構(gòu)成的國家，并可包括其他島嶼”的一般群島國家存在著本質(zhì)區(qū)別。更為重要的是，中國作為一個以大陸為基礎(chǔ)進(jìn)行行政管理、促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)和文化發(fā)展的國家，其陸地領(lǐng)土需求與其群島領(lǐng)土存在緊密的聯(lián)系，并且這種需求符合國家整體利益，也方便進(jìn)行行政管理，這些權(quán)利需求使得南海成為了一個“特殊權(quán)利領(lǐng)域”。因此，U形線內(nèi)并未確定領(lǐng)?；€的區(qū)域乃是為了方便大陸領(lǐng)土與其密不可分的群島水域之間的主權(quán)聯(lián)系而需要享有特殊權(quán)利的領(lǐng)域。

再次，南海特殊權(quán)利領(lǐng)域是保持中國南海島嶼健康發(fā)展的必需區(qū)域。作為以大陸為基礎(chǔ)開展社會經(jīng)濟(jì)活動的國家，中國也需要有效地管理其群島，這也與普通的以群島為基礎(chǔ)的國家不同。中國南海的島嶼較之大陸地區(qū)，仍處于初級開發(fā)的狀態(tài)，需要與其大陸地區(qū)存在緊密的聯(lián)系。如果把中國在南海的群島看做是“嬰兒”的話，南海U形線內(nèi)的區(qū)域則是起到孕育作用的“搖籃”。因此，中國對于南海特殊領(lǐng)域內(nèi)的權(quán)利不同于毗連區(qū)、專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)和大陸架權(quán)利，其應(yīng)當(dāng)包括為了保證大陸領(lǐng)土與其密不可分的群島水域之間的主權(quán)聯(lián)系，以及群島自身發(fā)展所必需的既有的以及將來應(yīng)當(dāng)具有的一切權(quán)利。

又次，中國在南海U形線內(nèi)的區(qū)域所享有的權(quán)利為國際法法理與國家實(shí)踐所認(rèn)可。這些權(quán)利以充分的歷史事實(shí)為依據(jù)，即中國人最早發(fā)現(xiàn)、命名、開發(fā)使用和長期有效管理這些島嶼，此外，這些權(quán)利也得到了戰(zhàn)后國際法體系的認(rèn)可，包括1943年的《開羅宣言》、1945年的《波茨坦公告》和1951年的《舊金山和約》。這就說明了中國對南海諸島的權(quán)利不同于其他以大陸為主體的國家對于其群島的權(quán)利。

最后，中國對于南海的權(quán)利并不排斥中國與相關(guān)國家“擱置爭議，共同開發(fā)”。實(shí)際上，中國人民在南海的活動已有兩千多年歷史。在上世紀(jì)60年代末南海地區(qū)發(fā)現(xiàn)豐富的油氣資源之前，南海諸島屬于中國是國際社會的普遍共識，各國外交實(shí)踐、權(quán)威地圖和出版物均確認(rèn)南海諸島屬于中國。而那之后，菲律賓等國陸續(xù)非法侵占和蠶食中國南沙島礁多達(dá)40多個。對此，中國保持了極大的忍耐和克制，提出了“擱置爭議，共同開發(fā)”的倡議，不僅與菲律賓歷任政府達(dá)成通過談判解決南海有關(guān)爭議的雙邊協(xié)議，還與東盟各國共同發(fā)表了《南海各方行為宣言》，積極磋商制定“南海行為準(zhǔn)則”，以實(shí)際行動維護(hù)南海的和平穩(wěn)定。

（二）南海上空的法律地位

誠如前述，中國對于南海U形線內(nèi)所擁有的權(quán)利包括為了保證大陸領(lǐng)土與其密不可分的群島水域之間的主權(quán)聯(lián)系，以及群島自身發(fā)展所必需的既有的以及將來應(yīng)當(dāng)具有的一切權(quán)利。之所以言稱“未來的一切權(quán)利”，是因?yàn)橹袊鴮τ谀虾形線內(nèi)區(qū)域的權(quán)利并不是靜止的，我們應(yīng)當(dāng)以發(fā)展的眼光來看待這些權(quán)利。過去對島嶼的行政管理和經(jīng)濟(jì)開發(fā)，主要通過船舶為載體進(jìn)行，隨著新技術(shù)的發(fā)展，將逐步增加航空器、網(wǎng)絡(luò)通訊設(shè)備等載體。

2016年1月6日，中國政府征用的2架民航客機(jī)先后從海口美蘭機(jī)場起飛，經(jīng)過近2小時的飛行分別于10時21分、10時46分平穩(wěn)降落南沙永暑礁新建機(jī)場并于當(dāng)日下午返回?？冢囷w成功。同年7月13日8時30分、8時40分，中國政府征用的南方航空公司、海南航空公司兩架民航客機(jī)先后從?？诿捞m國際機(jī)場起飛，經(jīng)過近2個小時的飛行，分別于10時29分、10時28分在美濟(jì)礁新建機(jī)場和渚碧礁新建機(jī)場平穩(wěn)著陸并于當(dāng)日下午返回?？冢囷w成功。這次試飛成功證明這兩個新建機(jī)場具備了保障民航大型客機(jī)安全運(yùn)行的能力，將為島礁物資運(yùn)輸、人員往來、醫(yī)療救護(hù)提供便捷的交通方式，同時將為南海地區(qū)的跨洋飛行提供新的備降機(jī)場選擇和更為經(jīng)濟(jì)靈活的航線選擇。這也充分證明了中國已經(jīng)采用新的載體來管理和開發(fā)南海諸島。

與南海海域權(quán)利一樣，中國對于南海上空的權(quán)利也應(yīng)當(dāng)包括為保證大陸領(lǐng)土與其密不可分的群島水域之間的主權(quán)聯(lián)系，以及群島自身發(fā)展所必需的既有的以及將來應(yīng)當(dāng)具有的一切權(quán)利?！赌虾８鞣叫袨樾浴返谌龡l規(guī)定，“各方重申尊重并承諾，包括1982年《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》在內(nèi)的公認(rèn)的國際法原則所規(guī)定的在南海的航行及飛越自由”，但是值得注意的是，這種“航行及飛越自由”并不能損害到中國所享有的前述一切權(quán)利。

因此，中國對于南海上空的權(quán)利具有優(yōu)先性，這種優(yōu)先性是與國家主權(quán)原則密不可分的?！堵?lián)合國憲章》特別強(qiáng)調(diào)對于國家主權(quán)的保障。南海地區(qū)作為中國管理和開發(fā)其東沙群島、中沙群島、西沙群島、南沙群島及其附近海域的重要支撐體，體現(xiàn)了主權(quán)聯(lián)系的特征。另外，這種主權(quán)聯(lián)系具有一慣性與連續(xù)性，即中國以此種方式管理和開發(fā)南海諸島是為當(dāng)代國際法所認(rèn)可的慣常方式。所以，各國“在南海的航行及飛越自由”不得影響到此種權(quán)利的實(shí)現(xiàn)。

三、國家航空行為與民用航空行為的差別

（一）國家航空行為的特征分析

根據(jù)《海洋法公約》第38條、第53條、第58條、第87條的規(guī)定，船舶與航空器在用于國際航行的海峽、群島國的群島水域、專屬經(jīng)濟(jì)區(qū)以及公海都享有不同程度的航行自由與飛越自由。一般而言，沿海國在用于國際航行的海峽采取過境通行制，但在例外情況下，也有可能采取無害通過制度。1963年《關(guān)于在航空器內(nèi)的犯罪和其他某些行為的公約》第4條規(guī)定，沿海國在特殊情形下可以對公海上空“飛行中的航空器”行使特定的刑事管轄權(quán)。就國際習(xí)慣而言，沿海國在公海上對海盜、販奴、劫機(jī)等國際犯罪具有普遍管轄權(quán)。

但是，筆者認(rèn)為航空器在南海上空的運(yùn)行，應(yīng)當(dāng)受到中國對南海上空所具有的為保證中國大陸領(lǐng)土與其密不可分的群島水域之間的主權(quán)聯(lián)系，以及群島自身發(fā)展所必需的既有的以及將來應(yīng)當(dāng)具有的一切權(quán)利的限制，所以并不能適用既有的制度。應(yīng)當(dāng)從發(fā)展國際法、利用國際法的角度，制定一套專門的制度進(jìn)行調(diào)整。

這就需要我們對進(jìn)入南海上空的航空器進(jìn)行分類識別，無論是《芝加哥公約》還是中國《民用航空法》都區(qū)分了“國家航空器”與“民用航空器”，但是并沒有對“國家航空行為”與“民用航空行為”加以區(qū)分。

航空行為作為一項(xiàng)速度快、跨越地域廣的交通運(yùn)輸活動，非常容易牽連到主權(quán)問題，因此無論是民用航空行為還是國家航空行為，都需要對可能讓對方誤解為侵略行為的行為給予足夠的關(guān)切，以避免發(fā)生誤擊事件。

1.空氣空間的地位爭議

空氣空間的地位從1912年在布魯塞爾召開的國際法學(xué)會年會中開始爭論，分別出現(xiàn)了“空氣空間自由論”與“空氣空間主權(quán)論”兩種不同意見。

“空氣空間自由論”認(rèn)為各國擁有在空氣空間自由飛越的權(quán)利，⑨例如，《國際航班過境協(xié)定》第一條第一節(jié)規(guī)定，“每一締約國給予其他締約國以下列關(guān)于定期國際航班的空中自由：（一）不降停而飛越其領(lǐng)土的權(quán)利；（二）非運(yùn)輸業(yè)務(wù)性降停的權(quán)利。本節(jié)所規(guī)定的權(quán)利不適用于對定期國際航班禁止使用的軍用機(jī)場。在戰(zhàn)爭或軍事占領(lǐng)地區(qū)及戰(zhàn)時通往此項(xiàng)地區(qū)的補(bǔ)給路線上，此項(xiàng)權(quán)利的行使須經(jīng)軍事主管當(dāng)局的核準(zhǔn)”。另外，《國際航空運(yùn)輸協(xié)定》第一條第一節(jié)規(guī)定，“每一締約國給予其他締約國以下述關(guān)于定期國際航班的空中自由：（一）不降停而飛越其領(lǐng)土的權(quán)利；（二）非運(yùn)輸業(yè)務(wù)性降停的權(quán)利；（三）卸下來自航空器所屬國領(lǐng)土的客、貨、郵的權(quán)利；（四）裝載前往航空器所屬國領(lǐng)土的客、貨、郵的權(quán)利；（五）裝卸前往或來自任何其他締約國領(lǐng)土客、貨、郵的權(quán)利。關(guān)于本節(jié)（三）、（四）、（五）各項(xiàng)所規(guī)定的權(quán)利，每一締約國所承允的，僅限于構(gòu)成來自或前往該航空器所屬國本土的合理的直接航線上的直達(dá)航班。本節(jié)所規(guī)定的權(quán)利不適用于對定期國際航班禁止使用的軍用機(jī)場。在戰(zhàn)爭或軍事占領(lǐng)地區(qū)及戰(zhàn)時通往此等地區(qū)的補(bǔ)給線上，此項(xiàng)權(quán)利的行使須經(jīng)軍事主管當(dāng)局核準(zhǔn)”。以《國際航班過境協(xié)定》和《國際航空運(yùn)輸協(xié)定》為代表。實(shí)際上這種飛越自由與國家領(lǐng)土主權(quán)原則是相背離的，領(lǐng)空作為國家行使主權(quán)的一部分，是不可分割的。特別是從領(lǐng)空的自然屬性上而言，其覆蓋領(lǐng)土與領(lǐng)海，如果允許他國航空器自由飛越，將可能會給所在國帶來不可估計(jì)的風(fēng)險。

“空氣空間主權(quán)論”的代表國際公約為《芝加哥公約》，其第一條開宗明義認(rèn)為“締約各國承認(rèn)每一國家對其領(lǐng)土之上的空氣空間具有完全的和排他的主權(quán)”。

2.國家航空行為的特殊性

由于民用航空的屬性，以及歷史上所出現(xiàn)的誤擊民航飛機(jī)事件，逐漸引起國際社會對避免針對民用航空行為使用武力問題的關(guān)注。但是由于《芝加哥公約》出現(xiàn)的時候尚未預(yù)見到此類事件的發(fā)生，因此人們經(jīng)常引用的是《聯(lián)合國憲章》第二條第四款，“各會員國在其國際關(guān)系上不得使用威脅或武力，或以與聯(lián)合國宗旨不符之任何其他方法，侵害任何會員國或國家之領(lǐng)土完整或政治獨(dú)立”。在1983年“大韓航空007號班機(jī)空難事件”后，國際民航組織經(jīng)調(diào)查后，于1984年3月6日通過決議，認(rèn)為無論造成該機(jī)偏離其飛行計(jì)劃航路的原因?yàn)楹?，武力的使用都是違反國際法的，但是并未具體指出是違反哪條國際法規(guī)范。隨即在同年5月，增設(shè)《芝加哥公約》第三分條，要求不對民用航空器使用武力。

但是國家航空行為不同于民用航空行為，具體體現(xiàn)在下述方面：

首先，主體方面，國家航空行為的主體是國家，民用航空行為的主體是人或其他組織。需要注意的是，此處所言的“國家”概念是國家權(quán)力層面上的，其表現(xiàn)為非民事主體性。因此需要將國有航空公司的運(yùn)營與國家運(yùn)營區(qū)分，國有航空公司中的“國家”是民事主體意義上的，即作為民事主體的國家所進(jìn)行的民事行為，因此國有航空公司的運(yùn)營屬于民用航空行為。

其次，屬性方面，國家航空行為具有國家任務(wù)的屬性，是一種國家管理權(quán)的體現(xiàn)，因此如果存在與其他國家主權(quán)沖突的狀況，則將較民用航空活動復(fù)雜得多。主權(quán)這一概念意指對內(nèi)的最高權(quán)、對外的獨(dú)立權(quán)和防止侵略的自衛(wèi)權(quán)的集合。因此國家航空行為實(shí)際上體現(xiàn)的是主權(quán)的全部或者部分，是一種“權(quán)力”的體現(xiàn)，不能侵犯到其他平等主權(quán)國的主權(quán)。相反，民用航空行為則是平等主體間的民事行為，是“權(quán)利”的體現(xiàn)。

最后，既有規(guī)范方面，主要國際航空公約對于其是否適用于國家航空行為也進(jìn)行了相應(yīng)的規(guī)定，大致區(qū)分了在不同領(lǐng)域的適用情況。相比較而言，國際規(guī)范中有關(guān)民用航空行為的規(guī)定較為細(xì)致，但卻幾乎沒有針對國家航空行為的規(guī)定。

李理公行，可人經(jīng)通國行辦時地權(quán)、器他進(jìn)入治的。家運(yùn)用國于客空其家加統(tǒng)輸況國載適約對》旅航或國或任運(yùn)情個局不締約送以家于準(zhǔn)委空留一當(dāng)，視公運(yùn)業(yè)國對批地、航保但事時，沙器企于》際的。軍用為華空輸用約在護(hù)國國留國包行《航運(yùn)適公國保的約保該所空了以空約沙約、理締辦于公華何為局航締地續(xù)有航任機(jī)當(dāng)用延所于有飛該民本《，“民接賴上于用用。，“了定殖直有得的為于明規(guī)其本用適適不記或用定說中、規(guī)所為基適樣的書登局適定國當(dāng)》》據(jù)約同為中”，定家土行議國領(lǐng)空議該該書約依公約行款輸加其他航其家定公。本公空一運(yùn)附于何國本在經(jīng)議拉則，“本航第的在用任于對明量，“，牙哈規(guī)規(guī)輸民二辦約不轄適定。用條理》適下用聲運(yùn)海載拉用款運(yùn)于第所公款管否定府規(guī)政部，《達(dá)適瓜的第國其在件華一際對其下沙一力是全此。條的了約條，《第權(quán)約》條國六和的因?yàn)椤稙榈男惺矖l或機(jī)一酬明公的是二權(quán)公該”。行空定空第報表該定。二民主沙但第第人且約航，公家規(guī)航行用》取是條》蘭李的國進(jìn)民約收”，，規(guī)用約宗華輸?shù)囊惠敱緳?quán)適公、，《書波行改于題與公而此定知及修用問為沙物運(yùn)意第運(yùn)明主議通因物書適門行華貨免得人航留在”。費(fèi)注在空聲其牙時海隨、議情貨定況專空于航《以員本知《或的值法的?；蚶麑覈跒榱糁粲糜眯斜Ｍū＿m適空國用國用國況否航約適約適約情是家締況締況締知視情視情視通民于為用行適空用用用否航適適適是用稱名約公》約公沙華《定議牙》海書《哈拉》達(dá)約瓜公《拉

，空和地。確損。預(yù)）已航于器和關(guān)但織航牙危為于李系受二免；（所行于航行有的由空關(guān)海。組該海在行體海、器空且在，《空、事航，年此航的或范況機(jī)）飛用留事軍空用物五因家目亡規(guī)情業(yè)三將適扣軍供航民貨五》，傷的列營供于的際和九”。國于約身償下括；（即不性。、包器器定防為于用型類國李一輸用公人賠一不空空規(guī)預(yù)行用適知行的的平運(yùn)適，“，用該本統(tǒng)航他。適不則客公、，《項(xiàng)況但航航條一空其確通員時該情定機(jī)備關(guān)、不，于明時人用于知規(guī)旅立些中建規(guī)運(yùn)的有二，《家條郵須是。此國約為公行用行適進(jìn)可運(yùn)所隨輸包用通適留某輸上輸運(yùn)礎(chǔ)。三括必留求因用本空其國局局不保運(yùn)空基為第包其扣要分，“航用，此一當(dāng)當(dāng)》國空航則行》，及非的”。適定民看對來未，“事該約約航際原空約器則航空器所性為公締際國償航公空器除生留部，產(chǎn)扣，規(guī)于定并》定軍為條用規(guī)約規(guī)國或沙視國在賠用三適條公條該局華，一對性民規(guī)的航空中防行航十約一馬三為當(dāng)?shù)臑榻y(tǒng)，復(fù)于些作的航途預(yù)空正行《益恢用某府飛貨航人工行的程的用第公十羅十器事修空民》該。二《二空軍城航是利在適稱的，僅的政上、關(guān)有用約此動第的第航該拉用名者失約器行線客有所適公因活》訂》的由損公空執(zhí)航運(yùn)或的分利約簽書記是馬民式費(fèi)的該航粹規(guī)載題器部權(quán)”?？蘸焦斩ǖ橇康赜谡铮昧艏冋陠柨铡菲髌麟H馬7議國運(yùn)危適的輸貨的扣）通報務(wù)航約空空國《羅月拉該載在》約運(yùn)輸目性一防：（共收的失則航航債去公公空年書交取的的10馬用部運(yùn)定認(rèn)的的年年地在全一定爾航利際者制預(yù)留公始起為規(guī)承用際使目危明的九七議一扣在開引行些察拉特國或其，據(jù)統(tǒng)性實(shí)備所法某國察警19331952《聲器一馬《防確準(zhǔn)程非的蒙保失根《警和從是留用軍警際軍警際否保適是國況供和國供和國確約情于關(guān)的動用于關(guān)的動明締知用海的活適、目空適分用海的活適、目空不用視通不事察航部不事察航尚適用用用適用用適適分適適部拉馬》地書危定《議爾利》特約蒙公《防空規(guī)預(yù)航些》一留某約統(tǒng)扣的公《性器則認(rèn)利承權(quán)》際器約國空公《航》約公馬羅《

航際、關(guān)的國事海用的軍、察的供事警目于軍或察用供關(guān)警適于海和用、關(guān)不，適事海器不軍、空，供事航為于軍用行用供民空適于于航不用用用約適適民公不約于本，公用，“為該，適定空行約規(guī)航定。公款用規(guī)器的空該。，動四民款航定活第于一家規(guī)空條用第國條的條航五際第一適》其四的第國約此第目》的公因。約察約的京”，動公警公目東器活該和京察空據(jù)關(guān)北警《空航根海《和軍警際軍警際軍警際供和國于關(guān)的動供和國供和國用海的活于關(guān)的動于關(guān)的動適、目空用海的活適、目空用海的活適、目空不事察航不事察航不事察航用用用適適適》約公京東《止航非公制用的的于民全為》關(guān)害安行約《?？辗ā范s議公京》京北書北《《和

以上的區(qū)別說明，尤其需要研究國家航空行為的國際運(yùn)行。實(shí)際上，此類航空行為會引發(fā)權(quán)力與權(quán)力的沖突，或者說主權(quán)沖突，這就涉及到如何判定侵略行為的問題。在目前全球嚴(yán)峻的反恐形勢下，對于侵略的研判不僅僅是傳統(tǒng)意義上的，更需要增加反恐的因素。

（二）侵略行為定義的淵源

1.《聯(lián)合國憲章》第51條

《聯(lián)合國憲章》第51條規(guī)定，

聯(lián)合國任何會員國受武力攻擊時，在安全理事會采取必要辦法，以維持國際和平及安全以前，本憲章不得認(rèn)為禁止行使單獨(dú)或集體自衛(wèi)之自然權(quán)利。會員國因行使此項(xiàng)自衛(wèi)權(quán)而采取之辦法，應(yīng)立向安全理事會報告，此項(xiàng)辦法于任何方面不得影響該會按照本憲章隨時采取其所認(rèn)為必要行動之權(quán)責(zé)，以維持或恢復(fù)國際和平及安全。

該條所賦予國家在遭受武力攻擊時進(jìn)行自衛(wèi)的權(quán)利來自于國家主權(quán)原則。一國的主權(quán)表現(xiàn)為一個國家獨(dú)立自主處理自己內(nèi)外事務(wù)，管理自己國家的最高權(quán)利。

此條中的“武力攻擊”是核心概念，其是觸發(fā)自衛(wèi)權(quán)的條件。⑩Tarcisio Gazzimi, The Changing Rules on the Use of Force in International Law, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005, p. 132.但是對于“武力攻擊”的構(gòu)成條件，各國存在不同的主張。

2.卡羅琳規(guī)則

1837年，作為英國殖民地的加拿大發(fā)生叛亂。支持此次叛亂的一部分人駐扎于尼亞加拉河靠近加拿大一側(cè)的海軍島上，其中大多是美國人，他們租借美國私人船舶“卡羅琳號”為叛亂分子運(yùn)送武器與人員。12月29日，英國軍隊(duì)越界對停泊于美國境內(nèi)斯洛塞港的“卡羅琳號”發(fā)動襲擊，并推入尼亞加拉瀑布，造成一名美國人死亡。對此美國表示抗議，而英國則辯稱是基于自衛(wèi)與自保的需要。①James A. Green, Docking the Caroline: Understanding the Relevance of the Formula in Temporary Customary International Law Concerning Self-Defense, Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 14, Issue 2, 2006, pp. 433～435.此案形成了卡羅琳規(guī)則，即自衛(wèi)“必須在危急迫切，不能選擇手段，也無暇考慮的限度以內(nèi)，方為合法”。②R. Y. Jennings, The Caroline and Mcleod Cases, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 32, Issue 1, 1938, pp. 91～92.

但是由于判例法的傳統(tǒng)，卡羅琳號案的事實(shí)對結(jié)論的解釋產(chǎn)生了趨勢化影響，使得這一案件中“預(yù)先自衛(wèi)”的因素變得尤為突出。

3.《芝加哥公約》第九條與聯(lián)合國安理會“禁飛區(qū)”

《芝加哥公約》第九條規(guī)定，

禁區(qū)

一、締約各國由于軍事需要或公共安全的理由，可以一律限制或禁止其他國家的航空器在其領(lǐng)土內(nèi)的某些地區(qū)上空飛行，但對該領(lǐng)土所屬國從事定期國際航班飛行的航空器和其他締約國從事同樣飛行的航空器，在這一點(diǎn)上不得有所區(qū)別。此種禁區(qū)的范圍和位置應(yīng)當(dāng)合理，以免空中航行受到不必要的阻礙。一締約國領(lǐng)土內(nèi)此種禁區(qū)的說明及其隨后的任何變更，應(yīng)盡速通知其他各締約國及國際民用航空組織。

二、在非常情況下，或在緊急時期內(nèi)，或?yàn)榱斯舶踩?，締約各國也保留暫時限制或禁止航空器在其全部或部分領(lǐng)土上空飛行的權(quán)利并立即生效，但此種限制或禁止應(yīng)不分國籍適用于所有其他國家的航空器。

三、締約各國可以依照其制定的規(guī)章，令進(jìn)入上述第一款或第二款所指地區(qū)的任何航空器盡速在其領(lǐng)土內(nèi)一指定的機(jī)場降落。

1967年，西班牙援引《芝加哥公約》第九條規(guī)定，在阿爾赫西拉斯海峽周邊地區(qū)設(shè)立禁區(qū)，禁止所有航班飛行。英國提出反對，將此問題提交國際民航組織理事會，但是由于問題被政治化，該項(xiàng)爭議被無限期擱置。

值得注意的是，由于《芝加哥公約》并不適用于國家航空行為，如果援引《芝加哥公約》第九條，在效力上并不及于國家航空行為。

聯(lián)合國安理會出于對人道主義干預(yù)的要求，對一個國家領(lǐng)土上空的空間進(jìn)行限制，例如2011年在利比亞上空設(shè)立的禁飛區(qū)。其效力影響到國家航空行為。

（三）“武力攻擊”條件的辨析

無論是卡羅琳規(guī)則還是《聯(lián)合國憲章》第51條，都將武力攻擊作為行使自衛(wèi)權(quán)的觸發(fā)條件，但是究竟何為“武力攻擊”，卻是語焉不詳。

1.限制解釋論

傳統(tǒng)意義的限制解釋論認(rèn)為，《聯(lián)合國憲章》第51條中“聯(lián)合國任何會員國受武力攻擊時”的規(guī)定應(yīng)該嚴(yán)格進(jìn)行解釋。這就極大地限制了主權(quán)國家進(jìn)行自衛(wèi)的權(quán)利，即只有在遭受武力攻擊的時候，才可以進(jìn)行自衛(wèi)。這一時間點(diǎn)并不延伸到武力攻擊之前的準(zhǔn)備階段。③周鯁生著：《國際法》，北京：商務(wù)印書館1981年版，第199頁。進(jìn)而有學(xué)者明確認(rèn)為，武力攻擊必須是實(shí)際發(fā)生且處于繼續(xù)狀態(tài)。④許光建主編：《聯(lián)合國憲章詮釋》，太原：山西教育出版社1999年版，第353～360頁。

此外，還出現(xiàn)了限制解釋論的修正見解。有學(xué)者認(rèn)為如果相鄰國家中的一方發(fā)射火箭足以威脅到鄰國的安全，那么即可以觸發(fā)《聯(lián)合國憲章》第51條的自衛(wèi)權(quán)。⑤Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963, p. 367.還有學(xué)者認(rèn)為，除以上條件外，還應(yīng)當(dāng)滿足攻擊發(fā)動的“不可逆性”。⑥Singh M. Narendra, The Right of Self-Defence in Relation to the Use of Nuclear Weapons, Indian Yearbook of International Af f airs, 1956, Vol. 5, pp. 25～26.

2.擴(kuò)大解釋論

限制解釋論與以陸戰(zhàn)為主的時代密不可分，然而隨著軍事科技的發(fā)展，軍用飛機(jī)、巡航導(dǎo)彈等速度高、殺傷力巨大的武器逐步成為戰(zhàn)爭的主流，這對判定“武力攻擊”的傳統(tǒng)做法提出了挑戰(zhàn)。例如，某國精確制導(dǎo)導(dǎo)彈部署后，在其打擊范圍內(nèi)，相應(yīng)的鄰國就可能隨時會遭到毀滅性的打擊。

由此形成了對新形勢下“武力攻擊”的擴(kuò)大解釋論，由于在高科技武器打擊的背景下，被攻擊國家可能無法針對攻擊做出有效的反應(yīng)，從而實(shí)際上將被攻擊國置于被動境地，因此正如學(xué)者所指出的一樣，如果一個國家必須等到導(dǎo)彈越過邊界才能行使自衛(wèi)權(quán)，那有效的自衛(wèi)概念將無意義。⑦Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963, pp. 366～369.

3.侵略行為中反恐因素的加入

911事件中，美國戰(zhàn)斗機(jī)曾試圖截?fù)舯豢植婪肿咏俪值牡?架飛機(jī)，但它卻在采取行動之前在賓夕法尼亞上空墜毀。911事件過后，總統(tǒng)布什、國防部長拉姆斯菲爾德與參謀長聯(lián)席會議就制訂出了遇到類似緊急情況時新的行動準(zhǔn)則，此前國防部沒有得到采取武力行動對付被劫飛機(jī)的正式準(zhǔn)許。⑧《美國空軍舉行擊落被劫民航客機(jī)的實(shí)戰(zhàn)演習(xí)》，下載于http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/20 03-10-05/153963.html，2016年11月24日。

2006年《俄羅斯反恐怖主義法》第7條明確規(guī)定了“制止空中恐怖主義行為”，具體為：

1.依據(jù)俄聯(lián)邦規(guī)范性法律文件，俄聯(lián)邦武裝力量可以使用武器和軍事裝備，以便消除空中恐怖主義行為威脅或者制止類似的恐怖主義行為。2.如果航空器不理睬地面指揮的無線電指令，違反俄羅斯聯(lián)邦航空規(guī)則，或者對俄羅斯聯(lián)邦武裝部隊(duì)攔截飛機(jī)的無線電和視覺信號沒有反應(yīng)，或者拒絕服從，或者沒有任何解釋，俄羅斯聯(lián)邦武裝力量可以使用武器和軍事裝備迫降以制止其飛行。如果航空器不服從迫降并發(fā)生航空器內(nèi)人員死亡的現(xiàn)實(shí)危險，或者發(fā)生環(huán)境災(zāi)難，可以采用武器和軍事裝備摧毀航空器以制止其飛行。3.若獲取了利用航空器實(shí)施恐怖主義行為或者劫持航空器的可靠信息，已采取了所有的迫降措施并且出現(xiàn)人員死亡的現(xiàn)實(shí)危險或者面臨環(huán)境災(zāi)難，俄聯(lián)邦武裝力量可以運(yùn)用武器和軍事裝備摧毀航空器以制止其飛行。⑨許桂敏：《俄羅斯反恐立法特點(diǎn)評介》，載于《環(huán)球法律評論》2013年第1期，第57頁。

斯洛伐克政府2005年2月16日通過一項(xiàng)法令，授權(quán)斯國防部長在必要情況下可下令擊落侵犯其領(lǐng)空的飛機(jī)。根據(jù)該法令，對于非法進(jìn)入斯領(lǐng)空的飛機(jī)，斯空軍有權(quán)對飛機(jī)采取干預(yù)行動。在特別的情況下，即有明確跡象表明進(jìn)入其領(lǐng)空的飛機(jī)是恐怖分子發(fā)動襲擊的工具，可能對人們的生命財產(chǎn)造成嚴(yán)重危害時，斯國防部長可以下令將其擊落，不論它是民用飛機(jī)還是軍用飛機(jī)。⑩《防“9·11”重演歐洲各國立法允許擊落遭劫持飛機(jī)》，下載于http://news.tom.com/100 3/3295/2005114-1761852.html，2016年11月24日。

在當(dāng)前國際反恐形勢下，傳統(tǒng)認(rèn)為國際恐怖主義具有武力攻擊特點(diǎn)的理論遭遇到巨大沖擊。①Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of Armed Attack in Article 51 of the UN Charter, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2002, pp. 45～46.這在當(dāng)代就成為了教條的觀點(diǎn)，②Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq, San Diego International Law Journal, Vol. 4, 2003, pp. 16～17.因此存在革新的必要。特別是聯(lián)合國安理會1368號決議并沒有將自衛(wèi)權(quán)的行使與國家武力攻擊相聯(lián)系，而是明確提出了“恐怖主義攻擊”。此外，聯(lián)合國安理會1373號決議，以及國際法院在“石油平臺案”中也沒有將武力攻擊與國家行為相聯(lián)系。

隨著國際反恐行動的不斷深化與地區(qū)間沖突摩擦的日益頻繁，民用航空器飛越?jīng)_突地區(qū)上空時的安全保障就成為需要關(guān)注的問題。國際民航組織在2014年成立了“沖突地區(qū)民航風(fēng)險工作隊(duì)”，并連續(xù)召開4次會議，研究沖突地區(qū)民航面臨的安全和安保危機(jī)。③筆者參與了2015年7月13日至15日國際民航組織在加拿大蒙特利爾召開的第四次特別小組會議，審查了《國際民用航空公約》及其他民航條約中有關(guān)沖突區(qū)規(guī)定的適用問題。特別小組會議共有來自中國、美國、俄羅斯、烏克蘭等15個國家的代表參加，最終討論通過了“特別小組關(guān)于審查國際民航條約中有關(guān)沖突區(qū)規(guī)定的適用問題的報告”，并準(zhǔn)備向理事會提交。

在國際反恐怖主義的背景下，各國在判斷航空侵略行為的時候更加側(cè)重于航空行為本身，而對于國家行為的研判意愿下降，這就使得相應(yīng)的國際法準(zhǔn)則在反恐的背景下淡化了。

四、從國家航空器到國家航空行為——對于既有理論的整理

誠如上述，我們需要采用“國家航空行為”來替代“國家航空器”的意義，從而設(shè)定相應(yīng)的制度，筆者試圖從既有的理論作為研究的起點(diǎn)。

（一）國際民航組織

雖然國際民航組織建立的目的④國際民航組織的宗旨和目的在于：確保全世界國際民用航空安全地和有秩序地發(fā)展；鼓勵為和平用途的航空器的設(shè)計(jì)和操作技術(shù)；鼓勵發(fā)展國際民用航空應(yīng)用的航路、機(jī)場和航行設(shè)施；滿足世界人民對安全、正常、有效和經(jīng)濟(jì)的航空運(yùn)輸?shù)男枰?；防止因不合理的競爭而造成?jīng)濟(jì)上的浪費(fèi)；保證締約各國的權(quán)利充分受到尊重，每一締約國均有經(jīng)營國際空運(yùn)企業(yè)的公平的機(jī)會；避免締約各國之間的差別待遇；促進(jìn)國際航行的飛行安全；普遍促進(jìn)國際民用航空在各方面的發(fā)展。在于促進(jìn)民用航空的發(fā)展與合作，但是實(shí)現(xiàn)上述目的的前提在于辨別民用航空器和國家航空器，值得注意的是，國際民航組織并不具有界定國家航空器的權(quán)力。然而，對于二者的區(qū)別，國際民航組織進(jìn)行過以下研究工作。

1.對于民用航空器和國家航空器區(qū)別的專門研究

國際民航組織曾就民用航空器與國家航空器問題進(jìn)行專門研究，⑤Secretariat Study on “Civil/State Aircraft”, C-WP/9835 of 22/09/1993, presented by the Secretary General at the ICAO Council 140th Session.并最終形成工作報告。但報告實(shí)際上是對民用航空行為和國家航空行為進(jìn)行了分析，最終認(rèn)為除用于軍事、海關(guān)、警察目的的航空器以外的航空器應(yīng)當(dāng)屬于民用航空器，還同時強(qiáng)調(diào)在判斷航空器性質(zhì)的時候，也應(yīng)當(dāng)考慮到多重因素。

2.在航空器運(yùn)行方面的附帶提出

國際民航組織在2015年4月14日到15日召開了軍民合作研討會，在有關(guān)航空器運(yùn)行的討論中，⑥ICAO Global Provisions Regarding Aircraft Operations, ICAO Civil/Military Cooperation Symposium, Paris, France, 14-15 April 2015, at http://www.icao.int/RO_EURNAT/ Other%20Meetings%20Seminars%20and%20Workshops/ICAO%20Civil-Military%20 Cooperation%20Meetings/ICAO%20Civil-military%20Cooperation%20Symposium%20 2015/ICMCS%20PPT12.pdf, 24 November 2016.國際民航組織認(rèn)為《芝加哥公約》僅對民用航空器有效，不對國家航空器有效，并且認(rèn)為用于軍事、海關(guān)、警察目的的航空器應(yīng)當(dāng)是國家航空器，但是這一定義采用“包含但并不限于”的結(jié)構(gòu)，這就意味著國家航空器的目的是一個包含著軍事、海關(guān)、警察目的的更大范圍的目的集合。）方面的附帶提出

縮小垂直間隔（RVSM）即將現(xiàn)代噴氣式民航客機(jī)巡航階段所用的飛行高度層FL290至FL410（含）之間的垂直間隔標(biāo)準(zhǔn)由2000英尺縮小到1000英尺，從而增加空域容量，提高航空公司的運(yùn)行效益，減輕空中交通管制指揮的工作負(fù)荷。國際民航組織從20世紀(jì)70年代開始研究縮小垂直間隔標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的問題。

2002年1月，經(jīng)有關(guān)國家民航當(dāng)局和相關(guān)國際民航組織共同商討，在共達(dá)13

3. 在縮小垂直間隔（RVSM次的工作會議后，決定從2002年2月21日起在南海地區(qū)實(shí)施RVSM運(yùn)行。未獲得RVSM運(yùn)行批準(zhǔn)的航空器將不得在RVSM空域內(nèi)運(yùn)行，而只能在飛行高度層FL 290以下飛行。

國際民航組織在審議RVSM問題的時候，⑦George Firican, State Aircraft in RVSM Airspace, ICAO Civil/Military Coordination Workshop, Kiev Ukraine, 28-31 October 2013, at http://www.icao.int/RO_EURNAT/ Other%20Meetings%20Seminars%20and%20Workshops/ICAO%20Civil-Military%20 Cooperation%20Meetings/ICAO%20Civil-military%20Cooperation%20Seminar%202013/ Kiev%20day%201%20George%20Firican%20State%20Aircraft%20in%20RVSM%20 airspace.pdf, 24 November 2016.附帶提出將國家航空器定義為用于軍事、海關(guān)、警察目的的航空器。

4.在外國航空運(yùn)行者驗(yàn)證與監(jiān)控程序方面的附帶提出

在討論外國航空運(yùn)行者驗(yàn)證與監(jiān)控程序時，⑧Foreign Air Operator Validation & Surveillance Course, p. 7, at http://www.icao.int/safety/ implementation/library/a_icao_convention_annexes_related_to_fao_2009_07_r1.pdf, 24 November 2016.國際民航組織附帶對《芝加哥公約》第三條作出解釋，認(rèn)為《芝加哥公約》僅對民用航空器有效，并不對國家航空器有效，并且認(rèn)為用于軍事、海關(guān)、警察目的的航空器不是民用航空器，而應(yīng)當(dāng)是國家航空器。這種認(rèn)知與國際民航組織在討論航空器運(yùn)行時附帶提出的意見一致。

（二）國際航空運(yùn)輸協(xié)會

在2015年4月14日到15日召開的軍民合作研討會上，國際航空運(yùn)輸協(xié)會提出《芝加哥公約》僅對民用航空器有效，并不對國家航空器有效。⑨Dmitry Kosolapov, Improve Safety for Flight over the High Seas, ICAO Civil/Military Cooperation Symposium, Paris, France, 14-15 April 2015, p. 4, at http://www.icao.int/ RO_EURNAT/Other%20Meetings%20Seminars%20and%20Workshops/ICAO%20Civil-Military%20Cooperation%20Meetings/ICAO%20Civil-military%20Cooperation%20 Symposium%202015/ICMCS%20PPT07.pdf, 24 November 2016.此意見與同時參會的國際民航組織的意見一致，反映出民航業(yè)中2個重要組織對于此問題的共同認(rèn)知。

（三）歐洲航空安全組織

歐洲航空安全組織在其發(fā)布的《國家航空器在歐洲RVSM空域運(yùn)行與標(biāo)準(zhǔn)指南》⑩EUROCONTROL, Guidance Material for the Certifcation and Operation of State Aircraft in European RVSM Airspace, at https://www.eurocontrol.int/sites/default/files/article/ content/documents/official-documents/guidance/2012-cmac-rma-military-guidance.pdf, 24 November 2016.中認(rèn)為，“只有”用于軍事、海關(guān)、警察目的的航空器才是國家航空器，而無論是《芝加哥公約》還是國際民航組織都未用過“只有”一詞來嚴(yán)格定義國家航空器。

（四）北大西洋公約組織

北大西洋公約組織在討論其主導(dǎo)的任務(wù)與作業(yè)中的軍/民航空器運(yùn)行問題時，①NATO Policy for Civil/Military Aircraft Operating in Support of NATO or NATO-led Missions and Operations, at http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/ pdf_2016_08/20160804_1608-NATO-Policy-civil-military-aircraft.pdf, 24 November 2016.認(rèn)為用于軍事、海關(guān)、警察目的的航空器不是民用航空器，而應(yīng)當(dāng)是國家航空器。這一觀點(diǎn)與國際民航組織、國際航空運(yùn)輸協(xié)會一致。此外，北大西洋公約組織還強(qiáng)調(diào)任何締約國再發(fā)布關(guān)于國家航空器的規(guī)范時，都應(yīng)當(dāng)給予民用航空器應(yīng)有的安全注意。

（五）美國空軍

在參與討論國際民航組織CAR/SAM區(qū)域的RVSM問題時，美國空軍專門討論了國家航空器議題，認(rèn)為用于軍事、海關(guān)、警察目的的航空器不是民用航空器，而應(yīng)當(dāng)是國家航空器，并且國家具有定義國家航空器的自由，在定義時應(yīng)當(dāng)考慮航空器所有者、運(yùn)行者、乘客、貨物等因素。②U.S. Air Force: State Aircraft Issues, ICAO’s 1st RVSM Seminar for CAR/SAM Region, ICAO’s 2nd RVSM Seminar for CAR/SAM Region, at http://www.icao.int/RO_SAM/ Documents/2003/RVSMII/P-Storm-State%20Aircraft-E.pdf#search=State%20Aircraft%20 %20%20us%20AIr%20force, 17 December 2016.

（六）我國有關(guān)民用航空器和國家航空器區(qū)別問題的討論

1.學(xué)術(shù)界

我國學(xué)術(shù)界對此問題的討論，文獻(xiàn)較少且著眼于國家航空器的判定，③黃力華：《國家航空器法律問題研究》，載于《現(xiàn)代法學(xué)》2000年第6期，第146～149頁；李文莉：《國家航空器在國際法上的地位——從“南海撞機(jī)事件”談起》，載于《安徽職業(yè)警官學(xué)院學(xué)報》2003年第3期，第26～27頁。但是實(shí)際上仍是討論國家航空行為。

2.實(shí)務(wù)界

我國實(shí)務(wù)界方面，1993年中國民用航空局令第31號《民用航空器維修許可審定的規(guī)定》中曾經(jīng)規(guī)定，“國家航空器指軍隊(duì)、海關(guān)和警察使用的航空器”，但是本部規(guī)章被2001年《民用航空器維修單位合格審定規(guī)則》廢止。而在《中國民用航空空中交通管理規(guī)則》、④中國民用航空總局令第86號《中國民用航空空中交通管理規(guī)則》1999年7月5日發(fā)布，2000年1月5日實(shí)施。《民用航空飛行簽派員執(zhí)照管理規(guī)則》、⑤中國民用航空總局令第136號《民用航空飛行簽派員執(zhí)照管理規(guī)則》2004年12月16日發(fā)布，2005年1月15日實(shí)施。《中國民用航空總局關(guān)于奧運(yùn)會（殘奧會）期間外國飛機(jī)臨時飛行計(jì)劃申請、審批的通知》⑥中國民用航空總局明傳電報《中國民用航空總局關(guān)于奧運(yùn)會（殘奧會）期間外國飛機(jī)臨時飛行計(jì)劃申請、審批的通知》2008年2月發(fā)布，2008年7月1日實(shí)施。以及《民用航空器駕駛員和地面教員合格審定規(guī)則》⑦中國民用航空局令第224號《民用航空器駕駛員和地面教員合格審定規(guī)則》2014年7月10日發(fā)布，2014年9月1日實(shí)施。中，“國家航空器”僅僅作為一個概念在使用，并沒有確切的文本含義?！吨袊裼煤娇站株P(guān)于救災(zāi)物資中危險品運(yùn)輸有關(guān)事宜的通知》采用了單項(xiàng)行為定性的方式，規(guī)定“對包機(jī)運(yùn)輸含有危險品的救災(zāi)物資，可視為國家航空器運(yùn)行，不受CCAR-276部規(guī)章的限制，但對貨物的安全處理仍需滿足第二條第（二）款的要求”。

從上述規(guī)定來看，當(dāng)前在實(shí)務(wù)界，“國家航空器”并未具有完全的定義疆域，而僅有“局部”化的描述。

（七）階段性結(jié)論——有關(guān)航空器與航空器行為的區(qū)分

筆者認(rèn)為，對于民用航空器和國家航空器區(qū)別的既有探討混淆了航空器性質(zhì)與航空行為性質(zhì)，因此有必要厘清這2個概念。

當(dāng)前，各國以及國際組織大多采用涵蓋航空行為的“航空器”概念，這就可能導(dǎo)致在判別航空器實(shí)際行為時產(chǎn)生誤差。例如，在全球民用航空的發(fā)展史上，就發(fā)生了多次因誤判民用航空器的行為而產(chǎn)生的事故。

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為對為對行敵行敵確航為為航為為擊明民判行民判行誤不將誤將誤尚全269人人難亡遇人生遇298使死290難上部78喪上為人機(jī)數(shù)致機(jī)全上部客人并1993一是式蘇形5機(jī)于年擊”在標(biāo)，在飛也）進(jìn)員后就模入對1987誤被射正的1812器后起，向航駛了錄查治航航偏駕“，發(fā)落記調(diào)拉導(dǎo)磁班機(jī)的導(dǎo)彈時空”號擊行立克的前的上斯彈飛獨(dú)安駛G（航斗之射灣森導(dǎo)的的在班自將L007聯(lián)駕HD號戰(zhàn)此發(fā)斯文空班輪動蘇在軍波“防航一，?？张炋栃潞綖槟昕私?jīng)洋L007過式KA上模致，號做加多拉S-200經(jīng)007式行導(dǎo)意打伊機(jī)彈途巡枚KA織AL模開被客導(dǎo)一有航，K向準(zhǔn)這的。的組）飛是大爭艦航級戰(zhàn)衛(wèi)民加射擁民現(xiàn)航標(biāo)），長生機(jī)發(fā)伊護(hù)朗羅發(fā)認(rèn)際發(fā)承國組G（執(zhí)系航難磁行統(tǒng)班的兩彈伊德，導(dǎo)，康。時習(xí)開。小HD沒有航張?zhí)柸?提落演公國查緊克用并導(dǎo)國擊號空在斯韓調(diào)勢塔月性007致7美彈軍羅給。使長局斯接烏灣軍年習(xí)空直機(jī)（是慣AL導(dǎo)的導(dǎo)，歸報俄還告一后式。K直認(rèn)海海，演對后其終，飛模因斷是國峽艦承體將落起S原判景美。1988海府。解年最擊在IN的誤背，沒的日沉政確出被機(jī)為空錯蘇1992提到客改領(lǐng)的聯(lián)事11些爾SM茲-2MR木蘭。明克班不年直說更聯(lián)勢007難此月險霍準(zhǔn)烏航尚客擊彈斯事航墜空空航軍導(dǎo)羅機(jī)航機(jī)民美蘭俄客亞17西韓班件朗被件事克落航來MH件事大號事伊機(jī)落烏擊民件馬空毀9晨7 7年清10年4年日2014171983日日年日19883 1月月月2001月

目前，某些國家對中國在南海地區(qū)享有的權(quán)利存在不合理的看法，因此南海上空極容易出現(xiàn)誤判航空器行為的事件，因?yàn)閱渭兊貜暮娇掌鞯膶傩圆⒉荒艽_定航空器行為的性質(zhì)。這就需要我們對航空器與航空行為進(jìn)行區(qū)分與研究，特別是國家航空行為。

1.航空器性質(zhì)

航空器性質(zhì)主要根據(jù)其初始制造目的來確定，但這種初始目的并不影響其后被用作其他目的，并且現(xiàn)實(shí)中存在航空器性質(zhì)發(fā)生變化的情況。⑧《波音創(chuàng)造民航飛機(jī)改軍用歷史》，載于《北京日報》2007年5月22日。例如，波音737-100式飛機(jī)的設(shè)計(jì)目的是一種只有65到80個座位的小容量短途載客用機(jī)，因此波音737-100式飛機(jī)的航空器性質(zhì)是民用航空器。但是從波音公司的產(chǎn)品發(fā)展來看，波音大型噴氣客機(jī)形成了707、737、747、757、767、777系列，787也在研制試生產(chǎn)中。波音公司也應(yīng)軍需，將它們同時改裝為軍用飛機(jī)，如707-320B被改裝為空軍預(yù)警機(jī)，于1972年首飛；2006年11月，韓國向波音訂購了4架E-737預(yù)警機(jī)，使韓國能監(jiān)視整個朝鮮半島及周邊國家部分空域；747在1977年被改裝后，就用作航天飛機(jī)的載機(jī)至今；767增加KC-767加油機(jī)，可以直接為遠(yuǎn)程重型戰(zhàn)略轟炸機(jī)B-52H空中加油；1993年日本又成為767預(yù)警機(jī)的發(fā)起用戶，并已裝備了4架。也就是說，航空器的性質(zhì)實(shí)際上是客觀性質(zhì)，并且此種性質(zhì)是可變更的。所以，單純從航空器的性質(zhì)來界定航空器的行為是不科學(xué)的，比如，若一架民用航空器執(zhí)行的是國家任務(wù)，僅僅從航空器性質(zhì)進(jìn)行界定就有可能得出相反的結(jié)論。

2.航空行為

隨著無人機(jī)的興起，固執(zhí)地堅(jiān)守航空器的性質(zhì)已經(jīng)毫無意義，因?yàn)楹娇掌鲗?shí)際上從屬于其行為目的。例如，無人機(jī)可以用來運(yùn)送快遞，也可以用來執(zhí)行軍事任務(wù)。如果不加以區(qū)分統(tǒng)一以“無人機(jī)”作為關(guān)鍵概念進(jìn)行處理，將會產(chǎn)生行為混淆的問題。正是由于航空器性質(zhì)界定的缺陷，筆者認(rèn)為航空活動的性質(zhì)更加容易判斷，其需要采用實(shí)際目的來進(jìn)行判斷，例如某民航飛機(jī)波音737-100式飛機(jī)被國家征用，進(jìn)行搶險救災(zāi)，此時該飛機(jī)所進(jìn)行的活動則為國家活動。航空活動體現(xiàn)了航空器的主觀性質(zhì)。

3.從航空器到航空行為

由此，我們可以發(fā)現(xiàn)，航空器性質(zhì)與航空活動的性質(zhì)并無直接聯(lián)系。如果僅僅以航空器的性質(zhì)分類，則會忽視掉航空器實(shí)際上的目的。實(shí)際目的正是區(qū)分民用航空行為與國家航空行為的依據(jù)，而并非是航空器最初的設(shè)計(jì)目的。目前有關(guān)航空器的定義均采用了航空活動這一主觀標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來界定，因此在語言表述上，我們完全可以把國家航空器的定義看做是國家航空行為的定義。

五、國家航空行為的目的形態(tài)

誠如上述，對于航空器性質(zhì)的研判無助于解決現(xiàn)實(shí)中面臨的問題，民用航空器由于其行為被認(rèn)定為國家航空器而被擊落即為一例。國際社會對于民用航空行為的界定已經(jīng)相對清晰，因此，如何判定國家航空行為才是我們需要解決的真正問題。

（一）國家航空行為的定義權(quán)

首先，《聯(lián)合國憲章》序言規(guī)定“大小各國平等權(quán)利之信念”；第一條確定“發(fā)展國際間以尊重人民平等權(quán)利及自決原則為根據(jù)之友好關(guān)系”的宗旨；特別在第二條第一項(xiàng)規(guī)定“本組織系基于各會員國主權(quán)平等之原則”，第七項(xiàng)聲明“不得認(rèn)為授權(quán)聯(lián)合國干涉在本質(zhì)上屬于任何國家國內(nèi)管轄之事件”。第七十八條再次肯定“聯(lián)合國會員國之間關(guān)系，應(yīng)基于尊重主權(quán)平等之原則”，并把它列為各項(xiàng)原則之首，作為聯(lián)合國的一項(xiàng)基本組織原則。

其次，《芝加哥公約》第三條第四款規(guī)定，“締約各國承允在發(fā)布關(guān)于其國家航空器的規(guī)章時，對民用航空器的航行安全予以應(yīng)有的注意”，這表明《芝加哥公約》延續(xù)了《聯(lián)合國憲章》對于各國主權(quán)尊重的規(guī)定，承認(rèn)各國具有規(guī)定何為本國國家航空器（國家航空行為）的自由。

因此，無論是《聯(lián)合國憲章》關(guān)于國家主權(quán)原則的規(guī)定，還是《芝加哥公約》對于國家自行界定國家航空器（國家航空行為）的規(guī)定，均表明了規(guī)定國家航空行為和國家航空器的定義與范圍是一國主權(quán)范圍的事項(xiàng)。特別是，因?yàn)槟虾５貐^(qū)是維持中國大陸領(lǐng)土與其密不可分的群島水域之間的主權(quán)聯(lián)系，以及群島自身發(fā)展所必需的既有的以及將來應(yīng)當(dāng)具有的一切權(quán)利的承載體，因此需要由中國對國家航空行為進(jìn)行定義。

（二）民用航空行為與國家航空行為的區(qū)分

《芝加哥公約》第三條規(guī)定，

民用航空器和國家航空器

一、本公約僅適用于民用航空器，不適用于國家航空器。

二、用于軍事、海關(guān)和警察部門的航空器，應(yīng)認(rèn)為是國家航空器。

三、一締約國的國家航空器，未經(jīng)特別協(xié)定或其他方式的許可并遵照其中的規(guī)定，不得在另一締約國領(lǐng)土上空飛行或在此領(lǐng)土上降落。

四、締約各國承允在發(fā)布關(guān)于其國家航空器的規(guī)章時，對民用航空器的航行安全予以應(yīng)有的注意。

各國和各國際組織認(rèn)為該條款對民用航空器與國家航空器進(jìn)行了區(qū)分。

首先，《芝加哥公約》序言中開宗明義規(guī)定，“使國際民用航空得按照安全和有秩序的方式發(fā)展，并使國際航空運(yùn)輸業(yè)務(wù)得建立在機(jī)會均等的基礎(chǔ)上，健康地和經(jīng)濟(jì)地經(jīng)營；為此目的締結(jié)本公約”，且第三條重申“本公約僅適用于民用航空器，不適用于國家航空器”。由此我們可以發(fā)現(xiàn)，該公約的目的表明了其并不協(xié)調(diào)與規(guī)范國家航空行為的定義與范疇，因此，該公約規(guī)定的國家航空器定義僅在民用航空行為的范疇內(nèi)具有意義，也就是說，《芝加哥公約》對于民用航空行為與國家航空行為的區(qū)分，是以《芝加哥公約》的目的為語境的，這種區(qū)分并不適用于所有語境。

其次，從語義上分析，《芝加哥公約》第三條“用于軍事、海關(guān)和警察部門的航空器，應(yīng)認(rèn)為是國家航空器”中采用“用于（目的）……應(yīng)認(rèn)為是（性質(zhì)）”的表述模式，因此對于國家航空器的界定實(shí)際上是從航空行為的性質(zhì)來定義航空器的性質(zhì)。

再次，《芝加哥公約》第三條“用于軍事、海關(guān)和警察部門的航空器”，采用的是列舉式的表述，如果僅僅認(rèn)為此三種類型的航空器包含了全部的國家航空器，或者國家航空行為目的，則是對《聯(lián)合國憲章》中規(guī)定的國家主權(quán)原則的侵犯。由于各國具有平等主權(quán)，而國家航空行為目的又是國家主權(quán)的一個方面，因此不應(yīng)當(dāng)受《芝加哥公約》第三條定義的限制。

最后，《芝加哥公約》第三條第四款規(guī)定，“締約各國承允在發(fā)布關(guān)于其國家航空器的規(guī)章時，對民用航空器的航行安全予以應(yīng)有的注意”，這體現(xiàn)了《芝加哥公約》對各國主權(quán)的尊重，即各國具有規(guī)定何為本國國家航空器（國家航空行為）的自由。

（三）中國《民用航空法》對于民用航空行為的界定

我國現(xiàn)行的《民用航空法》并不含有直接界定國家航空器的條文，而僅是在第五條中規(guī)定，“本法所稱民用航空器，是指除用于執(zhí)行軍事、海關(guān)、警察飛行任務(wù)外的航空器”，但是《民用航空法》的目的僅僅是“為了維護(hù)國家的領(lǐng)空主權(quán)和民用航空權(quán)利，保障民用航空行為安全和有秩序地進(jìn)行，保護(hù)民用航空行為當(dāng)事人各方的合法權(quán)益，促進(jìn)民用航空事業(yè)的發(fā)展”，因此第五條這種列舉式的條文并不能看做是對民用航空行為和國家航空活動的區(qū)分，只能說第五條是作為界定民用航空器或者民用航空行為的一個組成部分，而要充分界定何為民用航空行為，還需要參考《民用航空法》的整個篇章結(jié)構(gòu)以及其他法律規(guī)范。

此外，我們還可以發(fā)現(xiàn)，從某種程度上說，1995年10月30日公布的中國《民用航空法》第五條，實(shí)際上是對《芝加哥公約》第三條“用于軍事、海關(guān)和警察部門的航空器，應(yīng)認(rèn)為是國家航空器”的重復(fù)。所以該條并不具有區(qū)分國家航空行為與民用航空行為的充分權(quán)威性。

（四）中國《憲法》與《物權(quán)法》對于國家航空行為的界定

有關(guān)國家航空行為的定義還可以從我國《憲法》與《物權(quán)法》中尋找。我國《憲法》第十三條對公民的私有財產(chǎn)作了規(guī)定：“國家為了公共利益的需要，可以依照法律規(guī)定對公民的私有財產(chǎn)實(shí)行征收或者征用并給予補(bǔ)償”，并且《物權(quán)法》第四十四條規(guī)定：“因搶險、救災(zāi)等緊急需要，依照法律規(guī)定的權(quán)限和程序可以征用單位、個人的不動產(chǎn)或者動產(chǎn)。被征用的不動產(chǎn)或者動產(chǎn)使用后，應(yīng)當(dāng)返還被征用人。單位、個人的不動產(chǎn)或者動產(chǎn)被征用或者征用后毀損、滅失的，應(yīng)當(dāng)給予補(bǔ)償?！?/p>

因此，出于“公共利益的需要”或“因搶險、救災(zāi)等緊急需要”的原因，國家可以征用與征收私有財產(chǎn)。同理，國家出于“公共利益的需要”或“因搶險、救災(zāi)等緊急需要”的原因，可以對原本用于民用目的的航空器進(jìn)行征用與征收，從而將民用航空行為轉(zhuǎn)化為國家航空行為。

（五）聯(lián)合判定

基于上述的分析可知，規(guī)定國家航空行為的定義是一國主權(quán)范圍之內(nèi)的事項(xiàng)，主權(quán)國家對此擁有無可爭辯的權(quán)力。如果運(yùn)用“國家航空行為、民用航空行為”的二分法來界定航空活動，國家航空行為的目的至少由以下三部分組成：

首先，《民用航空法》第五條規(guī)定“本法所稱民用航空器，是指除用于執(zhí)行軍事、海關(guān)、警察飛行任務(wù)外的航空器”，采用排除規(guī)定的方式界定了民用航空器，同時也劃定了非民用航空目的。從國家航空行為和民用航空行為二分的視野出發(fā)，這部分非民用航空目的就構(gòu)成了國家航空行為目的的一部分。因此在實(shí)定法意義層面上，“執(zhí)行軍事、海關(guān)、警察飛行任務(wù)”成為國家航空行為的目的之一。

其次，根據(jù)我國《憲法》與《物權(quán)法》，出于“公共利益的需要”或“因搶險、救災(zāi)等緊急需要”，國家按照法律規(guī)定可以征用或者征收私有財產(chǎn)。在現(xiàn)實(shí)生活中，由于突發(fā)災(zāi)害，國家會征用民用航空執(zhí)行相應(yīng)的救災(zāi)任務(wù)，此時民用航空器的行為具有了國家航空行為的屬性。換句話說，依據(jù)我國《憲法》與《物權(quán)法》，執(zhí)行國家任務(wù)也應(yīng)成為國家航空行為的目的之一。

最后，基于《聯(lián)合國憲章》關(guān)于國家主權(quán)原則的規(guī)定，以及《芝加哥公約》對于國家自行規(guī)定國家航空器（國家航空行為）的規(guī)定，國家具有補(bǔ)充國家航空行為定義的自由。

總而言之，國家航空行為的目的包括“執(zhí)行軍事、海關(guān)、警察飛行任務(wù)”、“公共利益的需要”與“搶險、救災(zāi)等緊急需要”，此外，國家還具有補(bǔ)充國家航空行為定義的自由。

（六）國家航空行為與民用航空行為混合情況下的性質(zhì)研判

在國家航空行為與民用航空行為出現(xiàn)混合的情況下，如何界定該活動的性質(zhì)呢？例如，基于雙邊司法協(xié)定，甲國執(zhí)法人員接受乙國執(zhí)法機(jī)關(guān)移交的外逃犯罪嫌疑人，搭乘民航航班由乙國回國的行為，即出現(xiàn)了國家活動（押解犯罪嫌疑人）與民用活動（普通的旅客乘坐）的混合，此時如何判定該航空器的活動性質(zhì)呢？筆者認(rèn)為，需要采用以下幾個標(biāo)準(zhǔn)進(jìn)行判斷。

首先，需要審視該航空器活動的主要目的是用于民用活動還是國家活動。上例中，如果該航班的主要目的為搭載旅客，押解行為本身并未對航空器功能產(chǎn)生實(shí)質(zhì)影響，則應(yīng)當(dāng)認(rèn)定為民用航空行為；反之，如果由于押解工作的要求，該民航飛機(jī)采用特別航班時刻等方式進(jìn)行保障，則應(yīng)當(dāng)認(rèn)定為國家航空行為。值得注意的是，對于飛入一國領(lǐng)空的航空器，應(yīng)當(dāng)依據(jù)該國法律對其航空行為的性質(zhì)進(jìn)行研判，這是對一國主權(quán)的尊重。這就意味著，甲國的國家航空器在甲國以及公海上空運(yùn)行的時候，應(yīng)當(dāng)遵守甲國的國內(nèi)法以及國際法準(zhǔn)則，而甲國的航空器在飛入乙國的領(lǐng)空后，需要受乙國國內(nèi)法的管控。

其次，需要審視該航空器的實(shí)際控制權(quán)掌握在誰手中，即主要看航空器處于何種主體的實(shí)際控制之下。國家航空行為不僅表現(xiàn)在目的上，還具備外在行為。一方面存在通過外在行為將民用航空行為誤解為國家航空行為，從歷次民用航空器被武裝擊落的原因來分析，我們可以發(fā)現(xiàn)大多數(shù)是由于對外在行為發(fā)生誤解而導(dǎo)致的；另一方面存在通過外在行為將國家航空行為誤解為民用航空行為。⑨例如，1981年6月7日以色列空軍實(shí)施“巴比倫計(jì)劃”，出動14架飛機(jī)偷襲了伊拉克首都巴格達(dá)東南約20公里處的核反應(yīng)堆，以色列對突擊飛機(jī)全部采用約旦空軍涂裝，沙特雷達(dá)曾發(fā)現(xiàn)并令其通報身份，以色列飛行員即以流利的阿拉伯語回答道：“是約旦空軍，例行訓(xùn)練?！睂Ψ叫乓詾檎?。當(dāng)約旦雷達(dá)發(fā)現(xiàn)時，由于機(jī)群編隊(duì)密集，在雷達(dá)屏幕上顯示的圖像只是一個模糊的亮點(diǎn)，很像一架大型運(yùn)輸機(jī)，以飛行員即用國際通用美語回答是“民航機(jī)”，再次蒙混過關(guān)。

最后，再利用飛機(jī)外表標(biāo)注進(jìn)行研判。民用航空器標(biāo)志即飛機(jī)號、機(jī)尾號、注冊號，是識別飛機(jī)的重要標(biāo)志，無此獨(dú)一無二編號的民用航空器是不允許進(jìn)行任何飛行的。國際民用航空組織理事會于1949年2月8日通過了《芝加哥公約》附件七《航空器國籍標(biāo)志和登記標(biāo)志》。1981年7月30日通過了附件七的第4次修改，各締約國的規(guī)定如與附件7的規(guī)定有差異時，應(yīng)通知國際民航組織備案認(rèn)可，并在該附件7的附錄中加以說明。這種標(biāo)準(zhǔn)實(shí)際上是從國家認(rèn)定以及國際認(rèn)定的角度對民用航空行為進(jìn)行了規(guī)定。因此在國際上我們可以通過相關(guān)標(biāo)識來進(jìn)行研判，其中包括國籍標(biāo)志、⑩國籍標(biāo)志選定規(guī)則：國籍標(biāo)志須從國際電聯(lián)分配給登記國的無線電呼叫信號中的國籍代號系列中選擇，須將國籍標(biāo)志通知國際民航組織。共用標(biāo)志①國際民航組織理事會于1969年1月23日通過了附件七第3次修改，并于同年5月23日生效，引進(jìn)了“共用標(biāo)志”、“共用標(biāo)志登記當(dāng)局”、“國際經(jīng)營機(jī)構(gòu)”等詞。按《國際民用航空公約》第77條規(guī)定，預(yù)期不以國家形式登記航空器的，可以采用共用標(biāo)志。共用標(biāo)志須從國際電聯(lián)分配給國際民航組織的無線電呼叫信號的代號系列中選定。由國際民航組織給共用標(biāo)志登記當(dāng)局指定共用標(biāo)志。例如，1983年國際民航組織理事會會議決定，阿拉伯航空貨運(yùn)公司（約旦和伊拉克聯(lián)營）聯(lián)合登記的航空器具有共用標(biāo)志4YB，由約旦保存并登記，約旦和伊拉克共同承擔(dān)國際民航組織規(guī)定的責(zé)任。以及登記標(biāo)志。②一般規(guī)定，登記標(biāo)志須是字母、數(shù)字或者兩者的組合，列在國籍標(biāo)志之后，第一位是字母的，則國籍標(biāo)志與登記標(biāo)志之間應(yīng)有一短劃。臨時登記標(biāo)志主要針對尚未取得國籍登記證的航空器。我國《民用航空器國籍登記規(guī)定》規(guī)定，當(dāng)用于試驗(yàn)和表演飛行，為支付出口的調(diào)機(jī)飛行（在國外交付時）以及民航總局認(rèn)為必要的情況下，可申請臨時登記標(biāo)志。具有臨時登記標(biāo)志的航空器不得從事客貨運(yùn)輸及其他經(jīng)營活動。

六、結(jié) 論

1976年的《東南亞友好合作條約》和1982年《海洋法公約》建立了和平解決東南亞地區(qū)爭端的初步機(jī)制，但是并沒有為南海問題提供實(shí)質(zhì)上的幫助。于是2002年11月，中國與東盟各國簽署了《南海各方行為宣言》，該宣言是第一個專門解決南海問題的政治文件。

如上文所述，在國際反恐的新形勢下，侵略行為的概念出現(xiàn)了擴(kuò)大的趨勢。這就對國家航空行為的判定提出了新的要求，而此問題的實(shí)質(zhì)就是國家航空行為國際運(yùn)行的合法性問題。

（一）整體上遵循和平共處五項(xiàng)原則

和平共處五項(xiàng)原則作為一個開放包容的國際法原則，集中體現(xiàn)了主權(quán)、正義、民主、法治的價值觀。③《習(xí)近平在和平共處五項(xiàng)原則發(fā)表60周年紀(jì)念大會上的講話》，下載于http://www. gov.cn/xinwen/2014-06/29/content_2709613.htm，2016年11月24日。1970年25屆聯(lián)大通過的《關(guān)于各國依聯(lián)合國憲章建立友好關(guān)系及合作的國際法原則宣言》和1974年第6屆特別聯(lián)大《關(guān)于建立新的國際經(jīng)濟(jì)秩序宣言》，都明確把和平共處五項(xiàng)原則包括在內(nèi)。對待國家間存在的分歧和爭端，要堅(jiān)持通過對話協(xié)商以和平方式解決，以對話增互信，以對話解紛爭，以對話促安全，不能動輒訴諸武力或以武力相威脅。熱衷于使用武力，不是強(qiáng)大的表現(xiàn)，而是道義貧乏、理念蒼白的表現(xiàn)。只有基于道義、理念的安全，才是基礎(chǔ)牢固、真正持久的安全。因此，和平共處五項(xiàng)原則應(yīng)當(dāng)作為一個概括性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來處理國家航空行為的國際運(yùn)行問題。

南海地區(qū)上空是中國管理和開發(fā)其東沙群島、中沙群島、西沙群島、南沙群島及其附近海域的重要支撐體的一部分，中國對南海上空享有的權(quán)利包括維持中國大陸領(lǐng)土與其密不可分的群島水域之間的主權(quán)聯(lián)系，以及群島自身發(fā)展所必需的既有的以及將來應(yīng)當(dāng)具有的一切權(quán)利。其他國家的“航行及飛越自由”不能干擾到此種權(quán)利的實(shí)現(xiàn)。

總而言之，南海上空的利用首先應(yīng)當(dāng)尊重中國的上述權(quán)利，并且本著和平發(fā)展與共贏的目的進(jìn)行利用。

（二）國家航空行為的雙重判定標(biāo)準(zhǔn)

如前所述，各國具有定義國家航空行為的權(quán)力，此外國際公約中又缺少有關(guān)國家航空行為的規(guī)定，所以，在當(dāng)前國際社會中，“國家航空行為”并未形成一個共信共行的協(xié)同概念，這就使得該概念的外延具有可擴(kuò)充性。因此，在判定某一行為是否屬于國家航空行為時，即排除適用民用航空公約的時候，應(yīng)當(dāng)結(jié)合所在國國內(nèi)法與國際法進(jìn)行判定。

一方面，對國家航空行為的判定是一項(xiàng)主權(quán)內(nèi)容，特別是對于飛臨本國領(lǐng)空的外國航空器，主權(quán)國家擁有不容置疑的研判權(quán)力；另一方面，應(yīng)當(dāng)在符合既有國際法準(zhǔn)則的情況下，結(jié)合相關(guān)國家規(guī)定和實(shí)踐進(jìn)行判定。

（三）國家航空行為的無害判定標(biāo)準(zhǔn)

國家航空行為的國際運(yùn)行有可能會導(dǎo)致主權(quán)沖突的情況。但是如果國家航空行為并沒有侵犯到另一國主權(quán)，則不應(yīng)當(dāng)被認(rèn)為是有害行為。例如，若國家航空行為的國際運(yùn)行是為了救助目的，則不應(yīng)當(dāng)認(rèn)為是有害行為。這點(diǎn)也是為國際法所認(rèn)可的，危難情形下可以解除國際不法行為的不法性是早已確立的國際習(xí)慣法規(guī)則。聯(lián)合國國際法委員會2001年在其第53屆會議上通過了《關(guān)于國家對國際不法行為的責(zé)任的條款草案》，該草案第24條第1款就指出：“就一國不遵守該國國際義務(wù)的行為而言，如有關(guān)行為人在遭遇危難的情況下為了挽救其生命或受其監(jiān)護(hù)的其他人的生命，除此行為之外，別無其他合理方法，該行為的不法性即告解除?！?/p>

但是，在南海上空進(jìn)行的國家航空行為，不能以危害中國大陸領(lǐng)土與其南海諸島的主權(quán)聯(lián)系，以及南海U形線內(nèi)水域?qū)Υ朔N關(guān)系的支撐為代價。這就要求在南海地區(qū)進(jìn)行的國家航空行為應(yīng)當(dāng)以此為最高準(zhǔn)則，這是由現(xiàn)代國際法上的國家主權(quán)原則衍生出來的。任何國家在利用他國賴以為生的區(qū)域時，都不應(yīng)當(dāng)使得作為該國“生命”的主權(quán)受到侵害。

（四）“排除合理懷疑”標(biāo)準(zhǔn)

排除合理懷疑實(shí)際上是刑事訴訟法對有罪無罪的研判標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，對于國家航空行為的國際運(yùn)行是否有害，需要采用此標(biāo)準(zhǔn)進(jìn)行研判，即相關(guān)國家只有在排除合理懷疑的基礎(chǔ)上才能在程序上認(rèn)定國家航空行為的國際運(yùn)行是否有害。

根據(jù)前論，甲國的國家航空器在甲國或公海上空運(yùn)行的時候，應(yīng)當(dāng)遵守甲國的國內(nèi)法以及國際法準(zhǔn)則，而甲國的航空器在飛入乙國領(lǐng)空后，則需要由乙國的國內(nèi)法進(jìn)行研判與調(diào)整。因此極有可能出現(xiàn)兩國對于航空行為研判規(guī)定不一致，甚至是相沖突的情況。在目前的情況下，期許統(tǒng)一的國際法標(biāo)準(zhǔn)對其進(jìn)行調(diào)整是不現(xiàn)實(shí)的。這就需要對研判標(biāo)準(zhǔn)進(jìn)行梳理，特別是對“無害”的把握。

作為在南海上空具有優(yōu)先權(quán)利的國家，中國應(yīng)當(dāng)具有程序法上的謹(jǐn)慎義務(wù)與注意義務(wù)。南海作為交通要沖，中國深知南海地區(qū)對于各國具有重要意義，因此積極倡導(dǎo)通過《南海各方行為宣言》來規(guī)范秩序，以增加南海地區(qū)的國際公益性。

（五）不優(yōu)先使用武力原則

雖然國家在遭遇侵略或者遭遇外來恐怖襲擊的時候，具有自衛(wèi)權(quán)，但前提是國家航空行為的國際運(yùn)行屬于侵略行為，否則不能使用武力。在侵略行為的研判方面，應(yīng)當(dāng)以限制解釋論為原則，輔之以反恐背景下必要的擴(kuò)大解釋。并且《南海各方行為宣言》中強(qiáng)調(diào)，“有關(guān)各方承諾根據(jù)公認(rèn)的國際法原則，包括1982年《聯(lián)合國海洋法公約》，由直接有關(guān)的主權(quán)國家通過友好磋商和談判，以和平方式解決它們的領(lǐng)土和管轄權(quán)爭議，而不訴諸武力或以武力相威脅”。

因此，在南海上空如果發(fā)生他國的國家航空行為侵?jǐn)_到中國大陸領(lǐng)土與其南海諸島的主權(quán)聯(lián)系，應(yīng)當(dāng)首先以談判協(xié)商的方式解決。

LI Yaning*

I. Research Questions

Serving as a strategic passage and energy base, the South China Sea (SCS) holds special strategic significance to China, a hybrid country that borders with both land and sea.①Du Debin, Fan Fei and Ma Yahua, Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea and China’s Strategies, World Regional Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2, 2012, p. 1. (in Chinese)Particularly, the current views and opinions about the U-shaped line in the SCS are not consistent. There are mainly four different postulations regarding the legal status of this line, namely, the “historic waters line”, the“historic title line”, “maritime boundary line”, and the “islands ownership line”. In accordance with the postulation of “islands ownership line”, China has indisputable sovereignty over the Dongsha, Zhongsha, Xisha and Nansha Islands as well as their surrounding waters.②Li Jinming, The Legal Status of the U-shaped Line in the South China Sea: Historic Waters, Maritime Boundary or a Line of Islands Ownership?, Southeast Asian Af f airs, No. 4, 2010, pp. 22～29 (in Chinese); Li Jinming, Background and Legal Status of the U-shaped Line in the South China Sea, Contemporary International Relations, No. 9, 2012, pp. 7～14 (in Chinese). Gao Zhiguo, the Director of China Institute for Marine Af f airs, SOA, argues that the U-shaped line on the Chinese map is merely a line that delineates ownership of islands rather than a maritime boundary in the conventional sense. He wrote in an article, “[a] careful study of Chinese documents reveals that China never has claimed the entire water column of the South China Sea, but only the islands and their surrounding waters within the line.”It implies that the SCS islands form an indispensable part of China, and the operation of state aircraft, especially those of foreign States, would become the focus of worldwide attention.

On the one hand, according to Article 3 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (hereinafter “Chicago Convention”), “[n]o state aircraft of a contracting State shall fy over the territory of another State or land thereon without authorization by special agreement or otherwise, and in accordance with the terms thereof.” On the other hand, China has concluded many bilateral aeronautical agreements with other States, allowing the entry of their civil aircrafts to China’s airspace.

Recently, under the pretext of the so-called “freedom of navigation”, many attempts have been made to internationalize the SCS issue. However, “freedom of navigation” and “freedom of overflight”, primarily, refer to the rights on the high seas. In contrast, the U-shaped line is an islands ownership line and resourcejurisdiction line.③Jin Yongming, The Nature of China’s U-shaped Line in the South China Sea and the Legal Status of Waters Enclosed by the Line, China Legal Science, No. 6, 2012, pp. 36～48. (in Chinese)China has special entitlement to the waters enclosed by the U-shaped line. Therefore, it is necessary to embark on a discussion on aviation behaviors.

The connotations and denotations of conventional legal concepts, unavoidably, will change accordingly with the development of science and technology, especially those relating to aviation activities. In this case, a study on the basic concepts pertinent to aviation activities is particularly important.

First, both the Civil Aviation Law of the People’s Republic of China and the relevant international conventions, confuse the two concepts of “aircraft”and “aviation behavior” and use them interchangeably. For example, Chicago Convention, Article 3, entitled “Civil and state aircraft”, defines state aircraft as“aircraft used in military, customs and police services”.④Article 5 of the Civil Aviation Law of the People’s Republic of China also adopts the same expression, namely, “Civil aircraft mentioned in this law refer to aircraft other than those used for fying mission of military, customs and police operations.”The expression “aircraft used in military, customs and police services”, virtually, is employed to describe“aviation behavior”, which however is conceptualized by using the word “aircraft”. This is a misuse of “behavior” for “object”. For this reason, when civil aircraft carry out state missions, or state aircraft perform civil tasks, misjudgment often occurs in practice. For instance, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) says shooting down a drone is a federal crime⑤FAA Says Shooting Down Drones Is a Federal Crime, at http://www.engadget. com/2016/04/18/faa-says-shooting-down-drones-is-a-federal-crime/, 22 November 2016.based on Title 18, Section 32 of the United States Code.⑥18 USC 32: (a) Whoever willfully - (1) sets fre to, damages, destroys, disables, or wrecks any aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States or any civil aircraft used, operated, or employed in interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce; … shall be fned under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years or both. Obviously, this provision used the word “aircraft”, without distinguishing aviation behaviors.This act, obviously, mixes up “object” with “behavior”.

Second, although much attention has been given to the study of civil aviation behavior by scholars and practitioners, few in-depth discussions have been made with respect to the defnition of state aviation behavior and the criteria to identify state aviation behaviors. Lack of such discussions will result in unclear or vague concepts. The elucidation of state aviation behavior, a concept most linked to civil aviation behavior, would make the scope of the latter clearer, and also contribute signifcantly to the development of the basic concept system concerning aviationactivities.

Finally, the majority of the recorded eight incidents, where civil aircraft were suspected to be shot down by armed forces, are tragedies caused by misjudging civil aviation behaviors as state ones. These tragedies, in nature, are resulted from the confusing of civil with state aviation behaviors. When a State’s aircraft, which have characteristics of state aviation behavior, enter into the airspace of another State, the right of self-defence may be triggered. That is one important reason why state aviation behavior urgently needs a careful study.

Embarking on the nature of aircraft and aviation activities, the author attempts, through examining the existing definitions for “act of aggression”, to outline the purpose and behavioral attributes of state aircraft, and further to define state aviation behavior.

II. The Legal Status of the SCS Airspace: A Perspective from Maritime Rights and Interests

Indisputably, the determination of the nature of airspace is fairly important for civil aviation activities. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) classified airspace into seven classes: Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D, Class E, Class F and Class G⑦1) Class A: IFR flights only are permitted, all flights are separated from each other and provided with air traffic control (ATC) service; continuous two-way radio communication is mandatory, and all fights are required to follow ATC clearances. 2) Class B: IFR and VFR fights are permitted; other requirements are identical with those of Class A. 3) Class C: IFR flights are separated from other IFR flights; VFR flights are separated from IFR fights; all these fights are provided with ATC service, and other requirements are identical with those of Class B. 4) Class D: IFR fights are separated from other IFR fights and are provided with ATC service; VFR fights receive traffic information in respect of all other fights; and other requirements are identical with those of Class C. 5) Class E: continuous two-way radio communication is mandatory for IFR fights; VFR fights are not required to follow ATC clearances; and other requirements are identical with those of Class D. 6) Class F: IFR flights receive air traffic advisory and information service and VFR flights receive fight information service; all fights are not required to follow ATC clearances; and other requirements are identical with those of Class E. 7) Class G: fights are not required to separated from each other, and all fights are provided with fight information service; continuous two-way radio communication is mandatory for IFR flights; flights are not required to follow ATC clearances; and other requirements are identical with those of Class F.Nonetheless, such technical classifcation of airspace is preconditioned on the principal attributes of airspace. In this connection, the legal status of the SCS airspace should be decided after first taking into account thestatus of SCS islands and their adjacent waters.

A. The Legal Status of the Area Enclosed by the U-shaped Line in the SCS

The Xisha Islands constitutes an integral part of China’s territory. And the Chinese government announced the baseline of the territorial sea of Xisha Islands in 1996, and the waters extending up to 12 nautical miles from the straight baseline is the territorial sea of China. Then there comes the question: How to defne other parts of the area enclosed by the U-shaped line? Part IV of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS) established a unique“archipelagic regime”, however, it failed to provide explicitly whether this regime is applicable to non-archipelagic State.

In light of the relevant legal documents and practice, the author is of the opinion: First, China has indisputable sovereignty over the Dongsha, Zhongsha, Xisha and Nansha Islands, as well as their adjacent waters.

Second, the archipelagic regime cannot be applied to the SCS area where China has special entitlement. The UNCLOS failed to deal with the issues associated with the mid-ocean archipelagos of non-archipelagic States, which is an unfortunate omission of the convention.⑧Kuen-chen Fu and Zheng Fan, Unity of Archipelago and Freedom of Navigation: Some Suggestions on Applying Archipelagic Regime in the South China Sea, Journal of SJTU (Philosophy and Social Sciences), Vol. 23, No. 6, 2015, pp. 5～13. (in Chinese)Chinese territory is mainly made of its mainland, which is essentially distinct from the general archipelagic States under Part IV of UNCLOS, which defnes archipelagic State as “a State constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other islands”. More importantly, China is a country which carries out pubic administration and promotes economic and cultural development primarily on its mainland. Its demands for land territory are closely related to the territory of its islands, which is consistent with the country’s overall interests and would facilitate public administration. Such demands turn the SCS into an “area where China should have special entitlement”. Therefore, the part of the area enclosed by the U-shaped line without fxed baseline of territorial sea, should be the area where China should have special entitlement, in view of the sovereign relations between China’s mainland territory and its indispensable archipelagic waters.

Third, the SCS area where China should have special entitlement is an indispensable zone for China to sustain the healthy development of its SCS islands. As a country which carries out social and economic activities primarily on its mainland, China also needs to ef f ectively manage its islands. This is another aspect that dif f erentiates China from archipelagic States conducting such activities principally on archipelagoes. Compared to its mainland, China’s islands in the SCS are still in the primary stage of development, which should be closely connected to its mainland. If China’s islands in the SCS are compared to an “infant”, then the area enclosed by the U-shaped line can be recognized as a “cradle” nurturing the infant. Therefore, being dif f erent from its entitlement to the contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf, China’s entitlement to the special SCS area should include, all the existing and future rights necessary for the development of these SCS islands, and for the maintenance of the sovereign relations between China’s mainland territory and its indispensable archipelagic waters.

Fourth, China’s entitlement to the area enclosed by the U-shaped line in the SCS is recognized by the jurisprudence of international law and state practice. The Chinese people frst discovered, named, developed and utilized the SCS, and have ef f ectively managed them for a long term. These historical facts substantiate China’s entitlement above. Additionally, China’s entitlement is acknowledged by the post-World War II international legal system, including the 1943 Cairo Declaration, the 1945 Potsdam Declaration and the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco. These facts indicate that China’s entitlement to the SCS islands is distinct from the entitlement of other mainland-based States to their islands.

Lastly, China’s rights over the SCS do not prevent China from “shelving disputes and seeking joint development” with other States concerned. In fact, the Chinese people have engaged in all kinds of activities in the SCS for over 2,000 years. Before the late 1960s, when abundant hydrocarbon resources were found in the SCS area, the fact that the SCS islands belong to China was widely recognized by the international community, and confirmed by diplomatic practice, along with authoritative maps and publications of other States. However, after the late 1960s, the Philippines and other States, one after another, illegally occupied and encroached upon more than 40 islands or features of Nansha Islands. China not only showed great tolerance and exercised much restraint towards such acts, but also put forward the initiative to “shelve dispute and seek joint development”. Apart from concluding bilateral agreements with each administration of the Philippines tosettle their disputes over the SCS through negotiations, China also issued, together with the ASEAN countries, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, and actively negotiate with the States concerned to formulate the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, with an aim to maintain the peace and stability of the SCS region by taking practical actions.

B. The Legal Status of the Airspace over the SCS

As stated above, the rights China enjoys over the area enclosed by the U-shaped line in the SCS should include, all the existing and future rights necessary for the development of the SCS islands, and for the maintenance of the sovereign relations between China’s mainland territory and its indispensable archipelagic waters. “All future rights” is used here because China’s rights over the area enclosed by the U-shaped line would not remain unchanged, and we should see these rights with foresight. Previously, the administration and economic development of islands were chiefly carried out through ships, but with the development of new technology, such jobs can also be performed through aircraft, network and communication equipment, and etc.

On 6 January 2016, two civilian airplanes requisitioned by Chinese government took of f from Haikou Meilan International Airport, and successfully landed at 10:21 a.m. and 10:46 a.m., respectively, on the airfeld newly built on the Fiery Cross Reef after nearly 2 hours’ flight. These two planes returned to Haikou, China, in the afternoon of the same day, signifying that the test fight is successful. In addition, on 13 July of the same year, a flight took off from Haikou Meilan International Airport at 8:30 a.m. and landed on the newly built airfeld on the Meiji Reef two hours later, while another took of f from Haikou at 8:40 a.m. and landed on the airfeld on the Zhubi Reef at 10:28 a.m.. The two civilian planes, one chartered by China Southern Airlines and the other by Hainan Airlines, both returned to Haikou after a short stay on the reefs. This successful test flight demonstrates that both airfelds have the capability to ensure the safe operation of large civilian aircraft, which, in turn, would provide a convenient means of transportation for the provision of daily supplies to the SCS islands, as well as the relevant passenger traffic and medical aid. Furthermore, these airfelds may serve as alternate airports in the SCS for cross-ocean fights, and are also in the position to of f er cheaper and more fexible air routes options. Such fights fully refect that China has employed a new vehicle to manage and develop the SCS islands.

Similar to China’s rights over the relevant sea areas of SCS, its rights to the SCS airspace should include all the existing and future rights necessary for the development of the SCS islands, and for the maintenance of the sovereign relations between China’s mainland territory and its indispensable archipelagic waters. According to Article 3 of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, “[t]he Parties reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and overfight above the South China Sea as provided for by the universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.” Notably, such freedom of navigation and overfight should not be with prejudice to all the existing and future rights of China as described above.

Therefore, the rights China enjoys over the SCS airspace have the priority over the freedom of navigation or overfight, which is closely related to the principle of state sovereignty. The Charter of the United Nations (hereinafter “UN Charter”) laid particular stress on state sovereignty. The SCS region, which serves as the important base supporting China’s management and development of the Dongsha, Zhongsha, Xisha and Nansha Islands as well as their adjacent waters, has sovereign relations with China’s mainland. Moreover, such sovereign relations have been exhibited in a continuous and consistent way. That is to say, the method that China adopted to manage and develop these SCS islands is a customary way recognized by the modern international law. Consequently, “the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea” should not affect the exercise of China’s rights abovementioned.

III. The Dif f erences between State and Civil Aviation Behaviors

A. The Features of State Aviation Behavior

In accordance with UNCLOS Articles 38, 53, 58 and 87, ships have, to varying extent, freedom of navigation in the straits used for international navigation, archipelagic waters of archipelagic States, EEZs and the high seas, while aircraft have varying degree of freedom of overfight over such sea areas. Coastal States generally adopt the transit passage regime for vessels going through the straits used for international navigation, but also the innocent passage regime in exceptional cases. Article 4 of the 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other ActsCommitted on Board Aircraft stipulates that a coastal State could interfere with an aircraft in fight over the high seas in order to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over an offence committed on board in exceptional cases. According to international customs and usage, coastal States have universal jurisdiction over international crimes committed on the high seas, such as piracy, slave trafficking and hijack.

However, the author contends, the operation of aircraft in the SCS airspace, should be subject to all the existing and future rights enjoyable by China, as necessary for the maintenance of the sovereign relations between China’s mainland territory and its indispensable archipelagic waters, and for the development of its SCS islands. Therefore, the existing regimes cannot apply to the SCS airspace. That is to say, a regime should be specially designed for the SCS airspace, by utilizing and developing international law.

The creation of such a regime requires us to classify and identify the aircraft over the SCS. Both the Chicago Convention and the Civil Aviation Law of the People’s Republic of China have dif f erentiated state aircraft from civil aircraft, but failed to distinguish state from civil aviation behaviors.

Having the feature of quick movement and covering extensive areas, aviation behaviors are quite likely to get involved in sovereignty disputes. In that case, aviation behaviors, civil or state, should show enough concerns over any act that may be mistaken as any act of aggression, in order to avoid aircraft being shot down by mistake.

1. The Debate over the Status of Airspace

The debate over the status of airspace started from the 1912 Annual Conference of the International Law Association held in Brussels. Two opposing opinions appeared in this conference: one holds that every State enjoys the freedom to fy in the airspace of other States, and the other asserts that every State has sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.

The frst assertion that every State enjoys the freedom to fy in the airspace ofother States,⑨Article 1(1) of the International Air Services Transit Agreement provides that: “Each contracting State grants to the other contracting States the following freedoms of the air in respect of scheduled international air services: 1. The privilege to fy across its territory without landing; 2. The privilege to land for non-traffic purposes. The privileges of this section shall not be applicable with respect to airports utilized for military purposes to the exclusion of any scheduled international air services. In areas of active hostilities or of military occupation, and in time of war along the supply routes leading to such areas, the exercise of such privileges shall be subject to the approval of the competent military authorities.” Additionally, Article 1(1) of the International Air Transport Agreement stipulates that: “Each contracting State grants to the other contracting States the following freedoms of the air in respect of scheduled international air services: 1. The privilege to fly across its territory without landing; 2. The privilege to land for non-traffic purposes; 3. The privilege to put down passengers, mail and cargo taken on in the territory of the State whose nationality the aircraft possesses; 4. The privilege to take on passengers, mail and cargo destined for the territory of the State whose nationality the aircraft possesses; 5. The privilege to take on passengers, mail and cargo destined for the territory of any other contracting State and the privilege to put down passengers, mail and cargo coming from any such territory. With respect to the privileges specifed under paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this section, the undertaking of each contracting State relates only to through services on a route constituting a reasonably direct line out from and back to the homeland of the State whose nationality the aircraft possesses. The privileges of this section shall not be applicable with respect to airports utilized for military purposes to the exclusion of any scheduled international air services. In areas of active hostilities or of military occupation, and in time of war along the supply routes leading to such areas, the exercise of such privileges shall be subject to the approval of the competent military authorities.”is represented by the International Air Services Transit Agreement and the International Air Transport Agreement. In practice, such freedom of overfight contradicts with the principle of state territorial sovereignty, since state sovereignty also extends to the territorial airspace. In particular, in terms of its natural attribute, territorial airspace covers territory and territorial sea; therefore, if foreign aircraft are allowed to fy freely in the airspace of a State, that State would be exposed to risks beyond calculation.

The Chicago Convention, a representative international treaty holding every State has sovereignty over the airspace above its territory, provides explicitly in its Article 1 that “[t]he contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.”

2. The Particularity of State Aviation Behavior

Considering the attributes of civil aviation, and the illegal downing of civil aircraft appeared in history, to avoid using force against civil aviation behaviors has gradually become a global concern. However, such incidents had not been anticipated at the time when the Chicago Convention was prepared. Therefore, people often quoted Article 2(4) of UN Charter, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrityor political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” After the crash of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 in 1983, the ICAO adopted a resolution on 6 March, 1984, based on its investigation, saying that any use of weapon against civil aircraft was incompatible with the rules of international law, no matter what reasons caused the airplane to deviate from its scheduled route. However, the resolution failed to specify which rule of international law was violated. In May of the same year, Article 3 bis was added to the Chicago Convention, which provided that every State must refrain from the use of weapons against civil aircraft in fight.

However, State aviation behavior is dif f erent from civil one in the following aspects:

First, the subject of state aviation behavior is State, while the subject of civil aviation behavior is individuals or any other entities. Notably, the concept of“State” here mainly refers to state power, which is not a civil subject. In that case, the operation of state-owned airlines should be dif f erentiated from state operation. The “state” in the expression of “state-owned airlines” is used in the sense of civil subject. That is to say, state, as a civil subject, conducts civil act. It follows that the operation of state-owned airlines is civil aviation behavior.

Second, state aviation behavior is of the nature of state mission, which refects the administrative power of a State. Hence, in case of conficts with the sovereignty of other States, state aviation behavior is much more complex than civil aviation activities. Sovereignty means the supreme power internally, the right to independence externally, and the right of self-defence to prevent foreign invasion. Therefore, state aviation behavior refects sovereignty in whole or in part, which shows a kind of power. It should refrain from jeopardizing the sovereignty of other sovereign States. In contrast, civil aviation behavior is a kind of civil acts by civil subjects with equal status, which manifests the “rights” of such subjects.

Third, all the principal international aviation conventions contain provisions defning whether they are applicable to state aviation behaviors, and also roughly distinguish their application in different areas. Comparatively, international regulations contain detailed provisions on civil aviation behaviors, but almost without any provisions on state aviation behaviors.

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The differences listed above show that state aircraft behaviors performed in foreign and international airspace need to be carefully studied. In practice, such behaviors have led to conficts of powers, or sovereignty conficts, which give rise to the question on how to determine an act of aggression. Given that the global antiterrorism situation is still severe at present, the study on aggression should not only made from a conventional angle, but also take anti-terrorism factors into account.

B. The Source of the Def i nition for Act of Aggression

1. Article 51 of the UN Charter

Article 51 of the UN Charter provides,

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

A State’s right to self-defence when suffering an armed attack, which is granted to the State by this Article 51, originates from the principle of state sovereignty. The sovereignty of a State means that a State can independently deal with its domestic and foreign af f airs, and has the supreme authority to administrate itself.

“Armed attack”, the core concept in this article, is a factor that triggers the exercise of the right to self-defence.⑩Tarcisio Gazzimi, The Changing Rules on the Use of Force in International Law, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005, p. 132.However, the opinions of different States vary with respect to the requirements of “armed attack”.

2. The Caroline Rule

In 1837, the United Kingdom was facing a rebellion in Canada, which at that time was still under British control. A number of the rebel forces acting insupport of the Canadian rebellion (the majority of which being U.S. nationals) were stationed on Navy Island on the Canadian side of the Niagara River. They were supplied in munitions and personnel by the Caroline, which was an American steamer hired for that purpose. On December 29, while the Caroline was docked at Schlosser, in U.S. territory, it was attacked by British forces that set fre to the steamer and towed it over Niagara Falls. In the process, a U.S. citizen was killed. The U.S. protested against the British act. However, the U.K. alleged that its act was necessary for self-defense and self-preservation.①James A. Green, Docking the Caroline: Understanding the Relevance of the Formula in Temporary Customary International Law Concerning Self-Defense, Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 14, Issue 2, 2006, pp. 433～435.And the Caroline Rule was established in this case, which says that self-defence may be justifed only in cases where the “necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation”.②R. Y. Jennings, The Caroline and Mcleod Cases, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 32, Issue 1, 1938, pp. 91～92.

However, due to the traditions of case law, the facts of the Caroline case had overwhelming infuence on the interpretation of conclusions, which highlighted the element of “preemptive self-defense” in the case.

3. Article 9 of Chicago Convention and the “No-Fly Zones”Imposed by the UN Security Council

Article 9 of Chicago Convention states,

Prohibited areas

a) Each contracting State may, for reasons of military necessity or public safety, restrict or prohibit uniformly the aircraft of other States from flying over certain areas of its territory, provided that no distinction in this respect is made between the aircraft of the State whose territory is involved, engaged in international scheduled airline services, and the aircraft of the other contracting States likewise engaged. Such prohibited areas shall be of reasonable extent and location so as not to interfere unnecessarily with air navigation. Descriptions of such prohibited areas in the territory of a contracting State, as well as any subsequent alterations therein, shall be communicated as soon as possible to the other contracting States and to the International Civil Aviation Organization.

b) Each contracting State reserves also the right, in exceptional circums-tances or during a period of emergency, or in the interest of public safety, and with immediate ef f ect, temporarily to restrict or prohibit fl ying over the whole or any part of its territory, on condition that such restriction or prohibition shall be applicable without distinction of nationality to aircraft of all other States.

c) Each contracting State, under such regulations as it may prescribe, may require any aircraft entering the areas contemplated in subparagraphs a) or b) above to ef f ect a landing as soon as practicable thereafter at some designated airport within its territory.

In conformity with Article 9 of the Chicago Convention, the Spanish Government, in 1967, declared the Spanish airspace surrounding Algeciras Bay a zone prohibited to aerial navigation. The U.K. protested against this declaration and forwarded its concerns over the issue to the ICAO Council. Nevertheless, since this issue was politicized, the deliberation of this issue was postponed indefnitely.

It should be noted, since the Chicago Convention does not apply to state aviation behaviors, it has little ef f ect on state aviation behaviors if its Article 9 is invoked.

UN Security Council, by invoking the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, imposes limits on the airspace over the territory of a State. For example, UN Security Council imposed a “No-Fly Zone” over Libya in 2011, which has ef f ect on state aviation behaviors.

C. The Requirements of an Armed Attack

Both the Caroline Rule and Article 51 of the UN Charter consider “armed attack” as a condition that triggers the exercise of right to self-defence. However, neither of them articulate what types of actions constitute an “armed attack”.

1. Restrictive Interpretation

According to restrictive interpretation in the conventional sense, “if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations” under UN Charter Article 51 should be strictly, narrowly and precisely construed. Such an restrictive interpretation greatly limits a sovereign State’s right to defend itself, since a State can defend itself only when it suf f ers an armed attack. And this time frame does notinclude the preparatory phase prior to an armed attack.③Zhou Gengsheng, International Law, Beijing: The Commercial Press, p. 199. (in Chinese)Moreover, some scholars even hold that an armed attack should actually take place and continue for a period of time.④Xu Guangjian ed., Commentary on the Charter of United Nations, Taiyuan: Shanxi Education Press, 1999, pp. 353～360. (in Chinese)

In addition, the restrictive interpretation of armed attack was also modifed to some extent. It is asserted that if one of two neighboring States launches a rocket threatening the safety of its neighbor, then the right to self-defence can be invoked under Article 51 of the UN Charter.⑤Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963, p. 367.It is also proposed that, apart from the conditions above, such an attack should also be “irreversible”.⑥Singh M. Narendra, The Right of Self-Defence in Relation to the Use of Nuclear Weapons, Indian Yearbook of International Af f airs, 1956, Vol. 5, pp. 25～26.

2. Extensive Interpretation

Restrictive interpretation is closely associated with the time dominated by land battles. However, with the development of military technology, warcraft, cruise missiles and other weapons of mass destruction become the main weapons used in wars, which poses challenges to the conventional way to determine an “armed attack”. For example, when a State has deployed its precision guided missiles, its neighboring States, if within the attack range of the missiles, would suffer devastating blows at any time.

In this new context, the extensive interpretation of an “armed attack” was formed. When attacked by high-tech weapons, the State attacked may not be able to ef f ectively react to the attack, which would actually put the State in a passive position. Therefore, as one scholar proposed, if a State may only exercise the right to self-defence when a missile crosses its border, then the concept of ef f ective selfdefence would be meaningless.⑦Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963, pp. 366～369.

3. The Anti-Terrorism Factors in an Act of Aggression

During the 9/11 attacks, an American fighter attempted to intercept the fourth airplane seized by the terrorists. Unfortunately, this fighter crashed in the air over Pennsylvania before the interception. Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, U.S. President George W. Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald Henry Rumsfeld and the Joint Chiefs of Staf f formulated a new code of conduct in case of similaremergencies. Before the new code, the U.S. Department of Defense had not been officially approved to use force against any hijacked airplane.⑧U.S. Air Force Conducted Live-Fire Drills with Respect to Hijacked Airliners, at http://mil. news.sina.com.cn/2003-10-05/153963.html, 24 November 2016. (in Chinese)

Article 7 (Suppressing Terrorist Acts in the Air) of the Russian Federal Law No. 35-FZ on Counteraction of Terrorism (2006) specifes,

1. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation shall use their weapons and military equipment in the procedure established by normative legal acts of the Russian Federation for the purpose of removing the threat of a terrorist act in the air or for the purpose of suppressing such terrorist act. 2. If an aircraft does not react to radio commands of ground control centers to stop violating the rules of using the airspace of the Russian Federation and (or) to radio commands and visual signals of the aircrafts of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation sent to intercept it, or refuses to follow radio commands or visual signals not explaining the reasons for it, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation shall use their weapons and military equipment for preventing the flight of the said aircraft by way of forcing it to land. If the aircraft does not obey the demand to land and there is a real danger of the loss of life or the onset of an ecological catastrophe, the weapons and military equipment shall be used for preventing the fl ight of the said aircraft by way of destroying it. 3. Where there is reliable information about the probable use of an aircraft for committing an act of terrorism or about the occupation of an aircraft and, with that, all measures required under the circumstances for its landing have been taken and there is a real danger of the loss of life or the onset of an ecological catastrophe, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation shall use their weapons and military equipment for preventing the fl ight of the said aircraft by way of destroying it.⑨Xu Guimin, A Review on the Features of Russian Legislation against Terrorism, Global Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2013, p. 57. (in Chinese)

The government of Slovakia adopted a decree on 16 February 2005, authorizing its Defence Minister to order the downing of any aircraft violating its airspace, if necessary. In accordance with this decree, Slovakian air force is empowered to intercept any aircraft entering its airspace. In exceptional cases, where there are clear evidences indicating that the aircraft entering its airspace isemployed by terrorists to launch attacks, which may cause severe damages to life or property, the Slovakian Defence Minister has the right to order the downing of such aircraft, be it civil or military.⑩European States Pass Laws Authorizing Shooting Down of Hijacked Aircraft in Order to Avoid the Replaying of 9/11 Tragedy, at http://news.tom.com/1003/3295/2005114-1761852.html, 24 November 2016. (in Chinese)

In the current situation of global anti-terrorism, prior assertions that terrorist acts constituted an “armed attack” have met great challenges.①Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of Armed Attack in Article 51 of the UN Charter, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2002, pp. 45～46.Such assertions are regarded as a strange formalism in modern day,②Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq, San Diego International Law Journal, Vol. 4, 2003, pp. 16～17.which therefore need to be evolved. Particularly, the UN Security Council, in its Resolution 1368, did not connect the exercise of the right to self-defence with armed attacks launched by States, but expressly pointed out the notion of “terrorist attacks”. Additionally, neither UN Security Council in its Resolution 1373, nor the International Court of Justice in Oil Platforms (Iran v. USA), correlated armed attacks with state behaviors.

Due to the increasing of global anti-terrorist actions and regional conflicts and confrontations, the security of civil aircraft, when flying over the conflict areas, became a global concern. In 2014, ICAO set up the Task Force on Risks to Civil Aviation Arising from Conflict Zones, which convened four meetings consecutively. The meetings studied the safety and security crises facing civil aviation arising from confict zones.③The author attended the fourth meeting of the special group held by the ICAO from 13 to 15 July 2015, in Montreal, Canada. The meeting reviewed the application of the Convention on International Civil Aviation and other civil aviation treaties relating to confict zones. Delegates from 15 States, including China, the United States, Russia and Ukraine, attended the meeting. After discussion, the meeting ultimately adopted the Report on the Outcome of the Meeting of the Special Group to Review the Application of ICAO Treaties Relating to Confict Zones, which would be forwarded to the ICAO Council.

Against the backdrop of international anti-terrorism, States are inclined to, when assessing whether a particular action can constitute an act of aviation aggression, focus on the aviation behavior per se, instead of judging whether it is performed by a State or not. That is to say, the corresponding rules of international law have been less invoked against the background of anti-terrorism.

IV. From State Aircraft to State Aviation Behaviors: An Review of Existing Theories

As previously mentioned, we need to create a regime of state aviation behavior, which corresponds to the existing regime of state aircraft. The author attempts to start the discussion from the existing theories associated with state aircraft.

A. ICAO

The ICAO was established with an aim④The aims and objectives of ICAO include: to ensure the safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation throughout the world; to encourage the arts of aircraft design and operation for peaceful purposes; to encourage the development of airways, airports and air navigation facilities for international civil aviation; to meet the needs of the peoples of the world for safe, regular, efficient and economical air transport; to prevent economic waste caused by unreasonable competition; to ensure that the rights of Contracting States are fully respected and that every Contracting State has a fair opportunity to operate international airlines; to avoid discrimination between Contracting States; to promote safety of flight in international air navigation; and to promote generally the development of all aspects of international civil aeronautics.to promote the development of civil aeronautics and cooperation in this regard. However, the attainment of this aim is conditioned on differentiating civil from state aircraft. Notably, ICAO is unauthorized to defne state aircraft. Nevertheless, the organization has made some researches on the dif f erentiation between civil and state aircraft.

1. A Special Study on the Distinction Between Civil and State Aircraft

ICAO completed a study dedicated to the issue of civil/state aircraft,⑤Secretariat Study on “Civil/State Aircraft”, C-WP/9835 of 22/09/1993, presented by the Secretary General at the ICAO Council 140th Session.and prepared a working report for it. This report, in fact, analyzed civil and state aviation behaviors. It asserted that aircraft other than those used in military, customs and police services should be regarded as civil aircraft. However, it also stressed that multiple factors should be taken into account, when examining the nature of an aircraft.In the ICAO Civil/Military Cooperation Symposium held on April 14 and 15,2015, when discussing about aircraft operation,⑥ICAO Global Provisions Regarding Aircraft Operations, ICAO Civil/Military Cooperation Symposium, Paris, France, 14-15 April 2015, at http://www.icao.int/RO_EURNAT/ Other%20Meetings%20Seminars%20and%20Workshops/ICAO%20Civil-Military%20 Cooperation%20Meetings/ICAO%20Civil-military%20Cooperation%20Symposium%20 2015/ICMCS%20PPT12.pdf, 24 November 2016.ICAO believed that the Chicago Convention should be applicable only to civil aircraft, and should not be applicable to state aircraft. Also, the ICAO contended that aircraft used in military, customs and police services should be state aircraft. In other words, state aircraft should include but not limited to aircraft used in military, customs and police services, meaning that state aircraft can be used for more purposes than military, customs and police services.

2. Incidentally Mentioned in the Discussion of Aircraft Operation

3. Incidentally Mentioned in the Discussion of Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM)

RVSM is implemented to reduce the vertical separation between fight level (FL) 290 and FL 410 from 2000-ft minimum to 1000-ft minimum, during the cruise phase of modern civil jet aircraft. It increases airspace capacity and operation profits of airlines, and decreases the workload in air traffic control. And ICAO started to study the RVSM standard in the 1970s.

In January 2002, upon negotiations between the aviation authorities of the States concerned and the relevant international civil aviation organizations, and after 13 working meetings, it is agreed that RVSM would be implemented in the airspace over the SCS since 21 February 2002. Aircraft without RVSM approval should not fy over RVSM airspace, and must fy below FL 290.

When deliberating the issue of RVSM,⑦George Firican, State Aircraft in RVSM Airspace, ICAO Civil/Military Coordination Workshop, Kiev Ukraine, 28-31 October 2013, at http://www.icao.int/RO_EURNAT/ Other%20Meetings%20Seminars%20and%20Workshops/ICAO%20Civil-Military%20 Cooperation%20Meetings/ICAO%20Civil-military%20Cooperation%20Seminar%202013/ Kiev%20day%201%20George%20Firican%20State%20Aircraft%20in%20RVSM%20 airspace.pdf, 24 November 2016.ICAO mentioned incidentally to defne state aircraft as aircraft used in military, customs and police services.

4. Incidentally Mentioned in the Discussion of Foreign Air Operator Validation and Surveillance

When reviewing issues relating to foreign air operator validation and surveillance,⑧Foreign Air Operator Validation & Surveillance Course, p. 7, at http://www.icao.int/safety/ implementation/library/a_icao_convention_annexes_related_to_fao_2009_07_r1.pdf, 24 November 2016.ICAO also explained Article 3 of Chicago Convention. The organizationargued that this convention should be applicable only to civil aircraft, but not applicable to state aircraft, and aircraft used in military, customs and police services should be deemed as state aircraft, rather than civil aircraft. This argument is consistent with the one raised by the ICAO when discussing aircraft operation.

B. International Air Transport Association (IATA)

IATA put forward, in the ICAO Civil/Military Cooperation Symposium held on 14-15 April 2015, that Chicago Convention shall be applicable only to civil aircraft, and shall not be applicable to state aircraft.⑨Dmitry Kosolapov, Improve Safety for Flight over the High Seas, ICAO Civil/Military Cooperation Symposium, Paris, France, 14-15 April 2015, p. 4, at http://www.icao.int/ RO_EURNAT/Other%20Meetings%20Seminars%20and%20Workshops/ICAO%20Civil-Military%20Cooperation%20Meetings/ICAO%20Civil-military%20Cooperation%20 Symposium%202015/ICMCS%20PPT07.pdf, 24 November 2016.The view of the IATA was identical with that of ICAO, which also attended the symposium, reflecting the common view shared by these two important organizations in this regard.

C. European Aviation Safety Agency

European Aviation Safety Agency, in its Guidance Material for the Certifcation and Operation of State Aircraft in European RVSM Airspace,⑩EUROCONTROL, Guidance Material for the Certifcation and Operation of State Aircraft in European RVSM Airspace, at https://www.eurocontrol.int/sites/default/files/article/ content/documents/official-documents/guidance/2012-cmac-rma-military-guidance.pdf, 24 November 2016.said that “only”aircraft used in the military, customs and police services would qualify as State aircraft. Comparatively, neither Chicago Convention nor ICAO has used “only” to strictly defne the concept of state aircraft.

D. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

When discussing issues related to civil/military aircraft operating in support of NATO-led missions and operations①NATO Policy for Civil/Military Aircraft Operating in Support of NATO or NATO-led Missions and Operations, at http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/ pdf_2016_08/20160804_1608-NATO-Policy-civil-military-aircraft.pdf, 24 November 2016.NATO argued that aircraft used in the military, customs and police services should be state aircraft, rather than civilaircraft. NATO is consistent with both ICAO and IATA in this aspect. Furthermore, NATO also emphasized that when any contracting States issues other guidelines for state aircraft, due regard should be paid to the safety of civil aircraft.

E. U.S. Air Force

In the ICAO’s RVSM Seminars for CAR/SAM Region, U.S. Air Force specifcally talked about state aircraft issues. And it proposed that aircraft used in the military, customs and police services should be state aircraft, rather than civil aircraft. In addition, States have the freedom to define state aircraft, and should take into account the owner, operator, passengers, cargos and other factors when defning②U.S. Air Force: State Aircraft Issues, ICAO’s 1st RVSM Seminar for CAR/SAM Region, ICAO’s 2nd RVSM Seminar for CAR/SAM Region, at http://www.icao.int/RO_SAM/ Documents/2003/RVSMII/P-Storm-State%20Aircraft-E.pdf#search=State%20Aircraft%20 %20%20us%20AIr%20force, 17 December 2016.

F. Discussions over the Distinction between Civil and State Aircraft in China

1. Academic Circles

In China, only a few academic papers have explored the distinction between civil and state aircraft. And these papers focus on the study and identifcation of state aircraft,③Huang Lihua, Legal Problems about the State Aircrafts, Modern Law Science, No. 6, 2000, pp. 146～149 (in Chinese); Li Wenli, Position of State Aircraft in International Law, Journal of Anhui Vocational College of Police Officers, No. 3, 2003, pp. 26～27. (in Chinese)which virtually discuss state aviation behaviors.

2. Practitioner Circles

In Chinese practitioner circles, the Civil Aircraft Maintenance Certification Regulations (CAAC Decree No. 31) of 1993, provided that “state aircraft refer to the aircraft used in the military, customs and police services”. However, this decree was abolished and replaced by the 2001 Civil Aircraft Maintenance Organization Certifcation Regulations. Additionally, “state aircraft” was used solely as a notion without any precise textual meaning in the following rules or regulations: Rules on Air Traffic Control of China’s Civil Aviation,④Rules on Air Traffic Control of China’s Civil Aviation (CAAC Order No. 86) was promulgated on 5 July 1999 and came into force on 5 January 2000.Civil Aviation Flight DispatcherLicense Management Rules,⑤Civil Aviation Flight Dispatcher License Management Rules (CAAC Order No. 136) was promulgated on 16 December 2004 and came into force on 15 January 2005.A Guide to Flight Plan Application and Its Approval for Foreign Aircraft Interim Flight Operations during Olympic/Paralympic Games issued by CAAC,⑥A Guide to Flight Plan Application and Its Approval for Foreign Aircraft Interim Flight Operations during Olympic/Paralympic Games, a telegraph issued by CAAC, was promulgated in February 2008 and came into force on 1 July 2008.and Rules of Certifcation of Civil Aviation Aircraft Pilot and Ground Instructor.⑦Rules of Certifcation of Civil Aviation Aircraft Pilot and Ground Instructor (CAAC Order No. 224) was promulgated on 10 July 2014 and came into force on 1 September 2014.The CAAC Notice Concerning Issues Relating to the Carriage of Dangerous Goods Contained in Relief Supplies determined the nature of a single behavior, saying that “the carriage of relief supplies containing dangerous goods by chartering may be considered as carriage by state aircraft, and therefore not subject to Regulations CCAR-276. Nevertheless, the safe disposal of cargo shall be carried out pursuant to the requirements laid out in Article 2(2).”

The preceding provisions show that the complete scope of state aircraft has not been defned by the practitioners. Currently, it is only partially described.

G. Periodic Conclusion with Respect to the Dif f erentiation between Aircraft and Aviation Behavior

In the view of the author, the existing discussions on the distinction between civil and state aircraft have confused the nature of aircraft with that of aviation behavior. Therefore, the two concepts need to be clarifed.

Presently, most States and international organizations tend to include “aviation behaviors” into the concept of aircraft, which, however, may cause misjudgment of the actual behaviors of aircraft. For example, many incidents, happened in the history of global civil aviation, were caused by misjudging the behaviors of civil aircraft.

NatureAcivilaviationbehaviors was misjudged asahostileact.Acivilaviationbehaviorwas misjudged asahostileact.Remainunclear.uencesC-4 ConseqDouglasDwasseverely damagedandthenditchedintotheocean, 9 0of1killing1passengersandonboard. crewAll58people ere onboardwkilled. Killingall95on board,includingrench aFgeneral.-54 954,ouglasCisjudged. ulgarianairspace articularlyintheyearof1warnings,thesandainlandandTaiwan,andthosed,loyedtointercepttheged ereinprogress.InthisperiohichainanIslandhappenedconstantly,wchanyduringaasattributedtoarencharmasaDlight1611.hooternwowC-4convertedforcivilian retracteditandIdentifcationoftheSasdeptofollowtheinstructionlyreece.ranceFar,pouglasDlightstrayedintoBbablecausewisfredbytheForeanWhinesemtates,wheaircraftshotdlFlAulgaria,afterreceivingfBretendedutthensharpulgariaandGort,theproissile,moftheKnitedSse.TersionoftheD5jetfightersw-1iGinitiallypgear,bever,in2011,aformerserviceman,allegedinaowthatamIntheaftermathconfrontationsbetweenChinaandtheUhlytenilitaryvrstsegment,theEBulgarianMstellationitslandingin.HmilitaryeenCherefore,thepossibilityishighforsuchaplanetogetmccordingthepilotsooningtotheof f icialrepbetwairconfictsinthevicinityofHmadepilotshigairliner,themuse.TDuringthefdtwoanplane.AL-049CdeployedcoursetotheborderbetweenBAccordfireinthecabtelevisioninterviewweapontest,infactcausedthecrashof AirFIncidentn n y CathayPacifcDouglas -4l Alrance redin DCShootdowShootdowofEFlight402CrashofaAirFAirlinerProbablyCausedbissileaMMisfeapon aWTestTime23July 195427July 195511ber Septem1968

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Currently, some States have unreasonable views towards China’s entitlement to the SCS region. Against this backdrop, it is likely that the aircraft behaviors in the SCS airspace would be misjudged, because solely judging from the nature of aircraft cannot determine the behavior of an aircraft. Therefore, we need to study aircraft and aviation behaviors, and dif f erentiate one from another, especially state aviation behaviors.

1. The Nature of Aircraft

The nature of an aircraft is primarily determined on the basis of its original intended usage, but this usage does not prevent it from being used for other purposes in the future. And changes of aircraft nature really exist.⑧Boeing Makes the History of Converting Civil Aircraft into Military Aircraft, Beijing Daily, 22 May 2007 (in Chinese). For example, Boeing 737-100 was originally developed as a short-range airliner with a capacity of 65～80 passengers. That is to say, Boeing 737-100 was civil aircraft in nature. However, the development history of Boeing products tells, Boeing has developed large jet airliners including series 707, 737, 747, 757, 767 and 777, and series 787 is also developed and under trial production. In order to meet military needs, Boeing also converted its airliners into military aircraft. For instance, Boeing 707-320B was later converted into an early warning aircraft, which made its maiden fight in 1972; in November 2006, South Korea ordered four Boeing E-737 early warning aircraft, enabling South Korea to surveil the whole Korean Peninsula and some airspace of its neighboring States; in 1977, Boeing 747 was modifed to ferry space shuttles, which has been used as shuttle carrier aircraft until now; Boeing KC-767 is an aerial refuelling tanker developed from Boeing 767, which can refuel a Boeing B-52H (a along-range, heavy strategic bomber) up in the air; in 1993, Japan became the primary user of Boeing 767 early warning aircraft, and four such aircraft have been put into service by now.In other words, the nature of aircraft is objective and may be changed. In that case, it is unscientifc to decide aircraft behaviors solely from the nature of aircraft. For example, with respect to a civil aircraft performing certain state mission, the conclusion regarding the nature of its behavior would be contrary to the truth, if merely judging from the nature of the aircraft.

2. Aviation Behaviors

With the development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), stubbornly insisting on treating the nature of aircraft as a criterion has become meaningless, because the nature of aircraft, in fact, depends on its behavioral purposes. For instance, UAV can be used for express delivery, and also for the performance of military missions. The behaviors of UAV would be confused with each other, if UAV is treated in a uniform way as a key concept. The author argues, precisely because of the defects lying in the definition of the nature of aircraft, the nature of aviation activities becomes easier to be decided, which, specifcally, should be decided by the actualpurpose of such activities. For example, a civil plane, Boeing 737-100, which was chartered by a State to do rescue and relief work, should be considered as carrying out state activities. It follows that aviation activities refect the subjective nature of aircraft.

3. From Aircraft to Aviation Behaviors

The statements above show, the nature of aircraft is not directly related to the nature of aviation activities. If aviation behaviors are classified merely based on the nature of aircraft, the actual purposes of aircraft would be ignored. However, such actual purposes, instead of the original intended usage of aircraft, should be the critical element distinguishing civil from state aviation behaviors. Currently, aircraft is defined in terms of the subjective criteria of aviation behaviors. In that case, the defnition of state aircraft could be mutatis mutandis applied to the defnition of state aviation behaviors.

V. The Purposes of State Aviation Behaviors

As described above, the determination of the nature of aircraft cannot contribute to the settlement of problems happened in real life. Due to their behaviors, many civil aircraft were shot down as state aircraft. Such tragedies can serve as a perfect example in this case. Given that the defnition made by the international community for civil aviation behavior is relatively precise and clear, the real problem that we have to tackle is how to determine or judge state aviation behaviors.

A. The Right to Def i ne State Aviation Behaviors

First, the UN Charter stipulates, in its Preamble, the determination “to reaffirm faith … in the equal rights … of nations large and small,” and in Article 1 the purpose “to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.” Particularly, the Charter provides: “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members” (Article 2, Paragraph 1); “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State” (Article 2, Paragraph 7); and “relationship among [Members of the United Nations] shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality” (Article 78). The principle of sovereignequality, a fundamental organization principle of the United Nations, is listed as the most important one.

Second, according to Article 3(d) of the Chicago Convention, “[t]he contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.” It shows, following the UN Charter, the Chicago Convention also provides for the respect to the sovereignty of all States, and acknowledges that a State has the freedom to defne its state aircraft or state aviation behavior.

Hence, both the principle of state sovereignty provided for in the UN Charter, and the freedom of States to define state aircraft or state aviation behavior contemplated in the Chicago Convention tell that, to provide for the definition and scope of state aircraft and state aviation behavior is a matter within a State’s sovereignty. Particularly, China should define state aviation behaviors, since the SCS region is the base supporting all the existing and future rights necessary for the maintenance of the sovereign relations between China’s mainland territory and its indispensable archipelagic waters, and for the development of the SCS islands.

B. The Dif f erentiation Between Civil and State Aviation Behaviors

Article 3 of the Chicago Convention provides,

Civil and state aircraft

a) This Convention shall be applicable only to civil aircraft, and shall not be applicable to state aircraft.

b) Aircraft used in military, customs and police services shall be deemed to be state aircraft.

c) No state aircraft of a contracting State shall fly over the territory of another State or land thereon without authorization by special agreement or otherwise, and in accordance with the terms thereof.

d) The contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.

This article is considered as the one that has differentiated civil from state aircraft.

First, the Preamble of Chicago Convention expressively provides, “… in orderthat international civil aviation may be developed in a safe and orderly manner and that international air transport services may be established on the basis of equality of opportunity and operated soundly and economically. Have accordingly conclude this Convention to that end.” And Article 3 reaffirms, “This Convention shall be applicable only to civil aircraft, and shall not be applicable to state aircraft.” These provisions indicate that the definition and scope of state aviation behavior are not covered in the Chicago Convention. Therefore, the defnition of state aircraft contained in this convention is meaningful and applicable only in cases of civil aviation behaviors. In other words, the distinction between civil and state aviation behaviors as envisioned in the Chicago Convention is made in relation to the purpose of this convention, which hence is not applicable in all cases.

Second, semantically, the provision “[a]ircraft used in military, customs and police services shall be deemed to be state aircraft” (Chicago Convention, Article 3) uses the sentence pattern of “… used in (purposes), should be (nature).” In that case, defning state aircraft is, actually, a process of depicting the nature of aircraft based on the nature of aviation behaviors.

Third, Chicago Convention, Article 3, “aircraft used in military, customs and police services”, sets out its provision by enumerating all possible kinds of state aircraft. However, if we say the three kinds of aircraft listed above cover all state aircraft or all purposes of state aviation behaviors, the principle of state sovereignty under the UN Charter would be violated. Since all States enjoy equal sovereignty, and the purposes of state aviation behaviors are covered in state sovereignty, such purposes should not be subject to the defnition contained in Article 3 of the Chicago Convention.

Lastly, Chicago Convention, Article 3(d) states, “The contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.” This article shows this convention respects state sovereignty, and all States have the freedom to prescribe what state aircraft or state aviation behaviors are in their own States.

C. Civil Aviation Behaviors Def i ned in the Civil Aviation Law of the People’s Republic of China

The Civil Aviation Law of the People’s Republic of China fails to directly define the term “state aircraft”. It only stipulates in Article 5, “Civil aircraft as referred to in this Law means aircraft other than those used in fight missions ofmilitary, customs and police services”. However, the aim of this law is solely “to safeguard the national sovereignty of territorial airspace and the rights of civil aviation, to ensure the conduct of civil aviation activities in a safe and orderly manner, to protect the lawful rights and interests of the parties concerned in civil aviation activities, and to promote the development of civil aviation industry.”Therefore, Article 5, which is stated by enumeration, cannot be considered as a provision distinguishing civil aviation behavior from state aviation activities. This article may only be said to constitute a part of the defnition of civil aircraft or civil aviation behavior. And the term of “civil aviation behavior” should be adequately defned by referring to the whole text and structure of the Civil Aviation Law of China and other laws or regulations.

In addition, Article 5 of the Civil Aviation Law of China, which was promulgated on 30 October 1995, to some extent, repeats the wording of the Chicago Convention Article 3, “Aircraft used in military, customs and police services shall be deemed to be state aircraft”. Consequently, this Article 5 does not have the full authority to dif f erentiate state from civil aviation behaviors.

D. State Aviation Behaviors Def i ned in the Constitution and Property Law of the People’s Republic of China

The definition of state aviation behaviors should also be found in the Constitution and Property Law of the People’s Republic of China. Article 13 of the Constitution of China lays down some provisions about private property, saying:“The State may, in the public interest and in accordance with law, expropriate or requisition private property for its use and make compensation for the private property expropriated or requisitioned.” Furthermore, Article 44 of the Property Law of China prescribes, “In order to meet such urgent needs as rushing to rescue or providing disaster relief, the immovables or movables of any entities or individuals may be requisitioned within the limits of power and in compliance with the statutory procedures. After the emergent use, the requisitioned immovables or movables shall be returned to the owners. Where the immovables or movables of any entities or individuals are requisitioned, or if they are damaged or lost thereafter, compensations shall be made therefor.”

That is to say, “in the public interest” or “in order to meet such urgent needs as rushing to rescue or providing disaster relief”, the State may expropriate or requisition private property for its use. In a similar vein, “in the public interest”or “in order to meet such urgent needs as rushing to rescue or providing disaster relief”, the State may expropriate or requisition civil aircraft for its use, which in fact turns a civil aviation behavior into a state aviation behavior.

E. Joint Determination

The analysis above shows that making regulations on the definition of state aviation behavior is a matter within the sovereignty of a State, and a sovereign State has indisputable power in this regard. If dichotomy (state and civil aviation behaviors) is used to define aviation activities, the purposes of state aviation behaviors involve, at least, the following three aspects:

First, Article 5 of the Civil Aviation Law of China, “Civil aircraft as referred to in this Law means aircraft other than those used in fight missions of military, customs and police services”, defines civil aircraft by excluding all possible options, and at the meantime describes the purposes of non-civil aviation activities. Seen from the dichotomy of state and civil aviation behaviors, these purposes of non-civil aviation activities form a part of the purposes of state aviation behaviors. In the eye of positive law, to engage in “fight missions of military, customs and police services” is one of the purposes of state aviation behaviors.

Second, pursuant to the Constitution and the Property Law of China, “in the public interest” or “in order to meet such urgent needs as rushing to rescue or providing disaster relief”, the State may lawfully expropriate or requisition private property for its use. In real life, due to emergent disasters, the State would requisition civil aircraft to engage in some relief work, where civil aircraft activities have the nature of state aviation behaviors. In other words, according to the Constitution and the Property Law of China, performing state missions should become one of the purposes of state aviation behaviors.

Lastly, in accordance with the principle of state sovereignty under the UN Charter, and the provision that States may defne their own state aircraft or state aviation behaviors under the Chicago Convention, States have the freedom to supplement the defnition of state aviation behaviors.

To sum up, the purposes of state aviation behaviors include: to engage in “fight missions of military, customs and police services”, to meet “the public interest”and “to meet such urgent needs as rushing to rescue or providing disaster relief”. Additionally, States have the freedom to supplement the defnition of state aviation behaviors.F. Nature of Aviation Activities When State and

Civil Aviation Behaviors Are Combined

Where state and civil aviation behaviors are combined together, how to determine the nature of such aviation activities? For example, when law enforcement officers of a State, in accordance with a bilateral judicial agreement, take a fleeing criminal suspect handed over by the law-enforcement authority of another State, back to his home State by civil aviation flight, state activities (sending a criminal suspect under escort) and civil activities (ordinary passengers taking a plane) are combined together. In this case, how to defne the nature of the activity of this aircraft? The author holds that this question should be answered based on the following standards.

Firstly, in order to defne the nature of such aviation activities, we may look into whether the aircraft is primarily used for conducting civil or state activities. In the example mentioned above, if the fight is mainly used for carrying passengers, and the escorting of criminal suspect does not substantially af f ect the functions of the aircraft, then the aviation activity should be deemed as a civil aviation behavior; in contrast, if the civil aircraft, as required by the escorting mission, adopts special fight timetable and other means to ensure its navigation safety, then this aviation activity should be deemed as a state aviation behavior. Notably, with respect to an aircraft flying in the territorial air space of a State, the nature of its aviation behaviors should be decided in accordance with the laws of that State, which is a kind of respect to the sovereignty of the State concerned. Specifically, when the state aircraft of State A operate in the airspace of that State or the airspace over the high seas, they should comply with the domestic law of State A and the rules of international law; when the state aircraft of State A enter into the territorial air space of State B, they should be regulated by the domestic law of State B.

Secondly, we may examine who de facto controls the aircraft. State aviation behaviors are not only refected in their purposes, but also include some external behaviors. On the one hand, some civil aviation behaviors are mistaken as state ones due to certain external behaviors; most of the airliner shootdown incidents in history were caused by misunderstanding of external behaviors. On the other hand, there are cases where state aviation behaviors, because of external behaviors, aremistaken as civil ones.⑨For example, Israeli air force carried out the “Operation Babylon” on 7 June 1981. It deployed 14 airplanes, launching a surprise strike against a nuclear reactor about 20 km southeast of the Iraqi capital Baghdad. Israel painted its attack squadron resembling the aircraft of Jordanian air force. When Saudi radar detected the Israeli aircraft and the controllers required the Israeli pilots to report their identities, the Israeli pilots replied in fuent Arabic: “We are Jordanian air force conducting routine trainings.” The controllers believed it to be true. When Jordan radar detected these aircraft, due to the density of the squadron, the image displayed on the radar screen was just a blurring dot, like a large transport aircraft. When enquired, the pilots answered in American English: “It is a civil plane”. The Israeli aircraft muddled through again.

Lastly, we can also determine the nature of an aviation behavior through aircraft marks. Civil aircraft markings, referring to aircraft number, tail number and registration number, is a signifcant symbol used to identify aircraft. Without such unique numbers, civil aircraft are not allowed to engage in any fight. The ICAO Council frst adopted Annex 7 “Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks” to the Chicago Convention on 8 February 1949. And the fourth amendment to Annex 7 was adopted on 30 July 1981. Contracting States are required to notify the ICAO of any dif f erences between their national regulations and the standards contained in this Annex 7, and describe the dif f erences in the appendices to Annex 7. Such standards actually set out some regulations on the identifcation of civil aviation behaviors both on national and international levels. Hence, in the international arena, we may determine the nature of an aviation behavior through relevantmarkings, including nationality,⑩Selection rule of nationality mark: the nationality mark shall be selected from the series of nationality symbols included in the radio call signs allocated to the State of Registry by the International Telecommunication Union. The nationality mark shall be notifed to the International Civil Aviation Organization.common①The third amendment to Annex 7 was adopted by the ICAO on 23 January 1969, and entered into force on 23 May of the same year. The amendment introduced expressions such as “Common Mark”, “Common Mark Registering Authority” and “International Operating Agency”. In accordance with Article 77 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, aircraft not registered on a national basis can apply for common marks. The common mark shall be selected from the series of symbols included in the radio call signs allocated to the ICOA by the International Telecommunication Union. Assignment of the common mark to a common mark registering authority will be made by the International Civil Aviation Organization. For example, the ICAO Council decision of 1983 required: the aircraft jointly registered by the Arab Air Cargo (cooperative between Iraq & Jordan) must bear the common mark “4YB”; joint register shall be maintained by Jordan; and Jordan & Iraq shall be jointly & severally bound to assume the obligations & responsibilities which ICAO attaches.and registration marks.②Generally, “registration mark” shall be letters, numbers, or a combination of letters and numbers. The nationality mark shall precede the registration mark. When the frst character of the registration mark is a letter, it shall be preceded by a hyphen. According to the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Nationality Registration of Civil Aircraft, with respect to a civil aircraft having not obtained a civil aircraft nationality registration certifcate, a provisional registration mark may be applied, when the aircraft is used in test flights, performance flights, orientation flights for export delivery (to be delivered in a foreign State), or in other circumstances considered necessary by the CAAC. Aircraft with provisional registration marks should not engage in passenger and cargo transportation, as well as other business operations.

VI. Conclusions

The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and the 1982 UNCLOS established the preliminary mechanism to peacefully settle the disputes in Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, this mechanism has not substantially contributed to the resolution of SCS disputes. In this context, China and ASEAN countries signed in 2002 the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which is the frst political document specially designed to settle SCS disputes.

As mentioned previously, in the current situation of global anti-terrorism, the notion of “aggression act” tends to expand its meaning, and impose new requirements on the identifcation of state aviation behaviors. The identifcation of state aviation behaviors, essentially, concerns the legality of state aircraft behaviors carried out in foreign and international airspace.

A. Adhering to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence on the Whole

The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, as open and inclusive principles of international law, embody the values of sovereignty, justice, democracy and rule of law.③Carry Forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to Build a Better World through Win-win Cooperation, Address by H.E. Mr. Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China, at Meeting Marking the 60th Anniversary of the Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/ t1170143.shtml, 24 November 2016.These principles were also incorporated in the relevant declarations, such as the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, adopted by the UN General Assembly at its 25th session in 1970, and the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, adopted at the sixth special session of UN General Assembly in 1974. Disputes and differences between countries should be resolved through dialogue, consultation and peaceful means. We should increase mutual trust, and settle disputes and promote security through dialogue. Willful threat or use of force are discouraged. Flexing military muscles only reveals the lack of moral ground or vision rather than refecting one’s strength. Security can be solid and enduring only if it is based on moral high ground and vision. Therefore, these fve principles should be employed as a general standard to deal with state aircraft behaviors performed in foreign and international airspace.

The SCS airspace is a part of the important base supporting China’s management and development of Dongsha, Zhongsha, Xisha and Nansha Islands as well as their adjacent waters. China’s entitlement to the SCS airspace should include, all the existing and future rights necessary for the development of these SCS islands, and for the maintenance of the sovereign relations between China’s mainland territory and its indispensable archipelagic waters. The freedom of navigation and overflight of other States should be without prejudice to China’s exercise of such rights.

Overall, in order to use SCS airspace, China’s rights mentioned above should frst be respected. In addition, the airspace should be used for peaceful development and win-win cooperation.

B. Double Standard to Def i ne State Aviation Behaviors

As stated above, given that States are authorized to define state aviation behavior, and international conventions are silent on the said behavior, currently, there is no concept of state aviation behavior widely acknowledged in the international community. This situation makes the concept extensible. In this connection, when assessing whether a behavior is a state aviation behavior or not, or excluding the application of civil aviation conventions, the domestic law of the State concerned and the international law should be considered together.

On the one hand, the right to evaluate and identify state aviation behaviors falls under the scope of sovereignty. In particular, with respect to foreign aircraft fying over the territorial airspace of a State, that sovereign State has indisputable power to assess their activities. On the other hand, when determining the nature of an aviation behavior, the existing rules of international law should be complied with frst, but the regulations and practice of the States concerned should also be taken into account.

C. The Standard to Determine the Innocence of State Aviation Behaviors

State aviation behaviors, if carried out in foreign and international airspace, may cause conficts of sovereignty. However, if a state aviation behavior does not jeopardize the sovereignty of another State, this behavior should not be deemed as a wrongful act. For example, where a state aviation behavior is performed in foreign and international airspace for relief work, it cannot be considered as wrongful. This point is recognized by the international law, since the wrongfulness of internationally wrongful acts is precluded in a situation of distress, which has long been established as a rule of customary international law. The International Law Commission, established by the United Nations General Assembly, adopted the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts at its ffty-third session in 2001. Article 24(1) of the Draft Articles provides that, “The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation of that State is precluded if the author of the act in question has no other reasonable way, in a situation of distress, of saving the author’s life or the lives of other persons entrusted to the author’s care.”

State aviation behaviors carried out in the SCS airspace should not undermine the sovereign relations between China’s mainland territory and its SCS islands, orthe support of f ered by the waters enclosed by the U-shaped line to such relations. That is to say, in the SCS region, state aviation behaviors should be performed according to this supreme principle, which derives from the principle of state sovereignty under modern international law. When any State utilizes a region that another State relies on for existence, it should not infringe the sovereignty of that State.

D. The Standard of Excluding Reasonable Doubts

The standard of excluding reasonable doubts is a standard applied in criminal procedure law to judge whether a suspect is guilty or innocent. This standard can also be applied to judge whether a state aviation behavior performed in foreign and international airspace is wrongful or not. That is to say, in procedure, a State cannot decide the wrongfulness of such a state aviation behavior before excluding all reasonable doubts.

As previously mentioned, when the state aircraft of State A operate in the airspace of that State or the airspace over the high seas, they should comply with the domestic law of State A and the rules of international law; when the state aircraft of State A enter into the territorial air space of State B, they should be regulated by the domestic law of State B. Therefore, it is highly possible that the two States would have different or even conflicting regulations about the identification of aviation behaviors. Currently, it is unrealistic to find a uniform standard from international law in this regard. In this context, we need to collate the existing standards, especially those concerning “innocence”.

China, a State with preferential rights to the SCS airspace, has duties of prudence and care under procedural law. SCS serves as a vital transportation hub. Being aware of the signifcance of SCS region to all States, China actively proposes to shape a normative order in the region through the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, with an aim to increase the public benefts derived from the SCS region.

E. The Principle of Not Resorting to Force First

States have the right to self-defence in cases of aggression or terrorist attacks. Nonetheless, force cannot be used, unless state aircraft behaviors performed in foreign and international airspace are determined as acts of aggression. Whendeciding whether an act constitutes an act of aggression or not, restrictive interpretation should be applied in principle, but extensive interpretation may also be used, if necessary, against the backdrop of anti-terrorism. The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea emphasizes that “[t]he Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign States directly concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.”

Therefore, if the state aviation behaviors of any other States performed in the SCS airspace prejudice the sovereign relations between China’s mainland territory and its SCS islands, it should be settled frst through consultation and negotiations.

Translator: XIE Hongyue

Standards to Identify and Decide the Legality of State Aviation Behaviors Performed in the South China Sea Region

The South China Sea (SCS) airspace is a part of the important base supporting China’s management and development of Dongsha, Zhongsha, Xisha and Nansha Islands as well as their adjacent waters. China’s entitlement to the SCS airspace should include, all the existing and future rights necessary for the development of these SCS islands, and for the maintenance of the sovereign relations between China’s mainland territory and its indispensable archipelagic waters. The freedom of navigation and overflight of other States should be without prejudice to China’s exercise of such rights. Currently, the two concepts,“aircraft” and “aviation behaviors”, are confused and used interchangeably both in the academic and practitioner circles. In addition, studies on the notion of state aviation behavior are few. Therefore, there is no clear standard to identify state aviation behaviors or state aviation behaviors performed in foreign or international airspace. This paper, by collating and examining the existing concepts and defnitions, clarifes the dif f erences between “aircraft” and “aviation behavior.” Further, it defines the notion of state aviation behavior after reviewing the purpose and behavioral attributes of state aircraft. Lastly, the author sorts out the standards which can be applied to decide the legality of state aviation behaviors performed in foreign and international airspace.

Civil aviation behavior; State aviation behavior; International law; Conventions on civil aviation

* 李亞凝，法學(xué)博士，中央財經(jīng)大學(xué)法學(xué)院博士后研究人員。電子信箱：daneenlee@ hotmail.com。

? THE AUTHOR AND CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEW

* LI Yaning, SJD, a postdoctoral research fellow at Law School of the Central University of Finance and Economics. E-mail: daneenlee@hotmail.com.

? THE AUTHOR AND CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEW