○ Zhang Yupeng

(School of Foreign Languages, Anyang Institute of Technology, Anyang, Henan, 455002)

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On the Treatment of Quantity Implicature byNeo-Gricean and Relevance Theory

○ Zhang Yupeng

(SchoolofForeignLanguages,AnyangInstituteofTechnology,Anyang,Henan, 455002)

As regarding to the derivation of quantity implicature, Grice’s proposition is problematic. In the literature, Grice’s derivation of quantity implicature has been questioned and alternative accounts have emerged. In this paper, I examine two accounts for the derivation of quantity implicature and try to compare and contrast these two accounts. First, the symmetry problem in Grice’s derivation of quantity implicature is elaborated. Second, the Neo-Gricean and Relevance Theory accounts for the derivation of quantity implicature are explained. Finally, I compare and contrast the two different accounts for the derivation of quantity implicature.

quantity implicature, Grice, Neo-Griceans, Relevance Theory

I. Introduction

Quantity implicature is not an entailment but an implication of an utterance which can be cancelled without seeming to be contradictory. What implicature the communicator will derive goes beyond the semantics and syntax of the utterance; it also depends on what contextual assumptions are used. Grice proposes the Cooperative Principle and Conversational maxims of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner and claims that the communicator should observe CP and these maxims in communication. As regarding to quantity implicature, Grice says that the Quantity maxim should be employed to derive quantity implicatures. However, the symmetry problem exists in the derivation of the quantity implicatures. Let me use the following example to illustrate this problem:

(1)Eventhough2014hasseensomeeconomicrecovery,shoppersremaindecidedlycautious.

Following the Quantity maxim, people can derive the ‘not total’ implication from the relevance of ‘total’, and people can also derive the ‘total’ implication from relevance of ‘some and not total’. But people only intuitively get the ‘not total’ implication from relevance of ‘total’, i.e. people intuitively get the quantity implicature that the economic recovery is not a total recovery. This is a big problem that Grice’s theory can not account for.

Ⅱ. Neo-Griceans’ Derivation of Quantity Implicature

Neo-Griceans basically agree with Grice’s account of quantity implicature. The Q-Principle by Neo-Griceans is an adaptation of Grice’s first quantity maxim:

“The Q Principle (Hearer-based):

MAKE YOUR CONTRIBUTION SUFFICIENT

SAY AS MUCH AS YOU CAN (Given R)”

Horn (1984)

“Q-Principle

Speaker’s maxim: Do not provide a statement that is informationally weaker than your knowledge of the world allows, unless providing an informationally stronger statement would contravene the I-Principle. Specifically, select the informationally strongest paradigmatic alternate that is consistent with the facts.

Recipient’s corollary: Take it that the speaker made the strongest statement consistent with what he knows…”

Levinson (2000)

The Neo-Gricean account for quantity implicatures differs from Grice’s in mainly two ways. First, while Grice’s maxim tells speakers to ‘give as much information as required’, Neo-Griceans’ Q-principle tells speakers to ‘say as much as you can’; Second, Neo-Griceans introduce Horn scales for the derivation of quantity implicatures. A Horn scale is an ordered set of expressions that supplies the alternatives upon which quantity implicatures turn. Some common Horn scales are <‘a(chǎn)ll’, ‘most’, ‘many’, ‘some’>, <‘a(chǎn)nd’, ‘or’>, <‘hot’, ‘warm’> … Neo-Griceans use the Horn Scales to solve the Symmetry Problem in Grice’s account for the derivation of quantity implicatures. Neo-Griceans place a ‘lexicalization constraint’ on scales, i.e. members of a scale should be lexicalized to the same extent. For the derivation of quantity implicature using the example (1), Neo-Griceans claim that <‘some’, ‘total’> rather than <‘some’, ‘some and not total’> can form a Horn scale since ‘some’ and ‘not total’ are not lexicalized to the same extent. In this way, Neo-Griceans seem to successfully account for why people can only intuitively derive the ‘not total economic recovery’ implicature. However, problems still exist in the lexicalization constraint. Monotonicity constraint and others are proposed to improve the Horn scale constraint.

Ⅲ. Relevance Theory’s Account for Quantity Implicature

The Relevance theory takes a different stance to account for the derivation of quantity implicature. The theory is based on two general claims about the role of relevance in cognition and communication:

“Cognitive Principle of Relevance:

Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance.”

“Communicative Principle of Relevance:

Every act of overt communication conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance.”

Wilson and Sperber (2004)

According to Relevance theory, it is the role of relevance in cognition and communication that we presume to infer the purpose of the conversation. Hearers interpret the speaker’s meaning following “presumption of optimal relevance”:

“Presumption of optimal relevance

(a) The utterance is relevant enough to be worth processing.

(b) It is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator’s abilities and preferences.”

“Relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure

a. Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: Test interpretive hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc.) in order of accessibility.

b. Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied.”

Wilson and Sperber (2004)

By listening to the utterance of example (1), the hearer can have access to three contextual assumptions that would lead to effects if the economic recovery isnone, orsomel, ortotal. According to Relevance theory the hearer would derive the quantity implicature that the economic recovery is total by appeal to clause (b) of the definition of optimal relevance. The inference follows the idea that the hearer can derive adequate effects from the assumption that the economic recovery is some, it should be evident that the hearer would derive more effects from the equally accessible assumption that the economic recovery is total because the total economic recovery assumption is more relevant. The speaker would violate the “presumption of optimal relevance” if he or she had thought the economic recovery is total. The speaker does not utter that the economic recovery is total. It must be that the speaker does not think it is total. Therefore the quantity implicature must be that the economic recovery is not total.

Assuming that the speaker would expect the hear to reason this way and doing so increases the overall effects derivable in an equally accessible context of assumptions as the adequate effects were derived, the first interpretation that satisfies expectations of optimal relevance is the one that includes the quantity implicature.

However, there exist three assumptions: the economic recovery isnone, orsomel, ortotal. Why do we choose ‘total’ as the alternative rather than ‘some and not total’? Relevance Theory appeals to the accessibility of alternative forms and contexts. For the accessibility of alternative forms, the Relevance theory appeals to the well known fact that linguistic forms can prime other linguistic forms i.e. ‘some’ primes ‘total’ rather than ‘not total’. The activation of ‘total’ would activate its meaning and may lead to the activation of contextual assumptions that make ‘total’ relevant. For the accessibility of contextual assumptions, the Relevance Theory appeals to the well known fact that negative propositions are harder to contextualize (Wason 1965, Nieuwland & Kuperberg 2008). This means, other things equal, the more accessible context in which the weak statement would be adequately relevant would be more likely contain contextual assumptions that give rise to S rather than not S. For example, the more accessible context in which ‘some’ would be adequately relevant would be more likely to contain contextual assumptions that give rise to ‘total’ rather than ‘not total’.

Ⅳ. The Comparison and Contrast

Both the Neo-Gricean and Relevance Theory treat the derivation of quantity implicature in terms of inferential pragmatic principles. However, they diverge in two features which will be accounted in detail later.

The idea inferential communication is the basis of Neo-Gricean and Relevance Theory. They inherit the inferential view of communication from Grice. Inferential communication refers to the communicator exploiting the mind-reading abilities of the addressee. According to these theories, people understand communication by paying attention to the communicator’s mental state, i.e. by inferring specific intentions the communicator have by appealing to Theory of Mind (ToM). ToM abilities, unique to humans, are the abilities to predict or explain people’s behaviors. Quantity implicatures could be explained by applying ToM to the communicator’s communicative intentions. Neo-Gricean and Relevance Theory, and Grice’s theory, are all concerned with how people get the interpretation people intuitively get. Gricean, Neo-Gricean and Relevance Theory all apply ToM to account for implicatures.

Although both Neo-Gricean and Relevance theory inherit the inferential view of communication, they diverge in mainly two features.

The first difference is that Neo-Griceans, same as Grice’s theory, appeal to some additional principles or maxims to derive implicatures. For Neo-Griceans, they employ the Q-Principle as mentioned above to derive quantity implicature. Relevance Theory does not appeal to separate Q-Principles to derive quantity implicatures. Relevance in Relevance Theory is a quantitative notion which increases with informativeness. Wilson & Sperber (2004) propose the Communicative principle of Relevance which says that ‘Every ostensive stimulus conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance’. The presumption of optimal relevance can have the same kind of consequences as a presumption that the speaker is being adequately informative.

The second difference is the role that accessibility of contextual assumptions plays. Neo-Griceans treat Generalized implicatures as context-independently and being default unless there are indications in the context to the contrary. Implicatures that are not default are treated as particularized implicatures which need specific features of the context. The Neo-Griceans introduced the idea of scales in the derivation of quantity implicature. Horn scales, which is an ordered set of expressions, supplies the alternatives upon which Q-implicatures turn. The neo-Gricean theory imposes lexicalization constraint on scales, which states that members of a scale should be lexicalized to the same extent. According to the lexicalization constraint, <‘some and not

total’, ‘some’> could not be possible since ‘some and not total’ and ‘some’ are not lexicalized to the same extent. Instead, we can only have < ‘total’, ‘some’>. The idea is that with the Horn scales and the Q-Principles (‘give as much information as you can’) one can derive the scalar implicatures context-independently, unless there are indications to the contrary. In other words, only one assumption is accessible according to the Noe-Gricean theory. For Relevance Theory, the derivation of quantity implicature is context-dependent. The contextual assumptions that lead to a stronger alternative are as accessible as the context that makes the weaker alternative relevant. A quantity implicature is derived in contexts where the weaker alternative is adequately relevant but the stronger alternative would have been more relevant in an equally accessible context. I have mentioned previously the reason why in Relevance theory’s view that other things equal, the more accessible context in which the weak statement would be adequately relevant would be more likely contain contextual assumptions that give rise to S rather than not S. So, we can see that Neo-Gricean and Relevance theory differ in the view whether the derivation of quantity implicature is context-dependent or not.

Ⅴ. Conclusion

To sum up, both Neo-Gricean and Relevance theory inherit Grice’s view of the inferential way of communication. They differ in that Neo-Griceans employ additional Q-Principle for the derivation of quantity implicature while Relevance theory does not rely on additional principle. More importantly, they differ in the view whether the derivation of quantity implicature is context-dependent or not.

[1]Horn, L. 1984. A new taxonomy for pragmatic inference: Q based and R based implicature[C]//D. Schiffrin. Meaning, Form and Use in Context (GURT '84), 11-42. Washington: Georgetown University Press.

[2] Levinson, S. 2000. Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature[M].Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[3] Nieuwland, M. S., Kuperberg, G. R. 2008. When the truth is not too hard to handle an event-related potential study on the pragmatics of negation[J].Psychological Science, 19(12): 1213-1218.

[4] Wason, P. C. 1965. The contexts of plausible denial[J].Journal of verbal learning and verbal behavior, 4(1): 7-11.

[5] Wilson, D., Sperber, D. 2004. Relevance theory[C]//L. Horn, G. Ward. Handbook of Pragmatics (607-632).

張玉鵬，男，河南安陽人，安陽工學(xué)院外國語學(xué)院講師，碩士研究生，研究方向：語言學(xué)。

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新格萊斯主義和關(guān)聯(lián)論對(duì)數(shù)量含義的推導(dǎo)分析

張玉鵬

(安陽工學(xué)院 外國語學(xué)院，河南 安陽 455002)

對(duì)于數(shù)量含義的推導(dǎo)，格萊斯會(huì)話含義理論存在一定的問題。其隨后出現(xiàn)的語用理論推導(dǎo)機(jī)制主要有新格萊斯主義和關(guān)聯(lián)論。本文對(duì)比比較新格萊斯主義和關(guān)聯(lián)論對(duì)數(shù)量含義的推導(dǎo)方法。文章首先闡述格萊斯會(huì)話含義理論推到數(shù)量含義時(shí)存在的對(duì)稱問題；其次，解釋新格萊斯主義和關(guān)聯(lián)論對(duì)數(shù)量含義的推導(dǎo)機(jī)制；最后，對(duì)這兩種數(shù)量含義的推導(dǎo)機(jī)制做一對(duì)比比較。

數(shù)量含義； 格萊斯； 新格萊斯主義； 關(guān)聯(lián)論